*Photo by Raul Ecay: Rapid Shelter Assessment Training in Lionde*

**Review of the 2013 Mozambique Floods IFRC led Shelter Cluster**

22 August 2013 – Final Report

Reviewer:

Birte Hald

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**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AZO: IFRC Africa Zone Office

CCCM: Camp Coordination and Camp Management

CCT: Cluster Coordination Team

CENOE: Centro Nacional Operativo de Emergencia

= National Emergency Operations Centre

CERF: UN Central Emergency Response Fund

COE: Centro Operativo de Emergencia

= Emergency Operation Centre (provincial level)

CVM: Cruz Vermelha de Mozambique = Mozambique Red Cross Society

DCM: Disaster and Crisis Management Dept, IFRC Secretariat

DREF: IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund

FACT: IFRC Field Assessment and Coordination Team

GOM: Government of Mozambique

GSC: Global Shelter Cluster

IASC: Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IFRC: International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IM: Information Management

INGC: Instituto Nacional para a Gestao de Calamidades

= National Disaster Management Agency

HCT: Humanitarian Country Team

IOM: International Organization for Migration

MOH: Ministry of Health

NS: National Red Cross Society

PNS: Partner National Red Cross Societies

SARO: IFRC Southern Africa Regional Office

SC: Shelter Cluster

SCC: Shelter Cluster Coordinator

SCT: Shelter Cluster Team

SSD: Shelter and Settlement Department, IFRC Secretariat

UNV: UN Volunteer

**Acknowledgements**

I would like to take the opportunity to thank all who contributed to this review. For many it meant taking time out of a busy schedule as distributions are still on-going and dead-lines are tight. Some people were no longer in-country and yet made themselves available for interviews in as far away locations as Myanmar, China, Zimbabwe, Switzerland and Canada. A special thanks to Lola Castro, WFP Representative and Chair of the HCT Working Group, who made time for the interview on one of her last extremely busy days in Mozambique before moving on to her new assignment as WFP Representative in Pakistan.

I would like to convey a special thanks to CVM for hosting my visit in Mozambique and supporting with logistics. Finally to the IFRC operations manager in Mozambique, Angel Vicario, for continued support, advice, information and encouragement throughout the visit.

Throughout I was met with a constructive attitude from all informants. The interviewees saw it as a priority to contribute towards the improvement of the joint efforts to deliver quality assistance to the people affected by disaster within emergency shelter, and thereby putting the humanitarian imperative above all other concerns.

**Executive Summary**

Since IFRC committed to the role as Global Shelter Cluster (GSG) convener in 2006, the IFRC Shelter and Settlements Department (SSD) has systematically reviewed the deployments of Shelter Cluster Teams to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve future response. The current review was undertaken between April and June 2013.

In January 2013 heavy rains in Southern Africa produced floods in Southern and Central Mozambique. Natural disasters such as floods, cyclones and droughts happen on a recurrent basis in Mozambique. In order to strengthen the national capacity to prepare and respond, the government has established a permanent national disaster coordination mechanism, supported by the Humanitarian Country Team Working Group (HCT), to prepare annual contingency plans and mobilize resources for the response when disasters occur. The national disaster coordination mechanism has four sector working groups, of which the shelter cluster is part of the infrastructure sector working group.

Mozambique Red Cross (CVM) is the appointed coordinator of the shelter cluster for emergency response, but has been without a shelter focal point since March 2012 and has currently weak capacity a head quarter level, although widely recognized as the first responder with its outreach and network of branches and trained volunteers.

The floods developed unusually fast in 2013, and clusters intensified the coordination, integrating with the sector working group structures, in order to respond to the needs. CVM was overwhelmed by the compounding pressure to implement and coordinate the shelter cluster and asked IOM for help. SSD was not alerted to the need to deploy a Shelter Coordination Team (SCT) until 4 February 2013. Eventually a SCT was deployed on 14 February 2013, almost four week after the Government declaration of red alert on 22 January 2013.

The SCT provided quality technical capacity for coordination and information management. The deployment of the SCT improved division of labour, avoided duplication, identified gaps, established an overview of who-does-what-where, improved the overall efficiency and produced reliable data for the Government on a daily basis. The database was much appreciated and is still being used.

In general, the contribution of the SCT was highly appreciated, it was, however, perceived as coming in late in the middle of the disaster and thereby felt as somewhat disruptive and as lack of recognition of on-going efforts. Furthermore, the SCT was perceived to leave too early, which eventually meant that the role of coordinating the shelter cluster had to be picked up again by IOM.

Several main shortfalls contributed to the late deployment of the SCT. CVM had weakened capacity to assume the cluster coordination role as per the National Contingency Plan and low awareness of the resources available from SSD to support shelter cluster coordination . The IFRC disaster management structures in Mozambique and the Southern Africa Regional Office (SARO) had a low level of awareness of the expectations of IFRC as a Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) convener and resources available for shelter cluster coordination. The Shelter Cluster members in Mozambique were submerged in the response, and didn’t think of contacting SSD in Geneva. While well intended, the assumption of the co-leadership of the shelter cluster by IOM without following due protocol further delayed the process.

