

Source: Bopha Shelter Cluster

**The Philippines Shelter Cluster in response to Typhoon Bopha / Pablo**

1 July 2014

Sara Davidson

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**Abbreviations and acronyms**

ASDSW A Single Drop for Safe Water

CRS Catholic Relief Services

DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development

DROMIC Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center

DRP Disaster Response Partnership

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

HC Humanitarian Coordinator

HCT Humanitarian Country Team

HLP Housing, Land and Property

HRC Humanitarian Response Consortium

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IEC Information, Education, and Communication

IDP Internally displaced person

IOM International Organisation for Migration

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies

NDRRMC National Disaster Risk Reduction and Monitoring Council

NGO Non-governmental organisation

OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PAGASA [Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Atmospheric,_Geophysical_and_Astronomical_Services_Administration)

SAG Strategic Advisory Group

Sitrep Situation report

TWIG Technical working group

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNISDR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

WASH Water, sanitation and hygiene

WEF World Economic Forum

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I am grateful to Madame Maria Elena S. Labrador, Shelter Cluster chair, and her colleagues from the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Davao Region who described their work during the Bopha response in a group discussion in Davao City arranged at short notice. Similarly, Randy Loy and his colleagues in the Compostela Valley chapter of the Philippines Red Cross came to Davao City to share their experience of work with the Shelter Cluster.

Many of the recommendations in this review draw on suggestions by informants but all errors and omissions are my own.

Sara Davidson

**Executive summary**

Typhoon Bopha (local name Pablo) made landfall on the east coast of Mindanao on 4 December 2012. It affected over 6.2 million people. Though preparedness measures saved many lives, more than 1,100 people were killed. Approximately 160,000 homes were damaged, one third irreparably, primarily in Eastern Mindanao. This is one of the poorest parts of the Philippines and one that is also affected by long-term conflict from several sources.

The ferocity and trajectory of Typhoon Bopha were unprecedented and local capacity was overwhelmed. On 6 December 2012, the President of the Philippines accepted an offer of international assistance. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) asked IFRC to support the government in shelter coordination in the administrative regions of Davao and Caraga.

This evaluation was commissioned by the IFRC. Its purpose was to review the effectiveness of support provided by IFRC’s Shelter Coordination Team and to identify key lessons and recommendations which can improve and inform future response. Evaluation methodology consisted of document review, a visit to the Philippines lasting ten days, semi-structured interviews, group interviews and written responses involving a total of approximately 35 informants. The evaluation considers primarily the period when IFRC’s Shelter Coordination Team was in Mindanao, from December 2012 to May 2013.

The evaluation was originally scheduled to take place during 2013 and its postponement presented a number of challenges. Many informants felt that their recollection of Bopha was by now poor and some documentation was no longer available. However, the cluster deployment had informed a 2013 evaluation of IFRC’s global commitment to shelter and shelter coordination, and the shelter response was evaluated on behalf of the cluster in July 2013.

Anticipating OCHA’s request for coordination in December 2012, IFRC responded very fast to the typhoon. It drew on regional and standby personnel to supply initial surge capacity and deployed a shelter coordinator from the Asia-Pacific Zone before Bopha made landfall. The delegation in Manila was supportive of the cluster and helped recruit a local logistics and liaison officer.

The core Shelter Coordination Team included a cluster coordinator, information manager and technical coordinator. Personnel were provided by IFRC National Societies in Australia, Britain and Switzerland. Global partner REACH supplied personnel to lead assessment, monitoring and response evaluation. For the first time, the Shelter Cluster recruited a team member from the private sector via its partnership with the World Economic Forum.

The Shelter Coordination Team was viewed by counterparts and cluster partners as skilled, collaborative and impartial. The relationship between IFRC and the government worked well: the Shelter Coordination Team, supported by global focal points brought skills and experience from previous shelter emergencies which complemented the role of DSWD in Mindanao. There was mutual trust and respect.

Staff of IFRC and its co-lead, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) also worked well together. IOM’s workload combined operational and coordination roles in both shelter and camp management. This workload, coupled with access issues that affected most Shelter Cluster partners, contributed to the slow start of provincial coordination. A written terms of reference, recommended by IASC when cluster leadership is shared, might have helped the lead agencies clarify and negotiate roles and accountabilities.

Although IFRC was praised for the speed of personnel deployment, lack of funding resulted in short contracts for most Shelter Coordination Team members. The team’s future was uncertain before it had been in Mindanao a month. Funding difficulties contributed to staff turnover and to departure of a reduced team in May 2013. Finance for shelter coordination was considered in the 2013 global evaluation of shelter commitment. Its recommendations on cluster funding are among the priorities for IFRC’s Shelter and Settlements Department in 2014.

The Shelter Coordination Team was also seen as too small for the scale of a response which, in conformity with national adoption of the cluster approach in the Philippines in 2007, had coordination hubs at multiple administrative levels. The Shelter Cluster strategy assigned co-leadership to IFRC in Davao and Caraga regions, to IOM at provincial level and NGO cluster partners at local level in some areas. Even after security and access restrictions on the Shelter Coordination Team had been lifted, however, the Shelter Coordination Team’s capacity was too small to provide support to hubs in both regions in a complex operating environment.

However, partnership with REACH expanded the Shelter Coordination Team’s capacity in shelter needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation in the worst affected coastal and inland areas. REACH recruited large numbers of local staff and volunteers to conduct surveys for these processes. The previously untested IFRC-WEF partnership, involving staff of Fluor Philippines, contributed to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and has potential in future deployments. However, it raised a number of questions about expectations and procedures, which must be satisfactorily resolved before the experience is repeated.

The Shelter Coordination Team rapidly equipped an office in Davao City and the first Shelter Cluster meeting, chaired by DSWD, took place less than a week after the typhoon made landfall. Approximately 35 organisations attended Shelter Cluster meetings in the period for which records are available but a smaller number had access to emergency shelter funding. In addition to the cluster lead agencies, those participating most regularly in cluster activities were Catholic Relief Services (CRS), IOM, OCHA, Plan International, Save the Children and the Humanitarian Response Consortium, a group of five national and international NGOs.

Information management and a website were established early and maintained throughout the IFRC-led team’s deployment. The role of the information manager was invaluable in reconciling differences in government figures on shelter needs. Information management was challenged by inexperience in stock recording and data collection at local level, where clusters were new and some local donors were not coordinating with government or clusters. The Shelter Cluster’s rapid shelter needs assessment also began early, within a week of the disaster and, despite considerable security and logistics challenges, provided credible information and evidence for cluster partners and the Bopha Humanitarian Appeal.

Professionally drawn leaflets illustrating shelter resilience techniques were developed by a group of partners, working with the cluster’s technical coordinator. These were one of the most popular outputs of the cluster. With financial assistance from IOM, six thousand leaflets were printed and distributed by partners. Training on shelter DRR was delivered by successive technical coordinators to over 150 persons in government and non-government organisations. Advocacy concerns were identified and incorporated into OCHA documents, messages for donors and several newspaper and social media articles.

Shelter Cluster assessment, monitoring and evaluation sought the views of affected people in shaping the response and measuring results. This was the first time that an IFRC-led team had been able to complete all three processes. Accountability to the affected population could have been strengthened by adding a feedback loop. This would have enabled affected communities that had participated in field research to know what findings were and to shelter partners to account. Accountability could also have been strengthened by greater participation of local NGOs in the Strategic Advisory Group. Research for the cluster on legal issues showed how this might be done.

“Handover” by IFRC to DSWD in May 2014 included written guidance on information management, a revised Strategic Operational Framework, recommendations on legal questions such as no-build zones and the rights of people living in them. “Handover”, DRR training and shelter resilience leaflets further contributed to capacity-building in Eastern Mindanao and to the work of the Shelter Cluster after the Bohol earthquake and Typhoon Haiyan. The Shelter Cluster could use similar leaflets to raise awareness of the cluster approach in the Philippines and to emphasise the importance of evacuation warnings: evacuation of shelter would have saved more lives in Typhoons Washi, Bopha and Haiyan.

Shelter Cluster partners had been expected to assist 85,000 families at the start of the response. By May 2013 when the IFRC-led team left, partners had been able to provide significant shelter support to approximately 65,000 families. Thousands were still living in evacuation centres and spontaneous settlements in tents or makeshift shelters. Most of the families assisted had received only emergency shelter assistance. Least well-served were families living in no-build zones. Reasons for the shortfall in Shelter Cluster documentation point to the lack of emergency funding - by May 2013, less than half the total 15.5 million US dollars requested through the overall humanitarian appeal had been received - and still unclear designation of no-build zones.

IFRC is currently seeking funding for a permanent or long-term shelter coordination role in the Philippines. This will assist future teams in understanding context and recurring problems and in promoting the cluster approach. It is clear, however, that any long-term coordination role must be supported with advocacy on shelter funding.

The evaluation makes a number of recommendations. Some of these echo those made in the evaluation of the Washi Shelter Cluster in 2012 and others are being addressed in the wake of the global shelter evaluation of 2013. In particular, IFRC should prioritise appointment of a permanent or long-term Philippines shelter coordinator. The Philippines has a high level of vulnerability to disaster and its government a strong commitment to preparedness and coordination: if the cluster approach cannot work in Philippines it is hard to see where it can work. On the evidence of the Bopha response, however, advocacy on funding for emergency shelter and shelter coordination will also be necessary.

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Cluster leadership** |
| R1 | Prioritise appointment of a long-term shelter coordinator in Philippines, in accordance with Washi review recommendations and ongoing discussions. |
| R2 | In accordance with IASC cluster guidance, draw up a memorandum of understanding setting out the roles of co-lead agencies and how to proceed if commitments are difficult to fulfil. |
|  | **Cluster personnel** |
| R3 | Brief all national and international Shelter Coordination Team members, including those deployed by partners, on security before and during deployment, in accordance with Washi review recommendations and Sphere standards. |
| R4 | Recruit shelter coordination team members for longer, in accordance with global shelter review recommendations. |
| R5 | Enhance diversity in core coordination teams, in accordance with Sphere standards. |
| R6 | Make full use of SOPs when deploying staff of partner agencies. Review generic job descriptions to ensure these reflect local security, requirements, expectations and capacity. |
| R7 | Ensure adequate handover, regular support and feedback, particularly for staff working alone. |
|  | **Supporting shelter service delivery** |
| R8 | Inform partners what they can expect of the Shelter Cluster. Remind all humanitarian actors of their duty to coordinate, if necessary using the IASC Minimum Commitments and / or Sphere standards. |
| R9 | Ensure frequently used technical and non-technical terms have consistent definitions that are readily understood by non-specialists. |
| R10 | Review generic terms of reference to ensure those of e.g. hubs, SAG or focal point role match requirements, expectations and agency / cluster capacity at local level. |
| R11 | Include use and maintenance of Dropbox and secure data storage in Shelter Coordination Team training and briefing. |
| R12 | Consider whether alternatives / parallels to Sharepoint are appropriate (see also WASHI cluster review recommendations). |
|  | **Strategy, policy and standards** |
| R13 | With partners, review strategy documents to ensure documents made public are complete and up to date. |
| R14 | Promote common understanding of *cross-cutting* and *inter-cluster* issues as well as any issues specific to the response. |
|  | **Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy** |
| R15 | Continue to use REACH in processes of assessment, monitoring and evaluation. Use these processes to strengthen feedback and accountability to affected people (see R19). |
| R16 | Encourage coordinating bodies to include IFRC Shelter Coordination Team (in Philippines or Zone) in after-action reviews. |
|  | **Advocacy and communication** |
| R17 | Include advocacy in Shelter Cluster strategies. |
| R18 | Match commitment to permanent / long-term shelter coordination in Philippines with global support for advocacy and fundraising. |
|  | **Accountability to affected persons** |
| R19 | Strengthen accountability by communicating the findings of assessments, monitoring and evaluation to the communities that contributed to them, and by showcasing the accountability work of partners. |
|  | **Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building** |
| R20 | Build on experience of Bopha cluster in IEC development to support the government in raising awareness of shelter preparedness and coordination structures in the Philippines. |
| R21 | With their permission and in accordance with data protection principles, maintain a list of agencies and individuals participating in cluster technical training or trained as enumerators for possible use in preparedness and future coordination. |
| R22 | Ensure that shelter DRR and materials reinforce warnings about the need for timely evacuation as well as the strengthening of shelter. |

# 1 Introduction

# 1.1 Purpose, scope and clients

This evaluation was commissioned by the IFRC. Its purpose is to review the effectiveness of coordination support services provided by the IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Team during the response to Typhoon Bopha and to identify key lessons and recommendations which can improve and inform future response.