There is a need to strengthen CVM capacity for coordination of the shelter cluster and the IFRC capacity for early warning and timely deployment in future disasters of scale, when extra capacity is required. A series of recommendations have been identified to ensure that the contribution of the GSC convener is perceived as appropriate and timely.

 **Recommendations**

**Investing in capacity for timely deployment of support for Shelter Cluster coordination and information management**

Given the cyclical nature of natural disasters in Mozambique, IFRC Shelter and Settlements Department in Geneva (SSD) must invest in preparedness measures to respond to future disasters in Mozambique. This comprises measures to ensure that in future medium to large scale disasters there is early warning mechanisms in place and that surge capacity and the roster be shaped up with Portuguese (or Spanish) speaking people who are familiar with Mozambique, Government disaster management and coordination mechanisms, more specifically:

* Ensuring close monitoring from IFRC Africa Zone Disaster Management Unit in the event of building up of new disasters, potentially requiring deployment of shelter cluster coordination capacity.
* Ensuring that there is shelter knowledge at IFRC Southern Africa Regional Office (SARO) to provide monitoring and early warning. Appointing a SARO staff as shelter focal point as part of his/her portfolio, providing the person with shelter training.
* Identification of people on the SSD roster with Portuguese skills and knowledge of Mozambique to be stand-by for the cyclone and rainy season.
* Deploying a shelter stand-by person for a short mission to Mozambique in November-December to familiarize with the systems and the actors in the infrastructure working group, the shelter cluster and INGC and liaise with the CVM shelter cluster focal point. Consider sending the stand-by person to Mozambique to participate in the HCT preparedness planning workshop in November/December. Even when deployment ends up not being needed, this would be a good investment.
* SSD should conduct shelter training in Mozambique at the end of 2013, ideally in connection with the HCT preparedness planning workshop November/December 2013.
* During the development of a new disaster scenario, SSD and/or the Africa Zone should stay in close contact with the CVM shelter focal person, and be prepared to deploy the stand-by person, if needed a full SCT, immediately from the very on-set of the disaster.

**Investing in building national society capacity**

There are several options for ensuring support for shelter cluster coordination in Mozambique. CVM capacity at head quarter is currently at a historical low. The preferred option of the people who contributed to the review is, however, to ensure that CVM, being a key actor in disaster response in Mozambique, has sufficient capacity, both as a responder, but also for shelter cluster coordination. It is recommended that efforts be put into developing capacity within CVM to implement the role as shelter cluster coordinator for emergency response. This entails:

* Recruitment of a permanent shelter focal person within CVM as soon as possible. A person who is Mozambican, speaks Portuguese and English
* Training of the CVM shelter focal point in the shelter cluster functions, procedures and protocols
* Providing close follow up from the IFRC Africa Zone Office, SARO and SSD in Geneva.
* SSD should renegotiate funding of a shelter focal person in CVM with UN Habitat and formalize it in a written agreement *as soon as possible*.
* IFRC should consider mobilizing resources for having an IFRC representative in Mozambique to support CVM senior management with organizational reform and, as part of the portfolio, to accompany the building up of the CVM capacity to coordinate the shelter cluster in between disasters.

**Formalizing temporary arrangements for Shelter Cluster coordination**

It is recommended that the standard procedure in the Global Shelter Cluster activation protocol be enforced.

It should furthermore be pursued that a paragraph is added to the National Contingency Plan for the Rainy and Cyclone Season 2013-2014 to the extent of: “When the shelter cluster is activated in Mozambique, IFRC has no permanent presence, and another organization takes on the cluster coordinating function, temporarily or even for the full length of the disaster, the organization shall contact the Global Shelter Cluster Convener in Geneva immediately, notifying the convener of this coordination arrangement until IFRC comes in to assume the coordination role, or for the agreed length of the arrangement.”

If sufficient resources for shelter cluster coordination by CVM/IFRC for the preparedness and emergency response cannot be assured, IFRC and CVM should acknowledge the lack of capacity to provide support for the on-going shelter cluster coordination efforts in Mozambique, and ask the best placed organization in Mozambique to assume the Shelter Cluster Coordinator role in Mozambique *for an agreed period*.

**Understanding the context**

SCTs that are deployed to Mozambique should be properly briefed about the government lead role, the government structures for disaster management and how the shelter cluster fits into the overall sector working group structure.

**Dissemination of IFRC role as Global Shelter Cluster Convener**

IFRC should use every opportunity to disseminate the role as Global Shelter Cluster Convener within the internal IFRC disaster management system: FACT induction and refresher trainings, ERU trainings, regional disaster management meetings, Disaster Management Working Group meetings in order to ensure that the awareness level is heightened in all entities involved in Disaster Management.

IFRC should include a section on the GSC Convener role and implications for IFRC disaster management in the IFRC Global Standard Operating Procedures for Disaster Management.

**IFRC visibility in Shelter Cluster Teams**

It is recommended that the practice of downplaying IFRC visibility in SCTs be loosened up, but that the practice of establishing a clear division of labour between the SCT and the IFRC operation is maintained, when a SCT is deployed, through the provision of dedicated shelter coordination capacity independent of IFRC operations.

Furthermore, IFRC must ensure sufficient capacity to lead the IFRC operation throughout the emergency response phase, so that division of roles between Shelter Cluster Teams and IFRC operation teams are not blurred.