The period covered by the evaluation is December 2012 to May 2013 when the Shelter Cluster was co-led by IFRC and the Philippines Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). This evaluation considers only IFRC’s contribution to shelter coordination. Shelter response was considered in an evaluation conducted in July 2013.[[1]](#footnote-1)

In addition to appraisal against the core cluster functions established by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the evaluation also considers leadership and personnel issues, in accordance with its terms of reference.

**1.2 Humanitarian reform and the transformative agenda**

The humanitarian reform process was initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2005 to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, coordination and partnership.

Humanitarian reform is based on three ‘pillars’, intended to address systemic weaknesses in response.

1. The *cluster approach*: addressing the need for ‘adequate capacity and predictable leadership in all sectors’ of humanitarian response.
2. *Humanitarian financing*: addressing the need for ‘adequate, timely and flexible financing’ of humanitarian response, notably through the Central Emergency Response Fund.
3. *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening*: addressing the need for *‘effective leadership and coordination in emergencies’* by the senior UN figure in country [[2]](#footnote-2)

Humanitarian reform acknowledges that effective response depends on the quality of *partnership* between the UN agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Red Cross/Red Crescent agencies that respond globally to emergencies. Commitment to partnershipbetween these constituencies was endorsed through a set of principles developed in 2007.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Of particular relevance to the present report is the cluster approach. However, the other ‘pillars’ - *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening*, *humanitarian finance* and *partnership -* are interlinked drivers of effectiveness and quality.

International response to the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods in 2010 exposed a number of systemic weaknesses and inefficiencies. Because of these, the IASC Principals reviewed the approach to multilateral humanitarian response and made further adjustments. In December 2011, the IASC principals agreed to a set of actions known as the *Transformative Agenda*, which aims to improve further leadership, coordination, and accountability of humanitarian interventions.

## **1.3 The cluster approach**

The cluster approach aims to address gaps and strengthen response in specific sectors of international humanitarian response. At global level, there are eleven clusters. Global lead agencies are responsible for setting standards and policy, building response capacity, and providing operational support to a cluster deployed at country level. At country level, the cluster approach is expected to ensure a coherent and effective sectoral response.

## 1.4 The Shelter Cluster

The Shelter Cluster coordinates the work of organizations involved in the provision of humanitarian shelter. At country level, UNHCR normally leads the cluster when a crisis is related to a conflict which results in internal displacement. If the crisis is related to a natural disaster, IFRC usually leads the Shelter Cluster.[[4]](#footnote-4) However, in different countries and at different phases of a response, other agencies, including the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UN-Habitat and NGOs may also lead or co-lead.

More information on the Shelter Cluster and the names of global Shelter Cluster partners can be found at: [www.sheltercluster.org](http://www.sheltercluster.org/)

**2. Methodology**

**2.1 Evaluation methodology**

a) Document review

b) Visit to Philippines lasting ten days

c) Semi-structured interviews (face to face in Manila; phone and Skype in Manila and UK); group interviews (Mindanao); written communication. These involved approximately 35 informants

e) Compilation and submission of draft report.

**2.2 Constraints**

This review had originally been timed to coincide with or follow the Shelter Cluster evaluation of the shelter response in 2013. However, workloads in Geneva and the deployment of Shelter Coordination Teams after the Bohol earthquake in October 2013 and Typhoon Haiyan / Yolanda in November 2013 all contributed to its postponement.

The postponement presented a number of challenges. The IFRC Shelter Coordination Team left Mindanao in May 2013. By April 2014, contact lists were out of date. Field research followed Holy Week, a major Christian festival in the Philippines where offices are closed for 2-3 working days. Some informants were on extended leave before and after the holiday.

Many informants felt that their recollection of Bopha was by now poor. The response to Typhoon Haiyan was uppermost in the mind of some though Haiyan provided a useful point for comparison and contrast with Bopha. Notwithstanding the passage of time, descriptions of events seemed generally consistent and conformed with documented information.

Deployment of the Bopha Shelter Cluster coincided with a major evaluation of IFRC’s global shelter commitment in 2012-2013. Findings on funding and staffing in the Bopha deployment were therefore among sources of recommendations on which IFRC is now acting.[[5]](#footnote-5)

1. **3 Background and context**

**3.1 Context of the 2012-13 emergency response**

1. **Background and context**

Typhoon Bopha (PAGASA name: Pablo)[[6]](#footnote-6), first made landfall at Baganga on the east coast of Mindanao at 4.45 a.m. on 4 December 2012. It was the sixteenth to hit the Philippines in 2012 and the most powerful ever to hit the island of Mindanao.

Bopha was a Category 5 super typhoon with winds of 160 mph (260 km/h). Ithad double the rainfall and three times the wind strength of Tropical Storm Washi (PAGASA: Sendong) which had struck northern Mindanao a year earlier. Preparedness measures put in place after Washi saved many lives. More than 167,000 people were evacuated to shelters. [[7]](#footnote-7) Nevertheless, a total of 1,146 people were killed by the typhoon and by floods and landslides that followed. Globally, this represented the largest number of people known to have been killed by natural disaster in 2012.[[8]](#footnote-8) Approximately 900 people are still missing.

Bopha affected over 6.2 million people. On this measure, it was second only to Typhoon Haiyan (PAGASA name: Yolanda) in the Philippines in the period between 1900 and 2014.[[9]](#footnote-9) Worst affected by Bopha were the regions of Davao (also known as Region XI: see map at Figure 1) and Caraga (Region XIII).

The provinces worst affected were Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley in Davao Region, and Surigao del Sur and Agusan del Sur in Caraga.[[10]](#footnote-10) Davao Oriental and Agusan del Sur are among the poorest provinces in in the Philippines. At the time of the disaster, 40 per cent of the population of Caraga were living below the poverty line. Chronic malnutrition in Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley was 49 per cent and 36 per cent respectively. [[11]](#footnote-11) Indigenous groups make up 20-40 per cent of the population of Caraga and over 40 per cent of the population of Davao Region.[[12]](#footnote-12) Between 60 and 80 per cent of those affected by Typhoon Bopha were indigenous people.[[13]](#footnote-13)

**Figure 1. Mindanao regions**



Source: maps@mindanaomaps.com

Poverty in Mindanao is driven by longstanding conflict whose roots lie in the colonial dispossession of Muslims and indigenous peoples, and the corporate exploitation of land, minerals and other natural resources. Between 2008 and 2011, the Abu Sayyaf group conducted a series of kidnappings for ransom in western Mindanao. In October 2012, the Communist New People’s Army attacked private mining operations in Surigao del Norte (Caraga), killing three security guards. Private armies, vigilantes, clan militias and death squads are perceived as operating with impunity throughout the Philippines, including in Mindanao.[[14]](#footnote-14) Approximately 44,000 people were displaced by armed conflict in Eastern Mindanao between 2008 and 2012.[[15]](#footnote-15) Those areas most affected were north-eastern Caraga and Davao Region hence people affected by Typhoon Bopha were also likely to have suffered forced displacement at least once before.[[16]](#footnote-16)

A total of158,768 homes were damaged, one third irreparably, by the typhoon and its aftermath. Roads and bridges were demolished and/or rendered impassable. Sources of livelihood, primarily banana and coconut plantations, were destroyed. Compostela Valley had been the centre of the country’s banana export industry, the third largest in the world, which represented the primary source of income for approximately 150,000 people.[[17]](#footnote-17) Davao Oriental, the country’s main producer of copra, saw 60 per cent of coconut plantations destroyed. The total cost of damage to public infrastructure and agricultural land was estimated at 830 million US dollars.[[18]](#footnote-18)

**3.2 Shelter Cluster roll-out**

The frequency of natural disaster in the Philippines and the country’s level of vulnerability has resulted in legislation on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and the institution of clusters in national, regional and provincial government structures. In 2007, Philippines government circular NDCC 5 designated DSWD Shelter Cluster lead, with IFRC and UN-Habitat its international counterparts.[[19]](#footnote-19)

On 6 December 2012, the President declared a state of calamity and accepted an offer of international assistance. On 10 December 2012, the United Nations and humanitarian partners launched an appeal for 65 million US dollars to provide immediate lifesaving aid and support to those affected by the typhoon. The appeal included a request for 10.5 million US dollars for immediate shelter assistance by Shelter Cluster partners. On 25 January, a revised appeal for 76 million US dollars, based on assessments undertaken by clusters, was launched.

IFRC launched a preliminary appeal on 5 December 2012 to support response by the Philippines Red Cross. The total of 4.5 million Swiss francs included 112,038 francs to cover the costs of Shelter Cluster coordination.

IFRC had been an active member of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in the Philippines prior to Bopha. It was involved in disaster preparedness activities and had led the Shelter Cluster in response to earlier emergencies, including tropical storm Washi in Northern Mindanao the previous year. In line with the government’s adoption of the cluster approach in 2007 and following discussions between IFRC, OCHA, IOM and UN Habitat, on 3 December 2012, OCHA asked IFRC to co-lead the Shelter Cluster, supporting DSWD, the government department responsible for emergency shelter.

IFRC responded rapidly. Its Shelter Coordinator in the Asia Pacific Zone had travelled from Kuala Lumpur to Manila before Bopha made landfall and became Field Coordinator. With support from global focal points and IFRC, the Shelter Cluster began work immediately, setting up at national level in Manila and at regional level in Davao City. The IFRC delegation assigned a local staff member to support the Shelter Coordination Team with logistics and liaison.

Two staff of partner agency REACH arrived in Philippines on 6-7 December to provide the Shelter Coordination Team with assessment capacity. The first Shelter Coordination Team meeting took place on 8 December. A rapid Shelter Cluster strategy meeting chaired by DSWD was held on 9 December in Davao City. The shelter needs assessment began on 10 December and the first meeting of the Shelter Cluster took place on 11 December.

This was the fourth time since 2006 that the IFRC had deployed a Shelter Coordination Team in the Philippines. It did so again twice in the next twelve months in response to the earthquake in Bohol and Typhoon Haiyan / Yolanda (see Annex 2).

# 4 Findings

## 4.1 Leadership

The Philippines government is seen as a leader in respect of legislation on DRR. The Philippines Climate Change Act became law in 2009 and the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (RA 10121) in May 2010. The government’s approach places international agencies in an auxiliary role. [[20]](#footnote-20) As noted above, it allocated responsibility for Shelter Cluster leadership to DSWD with IFRC and UN-Habitat as international counterparts. However, the cluster approach had not been instituted in subsequent legislation and understanding of it was uneven.

IFRC co-led the cluster at national level in Manila and regional level in Davao City. Because IFRC’s mandate precludes it from working in conflict areas, it agreed with IOM that IOM would provide coordination and information management at provincial level and in areas affected by conflict. [[21]](#footnote-21) After the IFRC-led team left in May 2013, IOM became technical coordinator.

Co-leadership between IFRC and the government worked well. The speed and flexibility of the IFRC Shelter Coordination Team and the experience it brought from previous emergencies supported the lead role of DSWD in Mindanao. Leadership at provincial, municipal and *barangay* (village, district or ward)[[22]](#footnote-22) level was less clear-cut. The need for immediate establishment of multiple coordination hubs had been recognized after Tropical Storm Washi.[[23]](#footnote-23) However, the trajectory, extent and ferocity of Typhoon Bopha overwhelmed preparedness, response and coordination capacity.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Staff of IFRC and IOM worked well together and both agencies facilitated cluster meetings in Davao City and Tagum. However, there were differences about roles and responsibilities. IOM had a larger staff and more vehicles than IFRC’s coordination team. Like most other agencies working at provincial, municipal or barangay level, it confronted access difficulties. In addition, IOM had a workload that combined programme and coordination responsibilities in camp management as well as in shelter. Its programme responsibilities were seen as conflicting with its coordination role during and after the period when IFRC led the Shelter Coordination Team.

In 2012, IASC recommended the use of written agreements where clusters are jointly led:

*Terms of reference or memoranda of understanding must [emphasis in original] be developed to ensure a common understanding of roles and responsibilities with the leadership arrangement within a specific context, as well as common accountabilities.* [[25]](#footnote-25)

Such an agreement could have helped clarify roles in the Bopha response and, importantly, alternatives if arrangements needed to change.

In a country as vulnerable to natural disaster as the Philippines, such problems are likely to recur. Action by IFRC, IOM, UN-Habitat and OCHA to institute and fund a permanent or long-term shelter coordinator, under discussion before Typhoon Bopha and at the time of this report, should be a priority.

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Cluster leadership** |
| R1 | Prioritise appointment of a long-term shelter coordinator in Philippines, in accordance with Washi review recommendations and ongoing discussions. |
| R2 | In accordance with IASC cluster guidance, draw up a memorandum of understanding setting out the roles of co-lead agencies and how to proceed if commitments are difficult to fulfil. |

**4. 2 Cluster personnel**

1. **Capacity**

*The cluster team came out really fast … a good solid group of people.[[26]](#footnote-26)*

*They come in with dedicated capacity [for coordination,] not like some other clusters. And the people they send out are technically competent.[[27]](#footnote-27)*

*They needed more people in the SCT. It was really a big emergency. [[28]](#footnote-28)*

*I feel that IFRC should have maintained their cluster lead until about September, to hand over more fully to the provincial governments of Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental as government plans and funding took hold.[[29]](#footnote-29)*

Dedicated coordination personnel were deployed swiftly in accordance with IASC criteria. Surge capacity was deployed before the typhoon and within three days of it making landfall using IFRC’s regional and focal points for shelter, coordination and information management. They were followed by staff of National Societies, partner organisations and the Asia-Pacific regional office (see Table 1). At the start of the response, one coordinator was based in Manila to liaise with stakeholders there. The IFRC delegation provided a local staff member throughout the deployment. All but four of the team were male.

The Shelter Cluster deployed specialist support for assessment in accordance with the IASC criteria. IFRC’s partnership with REACH, tested for the first time in the WASHI response, provided additional expertise and capacity who in turn recruited a large number of local staff and volunteers (see Section 4.4b).

**Table 1 IFRC Shelter coordination team, Typhoon Bopha, 2012-2013**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **SCT member** | **Status** | **Agency** | **Started** | **Finished** |
| Cluster Coordinator (1) Davao City | International | IFRC / Asia-Pacific Zone focal point | December | December |
| Cluster Coordinator (2) \* (Manila) | International | IFRC / global cluster focal point | December | December |
| Cluster Coordinator (3) | International | Australian Red Cross | December | January |
| Assessment Team Leader | International | IMPACT (REACH) | December | January |
| GIS Expert \* | International | ACTED (REACH) | December | January |
| Cluster Coordinator (4) | International | Australian Red Cross | January | March |
| Assessment Coordinator | International | IMPACT (REACH) | February | March |
| Cluster Coordinator (5) | International | Swiss Red Cross | March | May |
| Information Manager (1) | International | Canadian Red Cross / global cluster focal point | December | December |
| Information Manager (2) | International | IFRC consultant | December | March |
| Logistics, liaison, Information Manager (3) | National | IFRC delegation Philippines | December | May |
| Technical Coordinator (1) | International | British Red Cross | December | February |
| Technical Coordinator (2) \* | International | IFRC / Shelter and Settlements Department | February | March |
| Technical Coordinator (3) | National | Fluor Philippines (WEF DRP) | March | March |
| Technical Coordinator (4) | National | Fluor Philippines (WEF DRP) | March | April |
| Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Advisor \* | International | IFRC / Asia-Pacific Zone | April | April |

\*Female

The Shelter Coordination Team was viewed by informants as skilled and collaborative. The team maintained a core of coordinator, information manager, technical coordinator and liaison officer until April.

IFRC’s security regulations did not permit the Shelter Coordination Team to travel outside Davao City until the end of December 2012 when IFRC and ICRC reviewed cooperation. Even if the security and logistical restrictions had been lifted earlier, however, the team’s capacity would have been too small to support local hubs. Three weeks after the typhoon, the Shelter Cluster update noted that the coordination team, its own budget affected by under-funding of the response, might have to be withdrawn.[[30]](#footnote-30) The difficulty of funding the Shelter Coordination Team contributed to staff turnover and withdrawal of the team by May 2013.

Finance for shelter coordination was considered in an evaluation commissioned by IFRC’s Secretary General in late 2012. Its recommendations for an alternative cluster funding model were being acted on at the time of the present report. [[31]](#footnote-31)

**b) Staff management and support**

*We always had regular weekly Skype calls with [global focal points] and sometimes [regional focal point] …. I couldn’t tell when [global focal point] was sleeping because [answers] were coming in at different times.[[32]](#footnote-32)*

*Ensure that partners (any organisation that has an agreement with the IFRC and provides support to the Shelter Cluster in the field) are thoroughly briefed on matters of security and any other issue that might be of relevance to their mission, before departure.[[33]](#footnote-33)*

Support to core and assessment team members during the deployment was generally good. Assistance requested by the Shelter Coordination Team was provided promptly by global and regional focal points. Staff of REACH provided training to students with a background in field research and statistics who acted as assessment and monitoring enumerators and data entry staff. IFRC’s focal point for shelter support and training briefed Fluor, IFRC’s private sector partner in Manila, and advised construction engineers without humanitarian experience seconded to the cluster in Mindanao.

Most coordination team members received a handover from their predecessor. In one case this lasted a week though the last coordinator had only 30 minutes. In a situation such as this, where staff are working alone or largely alone, more proactive support from the region or Geneva would have been appropriate.[[34]](#footnote-34) Despite the Dropbox – or maybe because of it: some staff thought it was too easy to delete material– there were gaps in cluster memory.

IFRC security restrictions did not apply to personnel working for REACH. ACTED was responsible for them.[[35]](#footnote-35) Security issues led to access problems for the national assessment team in some areas and withdrawal in others but do not appear to have resonated at cluster level. This may help to explain why questions from another partner, Fluor, on staff security came as a surprise. The Washi cluster review made a number of observations and recommendations on cluster partnerships and security: these need to be revisited and the security risks to national as well as international staff addressed.

1. **Turnover**

*Surge personnel leave soon. I dealt with three different cluster coordinators in three weeks. [[36]](#footnote-36)*

*One of the things that [we] learned was to encourage staff to be on surge for three months. I think IFRC don’t do this.[[37]](#footnote-37)*

*I feel that IFRC should have maintained their cluster lead until about September, to hand over more fully to the provincial governments of Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental as government plans and funding took hold. [[38]](#footnote-38)*

The Shelter Cluster was praised for the speed with which it had deployed surge capacity and the quality of staff throughout the response but it could not maintain continuity. The last coordinator was in post for two months and the second information manager for three but there was a total of five Cluster Coordinators in five months.

While appreciating what each incumbent brought to the coordinator role, almost all informants, both national and international, commented on the frequent turnover and the setback this represented for local knowledge and relationship building. Lack of funding for the Bopha response contributed to short contracts for team members and pressure on recruiters.[[39]](#footnote-39) Cluster funding and recruitment are under review by IFRC following the global shelter evaluation in 2013.

Appointment to the role of technical coordinator did not follow the Standing Operating Procedure when IFRC and Fluor recruited for the role of technical coordinator in March.[[40]](#footnote-40) This resulted in initial recruitment failure because technically qualified candidates in the field of construction did not necessarily have experience in humanitarian response. The partnership thus tested people management and expectations on both sides.

Despite this, it has been cited as an example of good practice. The private sector in the Philippines was quick to respond after Bopha but slower than Fluor Philippines to coordinate its role with that of other humanitarian actors.[[41]](#footnote-41) Fluor Philippines contributed to DRR in Mindanao and is a potential partner in other shelter cluster responses in the country. Procedural issues and security questions must, however, be resolved before the experience is repeated.

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Cluster personnel** |
| R3 | Brief all national and international Shelter Coordination Team members, including those deployed by partners, on security before and during deployment, in accordance with Washi review recommendations and Sphere standards. |
| R4 | Recruit shelter coordination team members for longer, in accordance with global shelter review recommendations. |
| R5 | Enhance diversity in core coordination teams, in accordance with Sphere standards. |
| R6 | Make full use of SOPs when deploying staff of partner agencies. Review generic job descriptions to ensure these reflect local security, requirements, expectations and capacity. |
| R7 | Ensure adequate handover, regular support and feedback, particularly for staff working alone. |

**4.3 Supporting shelter service delivery**

**a) Cluster objective**

The main objective of the Bopha Shelter Cluster according to the draft strategic operational framework of 20 December 2012, was “to complement government and civil society efforts in providing all disaster-affected persons with safe, appropriate, and habitable shelter – at least one safe room per household – in dignity, to defined international standards.” This was in accordance with the template in the Shelter Cluster online toolkit.