**1 INTRODUCTION**

* 1. **Aim of this review**

Since IFRC took on the role as Global Shelter Cluster (GSG) convener in 2006, The IFRC shelter and Settlements Department (SSD) has systematically reviewed the deployments of Shelter Cluster Teams. The Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has commissioned this Review to analyse the effectiveness of the coordination services provided by the IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Team to the humanitarian response to the 2013 Mozambique floods, to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future response. The objectives of the Review are:

1. Examine the options for CVM/IFRC to continue to have a lead role in the cluster for preparedness and emergency response and the resources required to perform such a role.
2. Appraise the service provided by CVM/IFRC as shelter cluster coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors.
3. Review and analyse the experience of CVM/IFRC with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations.
4. Provide recommendations with regard to CVM/IFRC’s leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities, and clarify roles of CVM and IFRC at national level.
5. Examine if there were aspects of CVM/IFRC’s cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

Please see attached TOR for further details on the Review (Annex 1).

* 1. **The review process and methodology**

The Review started up on 24 April, with briefing at the Shelter and Settlement Department in Geneva on 29 April 2013 and initial literature review. Interviews were conducted in Nairobi at the Africa Zone Office on 28 May, in Maputo between 29 May and 10 June 2013. Interviews in Xai-Xai and Chokwe in Gaza Province were conducted on 4 and 5 June, and finally an additional interview was carried out at the Southern Africa Regional Office in Gaborone on 11 June 2013. A total of 35 informants contributed to this review, of which three sessions were focus group interviews. An interview guide was used for conducting semi-structured interviews (Annex 8).

Interviews included informants from CVM in Maputo and Gaza, IFRC Geneva, FACT TL, Africa Zone and Southern Africa Regional Offices, four PNS in Mozambique, a former UNV seconded to CVM as shelter focal point (for background information), INGC in Maputo and Gaza province, WFP, UNRCO, UNDP, IOM in Gaza, Maputo and Geneva, UN Habitat in Maputo and Geneva, Samaritan’s Purse in Chokwe and Save the Children. People who were not met in person were interviewed via Skype or telephone (sometimes on poor telephone lines) in as disperse locations as China, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Switzerland and Canada. The interviews were by and large of a qualitative nature, and triangulation of the information was critical to test the validity of the findings.

* 1. **Limitations of the review**

Locating the most appropriate persons was not always possible, such as a key informant from INGC, who was out of the country, and key persons from Min. of Public Works. More time for field visits would have allowed for inclusion of more key informants from Ministries, more UN agencies, and INGOs. The interview sample size is, however, sufficiently big to provide an informed analysis. Furthermore, observations and findings are consistently pointing in the same direction, so inclusion of additional informants would most likely not change the conclusions of the Review in any significant way. Given the limited time frame for the field visit and the fact that the review took place almost post emergency, the reviewer did not prioritize going to the affected communities. Observations about involvement of the affected population are therefore based solely on informants’ observations.

**1.4 Field visit itinerary and timeline**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Locations** | **May** | **June** | **July** | **Aug** |
| IFRC Africa Zone Office in Nairobi  | 28 |  |  |  |
| Field visit to Maputo | 29-31 | 1-9 |  |  |
| Field visit Xai-Xai |  | 4 |  |  |
| Field visit Chokwe |  | 5 |  |  |
| Debriefing at CVM Maputo |  | 10 |  |  |
| IFRC Southern Africa Regional Office, Gaborone  |  | 11 |  |  |
| Debriefing Genève |  | 20 |  |  |
| Draft Report |  |  | 19 |  |
| Dead line for comments, extended to |  |  | (26) | 10 |
| Final Report |  |  |  | 22 |

* 1. **Humanitarian reform and transformative agenda**

The Humanitarian Reform process was initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, together with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2005 to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, coordination and partnership.

To address systemic weaknesses in response, the humanitarian reform is based on three ‘pillars’:

* The *cluster approach*: addressing the need for ‘adequate capacity and predictable leadership in all sectors’ of humanitarian response.
* *Humanitarian financing*: addressing the need for ‘adequate, timely and flexible financing’ of humanitarian response, notably through the CERF.
* *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening*: addressing the need for ‘effective leadership and coordination in emergencies’ by the senior UN figure in country [[1]](#footnote-1)

Humanitarian reform acknowledges that effective response depends on the quality of *partnership* between the UN agencies, NGOs and Red Cross/Red Crescent agencies that respond globally to emergencies. Commitment to partnershipbetween these constituencies was endorsed through a set of principles developed in 2007.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Of particular relevance to the present report is the cluster approach. However, the other ‘pillars’ - *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening*, *humanitarian finance* and *partnership -* are interlinked drivers of effectiveness and quality.

The response to the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010 exposed a number of weaknesses and inefficiencies in the international humanitarian response. In light of the growing recognition of these weaknesses and inefficiencies, the IASC Principals decided to review the current approach to multilateral humanitarian response and make adjustments, building on the lessons learned in 2010 and 2011. Based on an analysis of current challenges to leadership and coordination, the IASC Principals agreed in December 2011 to a set of actions that collectively represent a substantive improvement to the current humanitarian response model. These actions are known as the Transformative Agenda, which aims at improving the leadership, coordination, and accountability of humanitarian interventions.

In recognition of these findings, the Global Shelter Cluster has placed a special focus on key elements that should enable predictable coordination, ensure coherent cluster and operational leadership at various levels, and improve the accountability and impact of the cluster on affected populations.

**1.6 Cluster approach**

The cluster approach is a component of the Humanitarian Reform and was endorsed by IASC principals in December 2005. A clusterbrings together groups of organisations and other stakeholders to address needs in one of the specific response gap areas identified by the reform process. These are predominantly sectoral groups. The cluster approach aims to address gaps and strengthen humanitarian response in the sector concerned.

There are eleven global clusters, which are seen as a mechanism that can strengthen response by ensuring predictability, accountability and partnership among agencies in different sectors. All clusters have focal points, known as Cluster Lead Agencies, which operate at the global and country level. Cluster lead agencies are responsible for setting standards and policy, building response capacity, and providing operational support to country level clusters. At country level, the cluster approach is expected to ensure a coherent and effective sectoral response.

**1.7 The Shelter Cluster**

The Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) is co-chaired by UNHCR and IFRC. UNHCR leads the Shelter Cluster in the area of conflict generated IDPs while IFRC is convener of the Shelter Cluster in disaster situations. Leadership may be less clear when natural disasters occur in countries also affected by conflict. For IFRC a decision is dependent upon the role of ICRC and whether ICRC leads operations for the Movement or not. Generally, IFRC will not take the lead of the Shelter Cluster in an operation following a natural disaster, if ICRC is the lead agency for the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. In such circumstances the Humanitarian Country Team may ask another agency to take the lead of the Shelter Cluster particularly if UNHCR is not active in the country.

The IFRC signed an agreement with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) defining the conditions for IFRC to lead the Shelter Cluster. The MoU emphasises that the Federation’s commitment at country level is not open-ended and that it is not ‘Provider of Last Resort’ if a gap in the provision of shelter goods and services remains unfilled.

The GSC supports country-level shelter clusters and other non-refugee[[3]](#footnote-3) coordination mechanisms by providing predictable, effective and timely shelter coordination services in order to improve humanitarian response. The GSC strengthens system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies through improved coordination at the global, regional, and national levels.

The GSC acknowledges that for the affected population the shelter recovery process starts immediately: households initiate the process of re-building their lives as soon as they can. Consequently, the GSC’s scope includes all aspects related to achieving the right to adequate housing with a humanitarian focus: household-related Non Food Items (NFIs), emergency and longer term shelter support, housing construction and reconstruction, and settlement support such as site planning and urban planning. The GSC acknowledges the variety of methods that shelter actors use to provide support and shelter options vary according to the context, protection aspects, climate, and other issues. They are defined in collaboration with local governments and in line with local regulations. Furthermore, the GSC acknowledges the invaluable contributions made by national-level shelter stakeholders to response and recovery efforts and declares its commitment to actively include those stakeholders in the work of the GSC.

* 1. **The disaster: Mozambique floods 2013**

In January 2013 heavy rains in Southern Africa produced floods in Southern and Central Mozambique. The floods developed unusually fast, forcing people to flee their homes, seeking refuge at high lying areas.

The floods affected a cumulative figure of more than 450,000 people, leaving 117 dead, destroyed close to 170,000 ha of cultivated land and displaced more than 185,000 people. The most affected province was Gaza, particularly the Limpopo river basin, followed by Maputo and Zambezia provinces. More heavy rains on 16 and 17 February, caused by a low pressure system in the Mozambique Channel, exacerbated the flood conditions.

On 12 January 2013 the Government declared orange alert. At the HCT meeting on 16 January the HCT advised clusters to “actively participate in the CTGC meetings and integrate in the four sectors of the CENOE, (which include infrastructure, social, communication and planning/information) at central level as well as other emergency structures at decentralised levels”.

The Government of Mozambique (GOM) made an initial allocation of 120 million MZN for the disaster response, followed up by an additional allocation of another 100 MZN, totalling 220 million MZN (approximately 7,5 million USD). Through the HCT an initial CERF allocation of 5,133,300 USD was provided, of which 1,002,288 USD for shelter. In addition to the CERF, a total of 21,510,941 USD were mobilised through the HCT partners.[[4]](#footnote-4)

**** Source: Mozambique Floods 2013, Consolidated Early Recovery Strategy, HCT, Maputo 25/04/2013

**2 COORDINATION** **ARRANGEMENTS**

* 1. **In-country coordination modalities**

Mozambique is a country prone to practically all types of natural disasters. The Rift Valley fault passes through Mozambique and tremors do occur, however not frequently. Floods, droughts, tropical storms and cyclones are, on the other hand, recurrent and produce natural disasters every year in varying degrees of strength.

Due to the cyclical nature of the disasters, the Government of Mozambique has established a permanent structure for the coordination of the emergency preparedness and response, developing national contingency plans for the rainy and cyclone season every year (Annex 3).