**b) Partners**

The strategic operational framework names approximately 18 organisations, mostly international NGOs. However, a larger number of organisations attended meetings at least once in the period 17th December to 2ndFebruary for which lists are available (see Annex 3).

There was no partnership agreement between lead agencies and cluster partners. However, the relatively small group of partners was active in hub and technical coordination. The co-lead agencies IFRC and DSWD met frequently, sometimes daily, in Davao City.

At national level, as noted above, the Philippines government has yet to institute the cluster system. Recommendations on this were included in the after-action review by OCHA and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Monitoring Council (NDRRMC) in 2013. In this connection, IASC and Sphere documents on coordination may also be useful. [[42]](#footnote-42)

**c) Regional coordination**

*The cluster is not just about 4W but about meeting partners. You get to hear things if you go to meetings. It’s not just what’s on the agenda.[[43]](#footnote-43)*

The draft strategic operating framework set out cluster structure and assigned responsibility to IFRC for co-leadership in Manila and the regions of Davao and Caraga.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **National and regional coordination** | **Cluster co-lead** | **Role** |
| Manila and regions: Davao Region, Caraga | IFRC | Cluster coordination:  Meetings, advocacy, information management, technical coordination |

Representatives of over 35 organisations attended Shelter Cluster meetings in Davao City and Tagum (Davao Region) at least once (see Annex 3). Excluding DSWD and IFRC, attendance at eight meetings from December 2012 to February 2013 averaged eleven organisations.

Participants represented government, national and international NGOs and networks, other clusters, Red Cross and OCHA representatives. Agencies / networks attending regularly were

Catholic Relief Services (CRS)

Humanitarian Response Consortium (a group of five local and international NGOs)

IOM

OCHA

Plan International

Save the Children

Regional cluster meetings were chaired by DSWD and co-facilitated by IFRC and IOM. Most informants found meetings well-organised and useful. Minutes from December to February are held on the cluster webpage. The fourth cluster meeting (20 December) stated that the regional cluster in Davao City covered only Davao Region, as per government instructions. [[44]](#footnote-44)

However, Butuan, the regional capital of Caraga, was not a coordination hub. Assessment, information management and technical support continued to cover Caraga where IOM (see below) was responsible for hub coordination at provincial level. Successive coordinators felt the cluster had insufficient local knowledge or capacity to do more in Caraga.

*At the start we didn’t realise the government boundaries as such. So there was another region up in Caraga that wasn’t necessarily getting picked up … And all the agencies fell into that … Agencies working in Caraga, I’m not sure how much coordination they got. [[45]](#footnote-45)*

*Catch up with the Caraga Region was a priority [in March-May] but due to [the] need to improve coordination at Provincial level, it was not feasible to allocate time for it.[[46]](#footnote-46)*

A long-term Shelter Cluster presence in Philippines could help IFRC to identify possible gaps in advance and to judge where best to target international support for coordination.

1. **Provincial coordination and focal points**

*Security in the first three months was difficult, I lived two hours away from where I was working. So there was a four hour journey because we were not allowed to stay in [municipality]. The curfew was 6.00 to 6.00. So I got there by 10.00 and had to leave by 3.00.[[47]](#footnote-47)*

*The two hubs identified by the Government are too far away from affected operational areas. Shelter actors, namely NGOs and IOM cannot sustain between four to six hour daily commutes for staff.[[48]](#footnote-48)*

The IASC’s coordination model starts at national level but the Philippines government model at *barangay* level. It would have been impossible for the Shelter Coordination Team to have mirrored the government’s coordination structure. Compostela Valley province for example, comprises 11 municipalities and 237 *barangays*.

As agreed at the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) meeting of 21 December, IOM led coordination at provincial level. Its role was coordination and information management. Three coordination hubs were designated by UNDAC and the Philippines government.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Provincial coordination hubs** | **Cluster lead** |
| Naburanturan, Compostela Valley (Davao Region) | IOM |
| Cateel, Davao Oriental (Davao Region) | IOM |
| Trento, Agusan del Sur province (Caraga) | IOM |

Cluster partners were also asked to take on the role of coordinator at municipal and *barangay* level. Their role was liaison and communication between local partners and cluster.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Municipal focal points** | **Agency** |
| Baganga, Davao Oriental (Davao Region) | IOM |
| Boston, Davao Oriental | IOM |
| Mati City, Davao Oriental | IOM |
| Monkayo, Compostela Valley (Davao Region) | Save the Children |
| Montevista, Compostela Valley | Save the Children |
| Laak / San Vicente, Compostela Valley | Shelterbox |
| Santa Josefa, Agusan del Sur (Caraga) | World Vision |
| Trento, Agusan del Sur | World Vision |
| Veruela, Agusan del Sur | World Vision |
| Loreto, Agusan del Sur | World Vision |

A generic Terms of Reference was drawn up for municipal focal points. Updates were requested at regional cluster meetings but no minutes of hub meetings or reports from focal points were available.

Informants noted the challenge for IOM in undertaking shelter hub coordination in addition to its response roles. However, all agencies faced problems of security, access and logistics in relation to hubs and affected areas. Heavy rains continued in January and February. Several weeks after the typhoon, internet access remained difficult and commercial phone signals weak in affected areas, including Nabunturan and Cateel.[[49]](#footnote-49)

Hub coordination improved following discussions between IFRC and IOM. Relaxation of security restrictions at the end of December allowed the Shelter Coordination Team to travel outside Davao City. IOM loaned the Shelter Coordination Team a vehicle, driver and fuel. The Philippines Red Cross and other partners also helped the team with transport. This enabled members to visit affected areas and to provide support for information management and DRR. Security issues continued to affect some areas, as noted in REACH’s assessment and evaluation reports and in inter-cluster minutes. .

1. **Strategic Advisory Group**

A SAG was created in December. The first was attended by DSWD, CRS and IOM and endorsed the Strategic Operational Framework. Plan, Save the Children and Shelterbox also attended the second in January which accepted applications for the Bopha Humanitarian Appeal.

It is not clear how agencies became members of the SAG: a long list of possible members is included in the Strategic Operational Framework but SAG meeting participants did not include local NGOs and networks or representatives from Caraga.

1. **Technical Working Groups (TWIGS)**

Three TWIGs were envisaged in the Strategic Operational Framework. A general TWIG was to be led by IOM, a second on integration of cross-cutting issues by UNDP, and a third, on housing land and settlements by NHA, UN-Habitat and CRS. There appeared to be too few regular cluster partners to support three groups. Technical issues were discussed after the main cluster meeting. In January, the technical coordinator proposed re-focus on three issues:

* Shelter DRR
* Shelter materials standards
* Land ownership resettlement and housing

**Shelter DRR** CRS, Oxfam, Philippines Red Cross, PLAN and Save the Children agreed to participate and share resources on shelter DRR. A one-day workshop took place on 26 January in Nabunturan. This involved 73 participants, including Shelter Cluster partners, DSWD and local and provincial government representatives. It focused on resilient building techniques using shelter kits.[[50]](#footnote-50) Three one-day workshops on DRR were subsequently led at New Bataan, Maco and Monkayo in the Compostela Valley (Davao Region). No records of workshop attendance are available but each was thought to have involved 30-40 participants. Evaluation of the response by REACH in July 2013 found that households which had taken part in DRR training were more likely to have secured roofing than those who had not.[[51]](#footnote-51) DRR training developed for the Bopha response was again delivered in the response to Typhoon Haiyan.

CRS, HRC and IOM proposed a multi-agency leaflet on shelter resilience. Leaflets in cartoon format were developed by a group that included the Shelter Cluster’s Technical Coordinator, and representatives of CRS, IFRC, IOM, Plan and Save the Children. Artwork was professionally drawn and six thousand leaflets printed with financial assistance from IOM. Leaflets were distributed by partners. Informants considered these one of the most useful outputs of the cluster and they were later adapted for use after the Bohol earthquake and Typhoon Haiyan.

**Land ownership, resettlement and housing** The Manila coordinator who had had experience in the Washi deployment advised the cluster to seek local expertise on land tenure at the start of the response. Some informants found the information on government no-build zones shared at cluster meetings highly relevant. Others thought the cluster had become needlessly embroiled in legal issues, as yet unresolved, at the expense of people in urgent need of humanitarian shelter.

Housing, Land and Property questions eventually became the subject of research commissioned by the cluster from IFRC’s Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Law Centre.[[52]](#footnote-52) Contributors included the cluster coordinator, a number of mayors, and representatives of CRS, DSWD and the National Commission for Indigenous People. The paper was finalized in March 2013, towards the end of the IFRC-led team’s deployment. It contributes to understanding of context and the cross-cutting issues of human rights and environment hence should be of value in future coordination between and after emergencies.

1. **Information management**

*Many local organisations distributed. It was a rainfall of goods. They [the SCT] had a hard time to do the mapping but I don’t blame the cluster for that … It’s not that the cluster in principle doesn’t work. It needed sub-hubs where people were based.[[53]](#footnote-53)*

Information management began quickly in accordance with IASC criteria and was generally well-regarded. The global focal point was followed by an experienced information manager, in post from December to March, who handed over to the local liaison officer. A template for use by cluster partners was created by the third cluster meeting on 17 December. It included shelter standards and local government divisions for reporting on planned and completed distribution of emergency, recovery and transitional shelter. A major task for the information manager was reconciliation of differences in the sets of government data on those affected by the typhoon (see Section 4.4).

Provincial hubs were expected to have an information manager as well as a coordinator. Partners were urged to share information at *barangay* level in order that local counterparts were in the picture as soon as possible. Among the challenges for information management was distribution by local donors and firms, most of which operated outside civilian coordination systems.[[54]](#footnote-54) Government shelter stocks were not always accurately calibrated and some partners did not distinguish between planned and distributed goods. Given multiple formal and informal coordination hubs, the role of cluster partners was invaluable. Once the Shelter Coordination Team was able to travel outside Davao City, the information manager could provide further support for data collection. Outreach, particularly to Caraga, remained difficult, however, in part because the Shelter Coordination Team was small.

Both ICRC and the Philippines Red Cross shared information with the cluster. The fact that others, notably private donors, were failing to coordinate or were distributing lower quality materials, diminished the value of cluster information in the eyes of some informants. One issue (also cited by REACH and in OCHA’s after-action review of the entire Bopha response) was the need for common understanding of even non-technical terms:

*We read ‘10k houses partially damaged.’ It doesn’t convey that a house is uninhabitable.[[55]](#footnote-55)*

Shelter data were uploaded to the Bopha section of the global Shelter Cluster website. This was sometimes done by the global focal point in Canada because internet speed in Philippines is comparatively slow (a similar problem was noted in the WASHI cluster review). [[56]](#footnote-56) Internal management of information was via Dropbox. Team members did not always know how to use the Dropbox or found it contained duplicates or drafts. As one Shelter Coordination Team member put it:

*“In the Dropbox there was everything and nothing … it was full of drafts and working documents… There should be a secure box with the core documents.” [[57]](#footnote-57)*

The information manager developed an IM handover manual and backed up all cluster data on a hard drive every week. At the time of this evaluation, the whereabouts of the hard drive was unknown. A number of documents remain on the website but there is no complete record of activities, achievements and milestones. Given repeated deployments in the Philippines, the cluster needs a way of capturing cluster knowledge and, particularly in an area affected by conflict, its data storage needs to be secure.

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Supporting shelter service delivery** |
| R8 | Inform partners what they can expect of the Shelter Cluster. Remind all humanitarian actors of their duty to coordinate, if necessary using the IASC Minimum Commitments and / or Sphere standards. |
| R9 | Ensure frequently used technical and non-technical terms have consistent definitions that are readily understood by non-specialists. |
| R10 | Review generic terms of reference to ensure those of e.g., hubs, SAG or focal points, match requirements, expectations and agency / cluster capacity at local level. |
| R11 | Include use and maintenance of Dropbox and secure data storage in Shelter Coordination Team training and briefing. |
| R12 | Consider whether alternatives / parallels to Sharepoint are appropriate (see also WASHI cluster review recommendations). |

**4.4 Strategy**

1. **Strategy and policy**

The Shelter Coordination Team and DSWD held a rapid Shelter Cluster strategy meeting on 9 December at the cluster office in Davao City. The meeting considered needs, shelter responses and communication. Notes of the meeting, together with emergency shelter standards used in Tropical Storm Washi, were shared with the HCT and emailed to cluster partners ahead of the first full Shelter Cluster meeting on 11 December. The draft Strategic Operational Framework and technical guidelines were posted on the cluster webpage after the meeting of 20th December. A revised strategy for use in the recovery phase was developed in May 2013.

The first Strategic Operational Framework is based on the template in the Shelter Cluster toolkit. It sets out vulnerability criteria and distinguishes between two broad categories of household: those living in evacuation centres, and those not.

The revised strategy was developed by the provincial government in Compostela Valley, the Build Back Better Centre in Davao Oriental and DSWD in Davao Region, with assistance from the IFRC and IOM co-leads. It reflected the experience of partners and the cluster, the findings of assessments and the move from regional to provincial coordination after the IFRC-led team ended its deployment in May. The revised strategy included shelter in the recovery period up to 24 months and expanded vulnerability criteria to include members of indigenous groups. This framework was used in the evaluation commissioned by the cluster and conducted by REACH in July 2013.

1. **Standards**

*The Shelter Cluster in Bopha were pretty fast in drawing up standards and guidelines.[[58]](#footnote-58)*

*Funding constraints have meant that the quality of emergency shelter provision has typically been well below Sphere humanitarian standards. Of the 86,000 families assisted by agencies in the Shelter Cluster, half have only received a single tarpaulin as relief agencies have struggled to find the resources to provide a more comprehensive package of assistance.* *[[59]](#footnote-59)*

The draft Strategic Operational Framework referenced Sphere and national standards on shelter and WASH, and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Technical standards set in mid-December were based on those used in Tropical Storm Washi. These covered kits for emergency shelter for repair of partially and significantly damaged houses but Sphere standards were not sustainable because of lack of funding. There remained gaps in standards on support for host families, tents, transitional shelter and bunkhouses but the use of tents and bunkhouses only as a last resort were among the cluster’s advocacy messages from the start.

One informant remained unaware of the Shelter Cluster’s emergency shelter standards and another thought they needed better dissemination to enable pre-positioning at lower cost between emergencies. Speaking of *overall* coordination, a third thought that more should be done to capture clusters’ experience and translate this into faster coordination in both shelter and other sectors. Clearly, a permanent or longer-term shelter coordination role would be valuable.

*We have not been good at documenting the experience in Pablo so that we could use it in Haiyan … For example, in Haiyan we had the same policy discussions we had in Pablo, particularly about shelter. Though the context was different, we discussed, for example, no-build zones, standards, relocation…. We had the same discussions and reached the same conclusions. [[60]](#footnote-60)*

1. **Assessment**

*The biggest challenge the Shelter Cluster had was discrepancy in shelter data from the government side. We had two different sources: DROMIC and NDRMC. Two sets of figures contradicted one another.[[61]](#footnote-61)*

For the national Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center (DROMIC), the total number of houses damaged in Davao Region was 85,357, for NDRRMC 128,777. Loss of life and the destruction of government infrastructure meant that information from *barangay* level was delayed. In the end, the Shelter Cluster followed DSWD in using DROMIC figures but uncertainty made appeals difficult.

The Shelter Cluster assessment ran from 10-21 December 2012. Target areas were the severely damaged coastal municipalities of Boston, Cateel and Baganga in Davao Oriental and New Bataan in Compostela Valley which had also suffered from flooding and landslide. A Factsheet on needs was produced by REACH and assessment criteria and questions were discussed at Shelter Cluster meeting in mid-December.[[62]](#footnote-62)

The assessment comprised

* Collection of secondary data
* Household surveys
* Key informant interviews
* GIS and mapping

Assessment team members came from local universities. Local organisations and UNISDR were consulted on security. Enumerators were trained, vans hired and teams deployed to the four field locations. For security reasons, some areas had to be excluded at the start and others after data collection had begun.

Despite logistical and security challenges, the assessment provided partners with information from over 3,000 households. The assessment identified shelter needs, vulnerabilities and capacities, original housing and the current condition of shelter.

**Table 2 Shelter Cluster Assessment Team, Typhoon Bopha, December 2012** [[63]](#footnote-63)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Assessment Team member** | **Status** | **Agency** |
| Assessment Coordinator | International | IMPACT (REACH) |
| Database/GIS Coordinator | International | ACTED (REACH) |
| 4 x Enumerator team leaders | National | Philippine Normal University, Agusan del Sur (Caraga) |
| 44 x Enumerators | National | Philippine Normal University |
| 15 x Data entry assistants | National | San Francisco College, Agusan del Sur (Caraga)  Informatics Computer Institute of San Francisco |
| 4 x Logistics assistants | National |  |

Initial findings were shared in a Shelter Cluster update on 24 December. Feedback was provided by the Shelter Coordination Team and the global focal point for information management. The first draft assessment report was available on 31 December and fed into the revised flash appeal. The report was finalized in January. As in the Washi response, the assessment was considered timely and credible and it was used by partners to provide evidence for their own applications.

*The REACH assessment was good. The level of detail helped us verify our information too.[[64]](#footnote-64)*

*REACH assessments were really good data and useful for planning … [our] staff participated in the exercise and still use some of the tools.[[65]](#footnote-65)*

*It’s not unreasonable that a barangay captain might say that every house was affected by the massive storm … and that’s why the REACH team helped us a lot with the assessment. [[66]](#footnote-66)*

REACH used lessons from the Bopha response to refine the methodology used in the Haiyan response. Changes included:

* Use mobile data collection to reduce time and error
* Give local team leaders an additional day’s training
* Include shelter experts in training and field tests to ensure accurate use of shelter terminology and descriptions
* Provide trained enumerators with reference materials on shelter damage for use during field assessment [[67]](#footnote-67)

The speed with which this large team was assembled and acted may hold lessons for future coordination and partnership working.

## c) Cross-cutting Issues

Integration of cross-cutting issues was proposed as the focus of a TWIG but it did not appear to have met. Perhaps because of this, many different ‘cross-cutting’ issues are named in different documents on the Bopha response. The first Strategic Operational Framework refers to age*, disability, environment, HIV/AIDS, gender, land tenure* and *protection*. The revised Appeal identifies *communication* as a cross-cutting issue and REACH’s evaluation report *livelihoods* and *education*. Some evaluation informants thought that *WASH* and *shelter* *technique*s were cross-cutting issues and the revised Strategic Operational Framework referred to *coconut lumber.*

The REACH-led assessment did not reference IASC cross-cutting issues but included cluster vulnerability criteria: pregnant / lactating women, indigenous people, elderly, single-headed households and disability. Its evaluation found that “vulnerable households were equally or more likely to have received shelter assistance, although some of the most vulnerable groups were also more likely to be still living in highly damaged shelters.”[[68]](#footnote-68) The global focal point for coordination advised the Shelter Coordination Team on use of the IASC gender marker in applications for the Humanitarian Assistance Appeal.

Whether or not the IASC cross-cutting issues are understood has been the subject of recent research by OCHA.[[69]](#footnote-69) Camila Vega’s review of the Washi cluster and Tessa Kelly’s paper on HLP for the Bopha Cluster are reminders that cross-cutting issues are rarely stand-alone ones. Addressing them in a context where climate change and conflict occupy the same space requires a perspective few rapid-response teams can be expected to have. A permanent Shelter Coordinator in the Philippines will be better able to advise on these issues, whatever they are called. In the meantime, the Shelter Cluster needs to promote better understanding.

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Strategy, policy and standards** |
| R13 | With partners, review strategy documents to ensure documents made public are complete and up to date. |
| R14 | Promote common understanding of IASC *cross-cutting* and *inter-cluster* issues as well as issues specific to the response. |

**4.5 Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy**

Communication with Geneva about progress was frequent. The Dropbox contains sitreps from 18 December to 11 February. In February 2013, REACH was asked to monitor progress and again deployed a local monitoring team. IOM and HRC-Oxfam provided enumerators and data entry staff, while IOM provided vehicles for the duration of the assessment. [[70]](#footnote-70)

**Table 3 Shelter Cluster Progress Assessment Team, February 2013**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Monitoring Team member** | **Status** | **Agency** |
| Assessment Coordinator | International | IMPACT |
| 12 x Enumerators | National | IOM  HRC-Oxfam |
| 5 x Data Entry Assistants | National | IOM  REACH |

In addition to municipalities in Davao Region targeted in the December assessment, the team also monitored progress in Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur provinces in Caraga, and all municipalities in Compostela Valley province (Davao Region). The cluster’s initial log frame was only partially complete. However, in its progress assessment, REACH used some of the global Shelter Cluster indicators and focused on priority groups identified in the strategy.

The progress report found that almost half of the houses damaged in the typhoon remained uninhabitable three months on. Shelter and livelihoods had been prioritised in accordance with the Shelter Cluster needs assessment and strategy. However, assistance given was more likely to have been in the form of tarpaulins rather than shelter kits.

The report also noted that in some municipalities, different government entities were attempting to coordinate simultaneously, possibly because of forthcoming elections. Gaps, duplication and use of non-standard shelter materials were also observed. The report was distributed to partners in March 2013 and the cluster coordinator used it to inform advocacy. The log frame in the revised strategy summarised progress by cluster partners to May 2013.

For reasons that are not clear, the Shelter Coordination Team did not participate in the after-action review organised by OCHA and NDRRMC in April 2013. The review included cluster coordination at hub level and would have been a good opportunity for learning and accountability.[[71]](#footnote-71)

The Shelter Cluster commissioned an evaluation of the shelter response in July 2013. REACH was again commissioned to recruit a team and did so with help from cluster partners.