At regular intervals the magnitude of the disasters overwhelm the local capacity to respond and additional resources are mobilized through the Government structures for disaster management: Disaster Management Coordinating Council (CCGC) involving key Ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister, who in turn delegates authority to the Technical Disaster Management Council (CTGC), chaired by the National Disaster Management Institute (INGC) Director for implementation of the Plan with the support of the Humanitarian Country Team Working Group (HCT) including IASC partners.

The structure for emergency preparedness and response is subdivided in four sectors: communication, infrastructure, information and planning and social services. The infrastructure sector includes: shelter and early recovery. The cluster system does not entirely correspond to the government structures, and some clusters need to attend different sector meetings e.g. infrastructure and social sectors in order to ensure an adequate level of information sharing. The Shelter Cluster is a sub-group under the Infrastructure Sector Working Group.

**Disaster Coordination Mechanisms**

**Government**

**Partners**

CCGC

HCT

CTGC

HCT Secretariat

HCTWG

**Communication sector**

**Infrastructure sector**

**Information and Planning sector**

**Social Services sector**

**Shelter**

**Early Recovery**

**Telecomm**.

**Logistics**

**Protection**

**Education**

**Health**

**Nutrition**

**WASH**

**Food Security**

**Source**:

CCGC Contingency Plan

for the Rainy and Cyclone

Season 2012-2013

**2.2 Participants in the Shelter Cluster in Mozambique**

The Infrastructure Sector Working Group meets regularly during the year, more frequently during the preparedness phase at the end of each calendar year to elaborate the Contingency Plans for the upcoming cyclone and rainy season. Furthermore, members of the Infrastructure Sector Working Group participate in simulation exercises, which have the positive side effect that people in the sectors know each other, know the mandates and priorities of each member organization and ministry, and first and foremost mean that cluster members are known to the Government officials. The Shelter Cluster sub-group under the Infrastructure Sector Working Group also meets regularly during the year, more intensively during the preparedness phase and during emergencies.

2.2.1 The Red Cross Movement

Mozambique Red Cross (CVM)

CVM Programme Director is named as shelter cluster coordinator for emergency response in the National Contingency Plan.

IFRC

IFRC doesn’t have a permanent presence or country office in Mozambique. IFRC does therefore not participate in the shelter cluster throughout the year, but can be called upon by CVM if extra capacity is needed. There was a temporary arrangement with an IFRC representative/operations manager in country, who did not participate in the shelter cluster meetings.

Partner National Societies (PNS)

Spanish Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, Belgian Red Cross and German Red Cross all have permanent representatives in Mozambique. German and Danish Red Cross were involved in the emergency response to the floods with funds and Spanish RC with a shelter programme, but they were not involved in the shelter cluster coordination.

2.2.2. IOM

IOM has a permanent presence in Mozambique and is a key participant in the shelter cluster. IOM has an emergency profile, but the mandate is Camp Management and Camp Coordination (CCCM) for which IOM is the global lead. IOM’s interest and priority focus is on camp situations and operational coordination.

2.2.3 UN Habitat

UN Habitat has a permanent presence in Mozambique. UN Habitat participates actively in the shelter cluster and is the cluster coordinator for early recovery. The UN Habitat Head of Office is explicitly named as cluster coordinator for early recovery in the National Contingency Plan.

Although engaged in supporting the Shelter Cluster during the emergency period through technical advice and support (Architecture, Engineering, Technicians), the mandate of UN Habitat is not to coordinate the emergency response, and UN Habitat is therefore reluctant to engage in this role during that phase.

2.2.4 Other participants

Other participants are: Government representatives from INGC and Ministry of Public Works. Save the Children-UK, Concern, Samaritan’s Purse, World Vision, UNDP (in Gaza), and CAFOD/Caritas (in Gaza).

* 1. **Shelter Cluster activation**

As emergencies are happening every year at different scale, the GOM is reluctant to appeal for international assistance, at least not for small and medium size emergencies. Instead, when an emergency builds up, threatening to outstrip resources and prepositioned stocks, INGC writes a letter to the HCT to mobilize stocks and technical assistance through existing structures and partnerships. Donors, who want, are free to contribute. In 2013 the first three months were almost fully funded through this mechanism.

Sector Working Groups are active all year round, therefore they are never deactivated, and neither do they need to be activated through the normal cluster activation procedure by a request from the HCT to the ERC. When the floods in Mozambique started in January 2013, the clusters simply began to work, mobilizing resources: personnel, volunteers and relief supplies, through the existing structures. On 16 January 2013 the HCT encouraged clusters to participate actively in the CTGC meetings and integrate with Government emergency coordination structures.

The floods developed quickly this year, almost twice as fast as usual, and there was a need to act fast. In this process, CVM was overwhelmed with the compounding pressure for Red Cross operational action and coordination of the shelter cluster. As soon as the red alert was declared the UN opened the CERF. CVM has no experience in processing and coordinating CERF applications and therefore turned to IOM for help with the coordination of the CERF application. IOM was already actively engaged in the emergency response and the shelter cluster meetings, and stepped in to help, and so did UN Habitat as well. The situation was of such a nature that everybody did their best to help out.

On 31 January 2013 IOM deployed an experienced Emergency Response Officer[[5]](#footnote-5)with Portuguese skills and substantial knowledge of Mozambique, to lead the operation in Gaza. In the absence of a CVM/IFRC coordinator in Gaza, IOM started coordinating on the ground, establishing an overview of who-does-what-where.