**Table 4 Shelter Cluster Evaluation Team, July 2013**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation team member** | **Status** | **Agency** |
| Evaluation Coordinator | International | ACTED (REACH) |
| Impact Evaluation Coordinator | International | UN-Habitat |
| Field Coordinator | National |  |
| 24 x Enumerators (8 team leaders) | National | HRC, IFRC, IOM, Oxfam |
| Data entry / data cleaning supervisor | National |  |
| Logistics assistant | National |  |

It was the first time that IFRC had been able to commission all three processes - assessment, monitoring and evaluation. In areas included in the evaluation, the team found that

* 73% of households whose homes had been damaged had received some form of shelter assistance.
* The majority, 58%, had received emergency shelter assistance: tarpaulins (most common), tents, emergency shelter kits or accommodation in bunkhouses.
* A minority, 34%, had received shelter recovery assistance
* Some affected areas remained particularly under-served, for example, those thought to have been designated no-build zones[[72]](#footnote-72)

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy** |
| R15 | Continue to use REACH in processes of assessment, monitoring and evaluation. Use these processes to strengthen feedback and accountability to affected people (see R19). |
| R16 | Encourage coordinating bodies to include IFRC Shelter Coordination Team (in Philippines or Zone) in after-action reviews. |

**4.6 Advocacy**

*[Coordinator] was up in Manila … pushing hard at national level with donors, going to HCT meetings and advocating for shelter.[[73]](#footnote-73)*

*The Shelter Cluster was not as loud as others.[[74]](#footnote-74)*

*If a category 5 super-typhoon – the highest mark on the scale – does not warrant donor attention, the future looks bleak.[[75]](#footnote-75)*

There was as yet no Shelter Cluster global focal point for advocacy and no Bopha cluster advocacy strategy. However, an update on 19 December identified target groups and issues.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Advocacy target group | Advocacy issue |
| Donors | * Funds for tarpaulins, shelter kits, repair kits * Funds for coordination |
| Affected people | * Technical guidelines to support build back better approach |
| Government | * Public buildings used as evacuation centres to be built back better |
| Shelter providers | * Use of camps and tents only as a last resort |

Advocacy on guidelines, evacuation centres and tents was part of the cluster’s technical role. Its main advocacy channels with donors, OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator were the cluster coordinators, one of whom was based in Manila at the start of the response. Informants in Manila and Mindanao were split on whether the cluster had done enough. One felt that shelter had dropped off the agenda too early as concerns about food and livelihoods rose. Another thought the Shelter Cluster less vocal than, for example, the WASH Cluster, and that it needed to communicate in less technical language.

Review of documentation, however, finds briefings for the Humanitarian Coordinator and articles by one cluster coordinator on the websites of IFRC, AlertNet and the *South China Morning Post*.[[76]](#footnote-76) These articles draw in part on findings by REACH but make them more accessible (see Annex 4). The same coordinator was interviewed by the English language *Mindanews* in January and explained the source and distribution of funding for shelter. IFRC’s regional spokesman contributed articles to IFRC and CNN, and IRIN published at least one article.

Cluster coordinators regularly briefed OCHA counterparts in Mindanao and Manila. The significance of shelter damage and shelter response was clearly recognised and shelter featured in all OCHA sitreps. CRS and IOM briefed donors during site visits in Davao Region in mid-January. Shelter was prominent in the original and revised Humanitarian Action Plan for the Bopha response which cited the Shelter Cluster’s needs assessment. Emergency and durable shelter solutions topped the plan’s list of requirements.

Despite this and despite assessment research that provided evidence of need, the emergency shelter response remained underfunded. Numerous possible reasons were cited by informants and in documentation: the crisis in Syria; storms in New York; Christmas; the Philippines’ status as a middle-income country; the Philippinos’ “natural resilience” to disaster; exhaustion of local government funds by December 2012; lack of clarity about government statistics; local elections in May 2013 prevented government and donors from releasing funds; Mindanao’s distance from Manila; Mindanao is “not significant - there’s nothing there that the people could be interested about”; the disaster “did not reach BBC or CNN”;[[77]](#footnote-77) the government had implied it could meet needs itself. Whatever the truth, it is likely that IFRC will need to back long-term commitment to shelter coordination in the Philippines with long-term advocacy on shelter funding.

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Advocacy and communication** |
| R17 | Include advocacy in Shelter Cluster strategies. |
| R18 | Match commitment to permanent / long-term shelter coordination in Philippines with global support for advocacy and fundraising. |

**4.7 Accountability to affected persons**

*The cluster has no mechanisms to be accountable to affected populations and not enough work with local government units to get significant representation at the local level to express the needs of affected people. [[78]](#footnote-78)*

*Accountability … was up to the implementers. But the cluster did the assessment and spoke to people.[[79]](#footnote-79)*

The Shelter Cluster strategy references Sphere standards, consultation and the use of complaints and feedback mechanisms but not accountability. There are no references to accountability to affected persons in the Dropbox or on the Bopha Shelter Cluster web pages and no information about affected people attending cluster meetings though partners, among them IOM, had feedback mechanisms in place.

Shelter Cluster assessment, monitoring and evaluation undertaken by local teams in local languages, sought the views of affected people in shaping the response and in measuring results. Accountability could have been strengthened by adding a feedback loop to REACH’s terms of reference, enabling the communities that had contributed to field research to know what had been found. This could also have assisted affected communities in holding shelter partners and funders to account.

**Recommendation**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Accountability to affected persons** |
| R19 | Strengthen accountability by communicating the findings of cluster assessments, monitoring and evaluation to the communities that contributed to them, and by showcasing the accountability work of partners. |

**4.8 Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building**

*People hadn’t internalised typhoon warnings. Mayors and heads of offices are also victims. … They just weren’t prepared … Our books say Compostela Valley is a typhoon-free area. [[80]](#footnote-80)*

*The big difference is [that] the WASH cluster main participants work together outside of emergencies so [there is] more coordination at ground level which does not exist in the Shelter Cluster.[[81]](#footnote-81)*

*[The coordinator] shared the PASSA handbook. I appreciated this. There was a video and orientation. [[82]](#footnote-82)*

Contingency planning in Philippines is the responsibility of the government. Capacity-building, though not explicitly referred to in the strategy, was a major part of the roles of both DSWD and the Shelter Coordination Team. “Handover” from the Shelter Coordination Team included written guidance on information management, support to develop the revised Strategic Operational Framework and a lessons learned session with DSWD by the cluster coordinator.

Informants referenced the cluster’s work on technical guidance, building back better, hazard mapping, HLP and training. As noted, DRR training and IEC contributed to work in Bohol and the response to Typhoon Haiyan.

The Shelter Cluster could build on its IEC work to help raise awareness of shelter preparedness and coordination structures in Mindanao. People now trained in DRR, PASSA or field survey techniques could be of assistance in future responses. Use of leaflets and / or IFRC’s manual on shelter coordination in natural disasters may be appropriate between emergencies.

Knowing *when* to leave a house behind is at least as important as knowing *how* to make it stronger. Shelter preparedness should also include messages about evacuation which could have saved more lives before Typhoons Washi, Bopha and Haiyan.[[83]](#footnote-83)

**Recommendations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building** |
| R20 | Build on experience of Bopha cluster in IEC development to support the government in raising awareness of shelter preparedness and coordination structures in the Philippines. |
| R21 | With their permission and in accordance with data protection principles, maintain a list of agencies and individuals participating in cluster technical training or trained as enumerators for possible use in preparedness and future coordination. |
| R22 | Ensure that shelter DRR and materials reinforce warnings about the need for timely evacuation as well as the strengthening of shelter. |

**5. Conclusions**

The IFRC acted very fast in the response to Typhoon Bopha. It had a core of skilled staff on standby and was able to begin work before the typhoon made landfall. The team received good support from the IFRC delegation, the Philippines Red Cross and regional and global focal points. With IOM and partners, it supported DSWD in Davao Region well in fulfilling the cluster core functions. The global cluster’s long-term partnership with REACH and, despite difficulties, the newer IFRC-WEF partnership, brought in additional expertise and personnel from the private sector.

Project funding for the Shelter Coordination Team delivered predictability and surge capacity for a short time only. Continuity was severely challenged by lack of funds for the emergency shelter response which had a knock-on effect on cluster recruitment and coordination. The result was turnover in the small core team and uncertainty about its future before it had been in place a month.

Individual Shelter Coordination Team members were well-qualified but the high rate of turnover put a strain on recruiters and for some informants raised questions about the commitment of the IFRC to shelter coordination. IFRC has subsequently reviewed its Shelter Cluster funding and recruitment model to try to address these issues and the global cluster appointed a focal point for advocacy.

The government’s national coordination structure, though mirroring that of the IASC, was untried in the regions affected by Typhoon Bopha. Inevitably, the government relied for data on personnel who may themselves have suffered loss and tragedy in locations where damaged infrastructure or longstanding conflict also barred access.

Shelter Cluster co-leads and partners also faced problems of access and communication in Caraga and Davao Region and the Shelter Coordination Team was initially confined to Davao City for reasons of mandate, security and logistics. The relatively small number of agencies working on shelter collaborated with the Shelter Coordination Team, co-lead IOM and government to support coordination hubs at municipal and *barangay* level but it is unclear whether Caraga received the same level of support as Davao Region.

Notwithstanding turnover, the Shelter Coordination Team succeeded in establishing a very strong relationship with the cluster lead, DSWD, in Davao Region. There was trust and respect on both sides. This was significant because it was the first time DSWD in this area had been required to take the lead in any humanitarian shelter response. By default, the Shelter Coordination Team was contributing to DRR and contingency planning by government and it did this well. With support from IOM, DSWD retained leadership of the Shelter Cluster after the IFRC-led Team left.

The Shelter Cluster is pushing an open door when it promotes coordination in the Philippines. It will continue to do so more easily with a long-term or permanent shelter coordinator in place. The Shelter Cluster needs a national overview better to understand a range of issues: context, government structure, partners’ strengths and how to address coordination at multiple levels in a nation of islands. If the cluster approach cannot work in Philippines with the government’s strong commitment to preparedness and the country’s high level of vulnerability to natural disaster, it is hard to see where it can work.

**Annex 1 Timeline**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **2012** |  |
| 30 November | Government initiates early warning and evacuation measures |
| 03 December | OCHA asks IFRC to co-lead the cluster in support of DSWD |
|  | IFRC Shelter Cluster Coordinator arrives in Manila from Kuala Lumpur |
| 04 December | Typhoon Bopha makes landfall in Davao Oriental, Eastern Mindanao |
| 05 December | RC / HC offers President international assistance |
|  | IFRC launches preliminary appeal to support response by Philippines Red Cross. The total of 4.5 million Swiss francs includes 112,038 Swiss francs to cover costs of Shelter Cluster coordination |
| 06 December | President accepts offer of international assistance, particularly in area of food, shelter and camp management |
|  | Government and HCT undertake rapid assessment in Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental (Davao Region) |
| 06-07 December | International assessment team arrives |
| 07 December | IFRC Shelter Cluster Coordinator arrives in Mindanao |
| 07-10 December | Shelter Cluster assessment preparation |
| 09 December | Rapid Shelter Cluster strategy meeting chaired by DSWD is held. |
| 10 December | Clusters are rolled out at regional level in Davao Region and Caraga. |
|  | Humanitarian Action Plan for 65 million US dollars launched. The appeal includes a request for 10.5 million US dollars for immediate shelter assistance by Shelter Cluster partners. |
|  | First meeting of the Shelter Cluster in Davao City |
| 11 December | Shelter Cluster assessment research starts |
| 12 December | Coordination hubs set up in Nabunturan, Compostela Valley Province (Davao Region) and Trento, Agusan del Sur Province, Caraga) |
| 20 December | Ceasefire between Philippines army and New People’s Army in Eastern Mindanao starts |
| 22 December | Shelter Cluster assessment research ends |
| 24 December | Shelter assessment initial findings shared by Shelter Cluster |
| 27 December | Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) releases 10 million US dollars from CERF |
| 31 December | Shelter Coordination Team permitted to travel outside Davao City for first time |
|  | Draft shelter assessment report delivered by REACH |
| **2013** |  |
| 04 January | Inter-cluster meeting informed that 12 people have been kidnapped by NPA since 31 December. |
| 15 January | Ceasefire between Philippines government and New People’s Army ends |
| 15-16 January | RC / HC and donors visit Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental (Davao Region) |
| 25 January | Revised Action Plan with appeal for 76 million US dollars, based on assessments undertaken by clusters, is launched in Manila and Geneva |
| 25 February | Shelter Cluster progress assessment research starts |
| 01 March | Shelter Cluster progress assessment research ends |
| 08 March | Information management handed over to DSWD. |
| 15 May | IFRC-led Shelter Coordinator ends mission. |
| 16 – 23 July | Shelter Cluster response evaluation preparation |
| 25 – 31 July | Shelter Cluster response evaluation research by REACH |
| 01 – 15 August | Shelter Cluster response analysis and reporting by REACH |
|  |  |

**Annex 2**

**IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Teams in the Philippines 2006-2013**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Disaster** | **International / PAGASA name** | **Date** | **Areas affected** |
| Super Typhoon | Haiyan / Yolanda | 8-Nov-2013 | Visayas, Mindoro, Palawan |
| Earthquake | n/a | 15-Oct-2013 | Bohol |
| Super Typhoon | Bopha / Pablo | 4-Dec-2012 | Mindanao, Visayas, Luzon |
| Tropical storm | Washi / Sendong) | 16-Dec-2011 | Northern Mindanao and Central Visayas |
| Super Typhoon | Parma / Pepeng | 29-Sep-2009 | Eastern Visayas, Luzon |
| Severe Tropical Storm | Ketsana / Ondoy | 24-Sep-2009 | Luzon |
| Super Typhoon | Durian / Reming | 27-Sep-2006 | Luzon, Visayas |

**ANNEX 3 Attendance at Shelter Cluster meetings**

**17.12.12- 02.02.13**

Meetings held in Davao City and Tagum. Representation at one or more meeting.

|  |
| --- |
| Access Aid International |
| Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) |
| Agri-Aqua Development Coalition - Mindanao |
| ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) |
| Balay Mindanaw Foundation |
| CARE |
| Catholic Relief Services (CRS) |
| Child Protection Working Group (CPWG) |
| Coalition of Services of the Elderly (COSE) |
| German Red Cross |
| Habitat For Humanity |
| Handicap International |
| HelpAge International |
| Humanitarian Response Consortium (HRC): A Single Drop for Safe Water (ASDSW); Kadtuntaya Foundation Inc. (KFI); Peoples Disaster Risk Reduction Network (PDRN); Rural Development Institute of Sultan Kudura (RDISK); Oxfam |
| ICRC |
| IFRC |
| International Labour Organisation (ILO) |
| IOM |
| Lutheran World Relief |
| New Heights Christian Fellowship |
| Oxfam-PINGO ( Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization) |
| Philippines Coconut Authority |
| Philippines Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) |
| Philippines Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD) |
| Philippines Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) |
| Philippines National Housing Authority (NHA) |
| Philippines Red Cross |
| Plan |
| Samaritan’s Purse |
| Save the Children |
| Shelterbox |
| Shelters International Disaster Response |
| [Silingang Dapit sa Sidlakang Mindanao](http://sildapseinc.wordpress.com/) (Sildap.SE Inc.) |
| UN OCHACHA |
| UN World Food Programme / Logistics Cluster |
| UNDP |
| UNFPA |
| UN-Habitat |
| UNHCR / Protection Cluster |
| UNICEF |
| Well of Life Community Development |
| World Vision |

**Annex 4**

**Typhoon Bopha survivors languish in ‘uninhabitable’ homes as funding shortfall stalls recovery efforts [[84]](#footnote-84)**

**Publié:** 25 mars 2013 9:07 CET



Photo caption: Funding shortfalls have meant that Shelter Cluster agencies have been unable to adequately cover the emergency shelter needs of Typhoon Bopha survivors. Credit: REACH / C. Westrope

*By Tom Bamforth*

When Typhoon Bopha, locally known as Pablo, swept across the Philippine island of Mindanao last December, more than 200,000 families in the provinces of Davao Oriental, Compostela Valley, and Caraga region lost their homes. Almost four months have elapsed and an assessment of the progress and effectiveness of the response to addressing emergency shelter needs has just been completed by REACH (a specialist humanitarian assessment organization). The assessment has revealed that an estimated 46 per cent of affected families - nearly half a million people - are still living in houses classified as ‘uninhabitable’.

The assessment was commissioned by the Shelter Cluster – an inter-agency coordination platform for all organizations working to address shelter needs in the wake of Typhoon Bopha. While some positive signs of recovery were identified, the assessment highlighted worrying gaps and inconsistencies in the levels of emergency assistance provided.

85 per cent of affected families currently live on the site of their original homes.  Some have received a tarpaulin or other form of emergency shelter assistance. Most are salvaging materials from their wrecked houses and are rebuilding and moving on with their lives as best they can. Despite the fact that 25 per cent of this population continue to live in makeshift shelters, there are greater indications of a return to normality, families are living together, shops and stores are beginning to reopen and community buildings and services are functioning.

Other assessment findings reveal a more troubling picture. An unusually high number of vulnerable groups were identified among the typhoon-affected population. 10 per cent of households included people living with disabilities and 26 per cent included lactating mothers. A further 11 per cent of households were headed by a single adult. Many of these unassisted families live in remote, rural and indigenous areas. There is also increasing evidence of spontaneous settlements emerging, where families have sought access to assistance by settling along the sides of roads and highways.

Significant emergency shelter needs remain, yet the humanitarian response remains slow and underfunded. Funding constraints have meant that the quality of emergency shelter provision has typically been well below Sphere humanitarian standards. Of the 86,000 families assisted by agencies in the Shelter Cluster, half have only received a single tarpaulin as relief agencies have struggled to find the resources to provide a more comprehensive package of assistance. There is an urgent and ongoing need for more durable solutions – tools, roofing, and construction materials – in order to provide the immediate basis for longer term recovery.

Despite the magnitude of the disaster, emergency appeals launched by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the UN’s Revised Bopha Action Plan are only 30 per cent met. As planning begins for longer term reconstruction, the humanitarian community must ensure that shelter needs are addressed. If they are ignored, there is a high likelihood that individual and community coping mechanisms will be further eroded, leaving the survivors of Bopha highly vulnerable to future shocks.

*Tom Bamforth, heads up the Shelter Cluster, an inter-agency coordination platform that brings together local and international humanitarian organizations that are responding to emergency shelter needs in Mindanao.*

**Annex 5 Evaluation informants**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Luca Pupulin | ACTED / Impact Initiatives | Geneva representative / Executive Director |
| Bernadette Cariaga | AusAID | Program Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Development and Co-operation Branch, Manila |
| Tom Bamforth | Australian Red Cross | Shelter Cluster Coordinator |
| David Dalgado | British Red Cross | Shelter Cluster Technical Coordinator |
| Neil Bauman | Canadian Red Cross | Global Shelter Cluster Focal Point, Information Management;  Shelter Cluster Information Manager |
| Joseph Curry | CRS | Country Representative |
| Alfredo M. Sy | DSWD | Head, Standards Unit; Boston, Davao Oriental Coordinator |
| Arlene L. Mangur | DSWD | Regional Program Coordinator, Sustainable Livelihood Program; Disaster Coordinator for Montevista Comval Province |
| Dolly Igaňa | DSWD | Municipal Disaster Coordinator in Baganga, Davao Oriental |
| Ma Elena S. Labrador | DSWD | Chief, Institutional Development Division, Regional Project Coordinator NCDDP;  Shelter Cluster Chair |
| Rebecca A. Santamaria | DSWD | Chief, Protective Services Unit; Davao Oriental Provincial Coordinator |
| Arlynn Aquino | ECHO | Humanitarian Aid Officer |
| Cyrone Bejer | Fluor | Associate Construction Support Engineer;  Shelter Cluster Technical Coordinator |
| David Vaughn | Fluor | Director of Business Continuity and Disaster Management Solutions |
| Emilio Teijeira | German Red Cross | Head of Country Office, Philippines |
| Timothy Yates | ICRC | Head of Sub Delegation, Davao |
| Aleksandre Mikadze | IFRC | Shelter Delegate, Philippines |
| James Shepherd Barron | IFRC | Shelter Cluster Coordinator (Haiyan response) |
| Marta Peña | IFRC | Shelter & Settlements, focal point for support operations & trainings |
| Necephor Mghendi | IFRC | Operations Manager, Philippines Delegation |
| Pablo Medina | IFRC | Senior Officer - Shelter Coordination, Shelter & Settlements |
| Patrick Elliott | IFRC | Asia Pacific Shelter Coordinator; Shelter Cluster Coordinator |
| Remuel Ompoc | IFRC | Shelter Engineer, IFRC, Northern Mindanao |
| Mariano Nava | IOM | DTM Coordinator; Cluster coordinator |
| Phyo Wai Kyaw | IOM | Senior Information Management Officer;  Shelter Cluster Information Manager |
| Junio Ramirez | Philippines Red Cross | Focal point supporting IFRC shelter projects, Compostela Valley |
| Marjorie Aguillim | Philippines Red Cross | Focal point and project officer, livelihoods, Compostela Valley |
| Randy Loy | Philippines Red Cross | Chapter Administrator, Compostela Valley |
| Clay Westrope | REACH | Global Assessment Manager/ US Country Representative; Philippines Assessment Manager |
| Kevin Lee | Single Drop - HRC | Executive Director, ASDSW |
| Roger Alonso Morgui | Spanish Red Cross | Head of Delegation, Philippines |
| Frédéric Blas | Swiss Red Cross | Shelter Cluster Coordinator |
| David Carden | UN OCHA | Head of Office, Philippines |
| Kasper Engborg | UN OCHA | Davao |
| Maria Agnes Palacio | UN OCHA | National Disaster Response Advisor, Philippines |

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**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

**Terms of reference for consultancy**

**Summary**

**Purpose**: The Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) seeks to review the effectiveness of the coordination services provided by the IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Team to the humanitarian response to typhoon Bopha in the Philippines, to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future response.

**Audience**: The IFRC and in particular the Shelter & Settlements Department will use the review to identify lessons and provide recommendations to improve future deployments. Shelter coordination team members will use it to learn from the findings and improve practice. Cluster partners will use it as reference and in improving their shelter response as relevant. The Humanitarian Country Team will use it to inform the current coordination arrangement for the shelter response in the Philippines. Donors and other humanitarian actors will use if for general information. The report will be public and available at sheltercluster.org.