The IFRC Shelter Coordinator from the IFRC Africa Zone Office in Nairobi arrived on 1 February 2013, to support CVM as shelter cluster coordinator and assess the needs for further support from IFRC SSD. He participated in shelter cluster meetings in support of CVM, but didn’t assume the shelter cluster coordination role himself. Approximately one week after his arrival, he requested the deployment of a SCT from SSD.

The SCT was deployed on Thursday 14 February, arriving in Maputo on Friday 15 February 2013 and in Xai-Xai on Sunday 17 February, attending its first coordination meeting on Monday 18 February 2013.

SCT presented themselves to the shelter cluster partners, took over the coordination responsibility from IOM and started coordinating the shelter cluster. It took the SCT a few days to orient themselves in the context and the existing systems, and the process was perceived by the people on the ground as a bit disruptive, as what had been used as mechanisms and tools for coordination was put aside, and the new systems, procedures, systems, standards and tools introduced. It contributed to the perception that shelter cluster members knew that it was a temporary arrangement.

The GOM lifted the red alert on 12 March 2013. The Shelter Cluster Coordinator left on the same day, the information manager two weeks later. According to the agreed protocol, UN Habitat was supposed to take over the shelter cluster coordination function, when the emergency phase was over and activities moved into early recovery. There was an understanding between the SCC and UN Habitat that this would be when the Government lifted the red alert. Nevertheless, as the emergency distributions were still on-going, there was a need for continued coordination of the emergency operation, so when the Information Manager left on 27 March, IOM assumed the shelter cluster coordination role again.

2.3.1 Chain of events

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 12 Jan | GOM declares orange alert |
| 16 Jan | HCT advices clusters to “actively participate in CTGC meetings and integrate in the four sectors of CENOE (which include infrastructures, social, communication and planning/information) at central level as well as other emergency structures at decentralized levels.”[[6]](#footnote-6)  |
| 20 Jan | UNRCO Sit Rep no 1 reports of 19,646 persons affected and 9 temporary shelters |
| 22 Jan | GOM declares red alert |
| 24 Jan | First CENOE meeting |
| 24-26 Jan | Rapid shelter assessment by IOM, UN Habitat and GOM |
| 30 Jan | IOM deploys Emergency Response Officer to Xai-Xai. In absence of a IFRC/CVM coordinator for coordinating the shelter cluster, she starts coordinating the shelter cluster in GazaCVM asks IOM to help out on the coordination of the CERF application |
| 1 Feb | CVM/IFRC Preliminary Appeal. FACT deploys |
| 1 Feb | IFRC deploys Shelter Coordinator from Africa Zone Office |
| 4 Feb | ERC approves CERF allocation of 5,133,300 USD towards floods response in Mozambique.  |
| 6 Feb | IFRC Shelter Coordinator requests deployment of IFRC SCT |
| 15 Feb | SCT arrives in Maputo |
| 16-17 Feb | Heavy rains worsen the situation |
| 18 Feb | SCT attends first coordination meeting in Xai-Xai. Takes over shelter cluster coordination |
| Late Feb | SCT Shelter Rapid Assessment |
| 5 Mar | Preliminary rapid assessment report for emergency shelter |
| 12 Mar | GOM lifts red alert. IFRC SCT Coordinator leaves. HCT chair states that “the lift up of red alert does not mean that all needs were covered on the contrary there are still humanitarian relief needs in the return and resettlement sites” |
| 15 Mar | After the lifting of the red alert, CTGC stresses again the need to strengthen monitoring and response measures in return as well as in the resettlement sites which is critical to prevent future disasters. |
| 27 Mar | SCT Information Manager leaves. IOM takes over coordination of shelter cluster.  |
| 10 June | Distributions still on-going, although winding down |

* 1. **Staffing**

The IFRC Shelter Coordinator from the IFRC Africa Zone Office was quickly deployed arriving in Mozambique on 1 February 2013 to assess the need for further support for the shelter coordination of CVM/IFRC in Mozambique. The Shelter Coordinator participated in shelter cluster meetings, but did not coordinate the shelter cluster. The Shelter Coordinator alerted SSD to the need for shelter cluster coordination capacity, and requested the deployment of a SCT about one week into his mission.

The priority for the SSD was to identify someone with Portuguese language skills and Mozambique experience, but didn’t manage. Lack of funding further delayed the deployment, but eventually a strong team was identified drawing on the shelter surge capacity, financed by Australian Red Cross and Canadian Red Cross. An experienced Australian Shelter Cluster Coordinator (SCC) and an equally experienced Spanish Information Manager (IM) were deployed. The Australian SCC did not speak Portuguese, but the IM was Spanish, and could manage the linguistic challenges.

The language issue seems, however, not to have been a major issue in practice. At the coordination meetings there was translation, and many informants, including from the Government, didn’t consider it a problem.

The Shelter Cluster Team (SCT) was deployed on 14 February 2013, arriving on Friday 15 February in Maputo on the last day of the FACT team leader’s mission, just in time for a short briefing.

The SCC left Mozambique on the day the red alert was lifted on 12 March 2013. This had been expected for a week, and hand-over arrangements were agreed with UN Habitat.

The IM stayed for a few weeks more until 27 March 2013, which provided more time for capacity building and training of the INGC and others in the information management systems and database.

**2.5 Timeliness**

Whereas every informant has expressed appreciation of the technical capacity and experience of the SCT, there has been consistent expressions that the deployment of the SCT was late.

There are many contributing factors, of which the key ones are outlined below. They mainly point to awareness and capacity weaknesses in CVM and some weaknesses in IFRC, which can be remedied in order to ensure more timely deployments in the future.

According to the National Contingency Plan for the Rainy and Cyclone Season 2012-2013, CVM is the cluster coordinator for the shelter cluster in the emergency preparedness and response phase. As mentioned in 2.2.1 there was no shelter focal point in CVM. This is one of the main reasons why nobody in CVM thought of contacting IFRC SSD for support.

IFRC had a representative/operations manager in-country, however, a person with a development profile and not familiar with IFRC emergency procedures, nor with the expectations of IFRC as GSC convener and the resources that could be mobilized for shelter cluster coordination. Therefore she didn’t think about contacting SSD, either.

The FACT team leader did not get involved with the shelter cluster, as the Africa Zone Shelter Coordinator was deployed to support CVM to assess the need for further shelter cluster coordination capacity.

So neither CVM, the IFRC representative, the FACT team leader, HCT, IOM or other Shelter Cluster members thought of contacting IFRC SSD in Geneva in the early stages of the floods to request additional capacity for shelter coordination. While well intended, the assumption of cluster co-leadership by IOM without following due protocol as agreed by the IASC[[7]](#footnote-7) contributed to further delaying a request for IFRC to meet its commitment.

It was only when a draft CERF document was being circulated for comments on 2 February 2013 that IFRC SSD in Geneva realized that IOM was quoted as co-lead of the shelter cluster in the CERF application. A few days later, the IFRC Africa Zone Shelter Coordinator requested a SCT from SSD.

From the time the request was made by the IFRC Africa Zone Shelter Coordinator until a SCT was on the ground, approximately 8 more days passed. The SCT eventually made it to Maputo on a Friday night so could not be presented until the Monday morning coordination meeting on 18 February, which was almost four weeks after the Government declared red alert. This further delay was caused by the unavailability of the GSC Global Focal Points for Shelter Coordination and Information Management, whose role is to deploy within 72 hours upon request, and the fact that funded shelter coordination roster members were not immediately available either.

With regard to the appropriateness of the length of the deployment, there are differing views. Many informants expressed that the SCT left prematurely. They “came late and left early” was a general observation. Others felt that hand-over arrangements had been agreed with UN Habitat, that the intensity of the operation had gone down and that there was no need for continued external support for coordination.

There seems, however, to be a need for continued coordination and information management for as long as relief distributions are on-going. As there were emergency distributions for a prolonged period after the lifting of the red alert, the coordination role in practice went back to IOM.

The “Shelter Project” has published case studies of the 2007 floods in Mozambique[[8]](#footnote-8), indicating that distributions continued for five months in 2007. This was also the case in 2013. The distributions were still on-going, although winding down, in June 2013.

**2.6 Remote support**

The main contact and support for the SCT was SSD in Geneva. This support: SSD accessibility, sparring/bouncing, technical support and advice was very appreciated by the SCT team and seems to have been adequate and timely. The contact and support was there, when needed.

The IFRC Africa Zone Office Shelter Coordinator, who was deployed for ten days early in the disaster, provided good support to CVM. He alerted SSD in Geneva to the need for the deployment of a SCT. His contribution has been highlighted by several informants as of high standards.

The IFRC Southern Africa Regional Office (SARO) had no contact with the SCT. The Disaster Management Coordinator and an Operations Manager supported the IFRC operation, but not the shelter cluster coordination. The experience of the Mozambique Floods 2013 has, however, produced awareness at SARO for the need to build up a certain level of knowledge of IFRC role in shelter cluster, including mechanisms and procedures, not as a full time position, but as part of a person’s portfolio. SARO should play an important role in monitoring developments in future disasters in Southern Africa and in alerting SSD in the early stages of the development of a potentially medium to large scale disaster.

* 1. **Handover**

There was an agreement between UN Habitat and the SCT to hand over when the red alert was lifted. The lifting had been expected for a week, and the SCC left on the day of the lifting. Nevertheless, as the emergency distributions were still on-going there was a need for continuity in the coordination of the emergency operation. The intensity of the coordination needs had gone down, though, and it is a question whether the situation justified a full time expensive expatriate as coordinator. Ideally this could have been handed over to a trained CVM shelter focal point.

It is outside the mandate and competence of UN Habitat to do coordination in the emergency phase and in practice the coordination ended up falling back on IOM, especially after the SCT IM left on 27 March 2013, as there continued to be a need for coordination and information management.

Many of the informants expressed that the departure of the SCC was perceived as premature, even though agreed beforehand. As the SCC had to leave, a second rotation with overlap could have been a better a solution.