**Commissioners**: This review is being commissioned by IFRC as Global Shelter Cluster Lead for natural disasters.

**Reports to**: Pablo Medina, IFRC Shelter and Settlements Department.

**Duration**: 25 working days, over a one month period.

**Timeframe**: from 1 April 2014 to 30 April 2014.

**Location**: Home based with travel to the Philippines (10 days). Dates for the field visit to be coordinated with the IFRC office and the current Shelter Coordination Team in the Philippines.

**Purpose of Project and Background**

The following are the Terms of Reference for a review of the Philippines Shelter Cluster in response to typhoon Bopha. IFRC is the shelter cluster lead for natural disasters in the Philippines.

In the early hours of 4 December, Typhoon Bopha, locally known as Pablo, hit the east coast of Mindanao in the south of the Philippines. It was the 16th and most powerful typhoon to hit the country in 2012. The Government of the Philippines initiated extensive preparedness measures that prevented the loss of many lives. On 7 December, the President of the Philippines declared a national state of calamity and accepted the offer of international assistance. IFRC launched a preliminary emergency appeal on December 5 to support the response efforts of the Philippine Red Cross for a total of CHF 4.5 million, including a total of CHF 112,038 to cover the costs of shelter cluster coordination. The United Nations and humanitarian partners launched an appeal for $65 million to provide immediate lifesaving aid and support to millions affected by the typhoon on 10 December. This appeal included a request for $10.5 million for immediate shelter assistance by shelter cluster partners.

As the global lead for the shelter cluster in natural disasters and in line with recent discussions on shelter cluster leadership in the Philippines among IFRC, OCHA, IOM, and UN Habitat at the country level, IFRC was requested by UN OCHA on 3 December 2012 to take on the cluster lead role in response to cyclone Bopha, in support of the government’s overall leadership. IFRC has been an active participant of the Humanitarian Country Team in the Philippines prior to the disaster, involved in disaster preparedness activities, as well as taking on the cluster lead role in emergencies, such as tropical storm Washi earlier in 2012. To provide this leadership within the shelter sector and to ensure appropriate advice to the IFRC in country delegation on its engagement with the Humanitarian Country Team on matters related to cluster coordination, the IFRC deployed its Shelter Coordinator in the Asia Pacific Zone to Manila prior to the arrival of typhoon Bopha.

In the initial weeks of the response, IFRC had deployed a shelter coordination team (SCT), comprising a coordinator, and information manager, and a technical coordinator, with financial contributions from the Australian, British and Canadian Red Cross. The SCT also included an assessment manager and a GIS/database expert provided through an agreement with ACTED, a partner organization of the Global Shelter Cluster. IOM led shelter coordination hubs in areas that are considered conflict-affected by the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement.

The SCT was exclusively dedicated to the task of cluster coordination, independent of PRC and IFRC operations. A local staff of the IFRC delegation acting as shelter cluster liaison officer provided additional support to the team.

**Alignment to the IFRC’s objectives and strategy**

(IFRC’s *Strategy 2020*)

This project aligns with strategic aim 2 of IFRC Strategy 2020, to save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crisis. It will provide key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future shelter response in the Philippines. Through improved shelter coordination, humanitarian agencies can strengthen the shelter response to disasters.

**Project objectives**

The objectives of the review are to:

* Appraise the service provided by IFRC as shelter cluster lead to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors.
* Review and analyse the experience of IFRC with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations.
* Provide recommendations with regard to IFRC’s leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities in the Philippines, for preparedness and emergency response and the resources required to perform such a role.
* Examine if there were aspects of IFRC’s cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

In the framework of these objectives, the review will encompass, but not be limited to, the following areas:

* **Coordination Arrangements**: in-country coordination modalities; activation of the cluster process; staffing and rotation; access to equipment and supplies by and funding of the Shelter Coordination Team (SCT); understanding, support, and impact of IFRC’s shelter coordination role within the in-country IFRC team and National Society, the Zone office and the secretariat in Geneva; value of linking and/or separating the SCT and the Red Cross relief operation; issues with regard to visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement; remote support; and design, implementation and timing of the exit/handover strategy.
* **Supporting service delivery**: coordination management; design, timeliness and implementation of the SCT, including factors and determinants which provided the SCT’s strengths and weaknesses; linkage of IFRC’s shelter coordination role with any coordination system set up by the national authorities; extent to which national actors (NGOs, affected population, civil society and private sector as relevant) were included in the coordination mechanism; relations with other sectors, the UN system, the Government and other coordination mechanisms as applicable; information management.
* **Informing strategic decision-making of the humanitarian response**: assessments and response gap analysis and how these fed into the appeal process; extent to which cross-cutting issues were included in the situation analysis and design of the shelter response.
* **Planning and strategy development**: strategic planning; technical coordination and application of standards; resource mobilization and appeals; accountability to affected populations; recovery guidance and involvement of the SCT in the transition from meeting emergency shelter needs to durable shelter solutions.
* **Advocacy**: communication and public information strategy and activities; identification of advocacy concerns and advocacy activities undertaken on behalf of cluster participants and the affected population.
* **Monitoring and reporting**: reporting systems to monitor the implementation of the cluster strategy and corrective action when necessary; cluster performance monitoring.
* **Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity building**: national contingency plans identified and shared if available; extent to which response followed previously established contingency plans; development of cluster-based contingency plans when relevant; risk assessment and analysis carried out; readiness status enhanced; regular distribution of early warning reports; training; the feasibility and conditions required for IFRC to continue to lead the shelter cluster during the preparedness and relief periods in the Philippines.

**Desired outcomes**

Through the conduct of a review of the Philippines Shelter Cluster in response to typhoon Bopha, the following outcomes will be achieved:

1. IFRC (Philippines delegation, Asia-Pacific Zone Office and the Shelter and Settlements department) will identify lessons and act on recommendations to improve future deployments.
2. Shelter Coordination Team members and the Global Shelter Cluster Support Team will learn from the findings and apply them to revise tools and guidelines to improve shelter coordination policy and practice.
3. Philippines shelter cluster partners and government will use it as reference to improve their shelter response in future disasters as relevant.
4. The Humanitarian Country Team and other clusters in the Philippines will identify good practices and areas for improvement that may be relevant to their own coordination responsibilities.
5. Donors and other humanitarian actors will use it to inform planning and funding decisions for future shelter coordination and response in the Philippines.

**Consultancy outputs**

1. An **inception note** (2-3 pages long) detailing the proposed methodology, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the evaluator.
2. **Debriefing / feedback to IFRC at all levels** – The evaluator will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC (in-country, zone, and Geneva) in a timely manner, before leaving the country.
3. **Draft report** – A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future shelter coordination and response, will be submitted for review and feedback.
4. **Final report** – Concise, written report in English (20-25 pages long) with key findings and recommendations and supporting information. The final report will contain a short executive summary and a main body of the report in the standard IFRC shelter coordination review template. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders, and address the objectives and areas of inquiry outlined above (Project objectives). The final report will be submitted within 3 days after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.
5. **Annexes** - Additional notes, summary of review activities undertaken including interview guide, list of stakeholders interviewed, questionnaire or survey if applicable, visits conducted with dates, list of documents reviewed, timeline that captures the milestones regarding the deployment of the SCT and shelter coordination and response, and any other supporting documentation as appropriate, as annexes to the report.

**Method of delivery and reasons for selecting that method**

The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Framework for Evaluation, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized, and to the evaluation criteria endorsed by the IFRC Secretariat (relevance & appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, coverage, impact, coherence, sustainability & connectedness, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Fundamental Principles, Code of Conduct, and IFRC’s Strategy 2020).

An **IFRC evaluation management team** will oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluator, to ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three people, one of which is from the Shelter & Settlements department, one from the Asia-Pacific Zone Office and one from the IFRC Country Office.

The **external evaluator** will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical expertise to the evaluation, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he should not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired in accordance with the IFRC procedure for the contracting of consultants, through a transparent recruitment process, based on their professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation. It is expected that the evaluator will be able to conduct a reliable and informed assessment of the shelter coordination in response to typhoon Bopha in the Philippines that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

**The specific evaluation methodology will be further detailed in the inception note in close consultation between the evaluator and the IFRC evaluation management team**, but will draw upon the following methods:

1. **Desktop review:** Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Philippines Shelter Cluster, relevant background documents and background and history, including prior IFRC Shelter Cluster evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites in the Philippines.
3. **Key informant interviews**, with key internal stakeholders within the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, the Asia-Pacific Zone Office, the Country Office, and the deployed shelter cluster co-coordinators, as well as with external stakeholders, including government officials, shelter cluster agencies, donors, OCHA, the Humanitarian Country Team, and others as relevant.

Other methods, such as a possible online survey or focus group discussions, will be detailed in an inception note to be developed by the consultant, as time and capacity allows.

An initial draft report will be prepared for a **review process,** whichshould occur within 1 week of submittal of the draft report to the evaluation management team, and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

1. **Days 1-2 of review process:** the evaluation management team to check content is in line with TOR and standards.
2. **Days 3-7 of review process:** stakeholders participating in the evaluation.

The review process will be followed to ensure stakeholder input while maintaining the integrity and independence of the report according to the following criteria:

* **Inaccuracy**. Inaccuracies are factual, supported with undisputable evidence, and therefore should be corrected in the evaluation report itself.
* **Clarifications**. A clarification is additional, explanatory information to what the evaluator provided in the report. It is the evaluators’ decision whether to revise their report according to a clarification.
* **Difference of opinion**. A difference of opinion does not pertain to the findings (which are factual), but to the conclusions and/or recommendations. These may be expressed to the evaluator during the review process. It is the evaluator’s decision whether to revise their report according to a difference of opinion.

**Support to be provided to the consultant**

The Senior Officer, Shelter Coordination, will brief the consultant and provide backstop support in dealing with any questions the consultant may have regarding the scope and content of the review. The IFRC Shelter Cluster Co-coordinator and the IFRC Country Office will provide the required administration and logistics support to organize the field visit and required interviews with stakeholders, as well as the information and background documentation required to gather data and analysis.

**Schedule for payment of fees**

The consultant will be paid the full amount upon satisfactory completion of the work in accordance with the terms of reference.

**Time Allocation, for budget purposes**

This assignment is for a maximum of 25 working days, during the period April 1-30, 2014.

**Management of consultancy**

The consultancy shall be managed by the Senior Officer, Shelter Coordination. He will provide the required briefing to the consultant and have weekly monitoring discussions to assess progress. Other ad hoc communications with the consultant will be held as required.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies



*Strategy 2020* voices the collective determination of the IFRC to move forward in tackling the major challenges that confront humanity in the next decade. Informed by the needs and vulnerabilities of the diverse communities with whom we work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms to which all are entitled, this strategy seeks to benefit all who look to Red Cross Red Crescent to help to build a more humane, dignified, and peaceful world.

Over the next ten years, the collective focus of the IFRC will be on achieving the following strategic aims:

1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises
2. Enable healthy and safe living
3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace

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