In the future it will be important to ensure that a careful analysis of the length of the deployment and of who takes over the coordination role after the departure of a SCT is done prior to the departure of a SCT. Second rotations are far from ideal in a country were personal connectivity, familiarity with the context and Government structures makes a big difference. Nevertheless, second rotations may be a better option than leaving the coordination in a bit of a vacuum. Alternatively, other options should be considered such as a) the future shelter focal point in CVM should be empowered to take over the coordination, this would also be in line with the National Contingency Plan; or b) the coordination role should be handed over to the organization that is best placed in country to do it. This last option may vary from one emergency to the other.

**3 SCT FUNCTIONING AND IMPACT**

**3.1 Coordination and information management**

One of the elements that has been mentioned by most informants is the fact that the SCT, once in Mozambique, produced considerable added value. The coordination mechanism meant that duplication was avoided, gaps were identified, the operation became smoother, and there was cost efficient use of resources. The technical capacities and professional experience of both the SCC and IM were of high quality. Many expressed that the solid and reliable information helped feed the GOM to make the right operational and strategic decisions and improved the quality of the response. The team, including the IFRC Africa Zone Shelter Coordinator, were regarded as very competent and all added value. They contributed towards improved information sharing, information management, mapping, definition of the composition of the shelter kit, harmonization of approaches and materials, overview over who-does-what-where, improved coordination, which in turn meant more efficient use of resources, enhanced transparency, that duplication was avoided, gaps identified and better division of work amongst the shelter cluster partners was ensured.

The development of a Shelter Cluster Strategy (Annex 5) also improved the efficiency. It did, however, come late: more than 6 weeks into the disaster, which is due to the late deployment of the SCT.

For IOM, who had been pulled into doing the coordination from the onset of the floods, the deployment of the SCT meant that IOM was relieved of the task of coordination and could focus on the operational aspects and implementation, which is IOM’s priority. Had IOM, on the other hand, known that they would be pulled in to do the coordination again, as soon as the SCT left, they “would have preferred to have kept the role throughout the operation”. This doesn’t mean that the efforts of the SCT were not appreciated, but the SCT could instead have come in as extra hands providing technical advice.

Again, the only issue appearing in the review was the timing of the deployment of the SCT. Some informants, especially from the Government, did, however, express that it took too long to get the system up and running, both with regard to mobilization of supplies, logistics and distribution, which in the end meant that too many people were left without a roof over their head for too long. This cannot be attributed only to the late arrival of the SCT, but to the general situation in country. It was only CVM and INGC who had limited prepositioned contingency stocks in country, and these were quickly depleted.

It was pointed out that the late arrival of the SCT was perceived as somewhat disruptive. As neither of the SCT had any previous experience from Mozambique, the SCT needed a few days to orient themselves in the context to understand the emergency coordination structures and culture in Mozambique. After this, the SCT introduced new coordination and information management systems. Whereas the quality of the new systems eventually helped improve efficiency of the coordination, it was perceived as a bit of lack of acknowledgement of what was already in place and functioning, even though this was neither ideal nor totally up to the standards. There was already coordination and good collaboration amongst the participants in the shelter cluster and a simple data base, so having to change systems in the middle of the emergency was initially met with certain scepticism.

Another point is that even though the SCT was mandated to provide *support* for the Government led emergency coordination[[9]](#footnote-9) (SCC TOR Annex 2) the SCT was perceived in the shelter cluster and HCT to have been asked to go to Mozambique to *lead* the shelter cluster.

The issue that arises from this is that in Mozambique it is the Government who leads the emergency coordination at all levels. The HCT supports the government efforts, and has put a lot of effort into building systems that support the Government systems and structures, avoiding creation of parallel structures. For the last two years there has been only one National Contingency Plan, whereas in the previous decade: 2001-2010 there were two parallel plans: one for the Government and one for the (UN)HCT. The owner of the National Contingency Plan is the Government, and HCT is there to support the Government. There is a high level of sensitivity to this issue in Mozambique and with the HCT, so it is advisable to avoid any gesture that can be perceived as wanting to lead the shelter cluster.

Having said that, all informants acknowledge that the data base “Tabela Dinamica” introduced by the SCT IM was much better than the one they had used hitherto, and it is still being used. Several did express, though, that there was a need for more training, and that especially INGC needs more training in order to master the database. This was given as a reason for why the IM should have stayed longer, even though he himself felt that there was less urgency for his presence. One informant from INGC said “We are waiting for him (the IM) to come back! The IM was very patient, and that helped a lot!”

**3.2 SCT identity vis-a-vis IFRC visibility**

In recent deployments, SCTs have downplayed the IFRC identity. The rationale behind this is: a) as the shelter cluster is supporting the Government, which is political and may at time have priorities that are not in line with IFRC policies, it is important to have a water tight separation between shelter cluster coordination and the IFRC operation in order not to compromise the IFRC principle of independence; and b) that shelter cluster members need to perceive the SCT as an unbiased coordinator.

In Mozambique this practice was also followed. The SCT wore no logos, used cars without logos and down played the IFRC identity to the extent that one informant, who had been trained by the SCT IM in the use of the database, had no idea that the IM was from IFRC, but thought he was from IOM.

There are quite differing views on whether this practice is necessary or not. The SCT informants are leaning towards a stricter implementation of this practice, quoting accountability to the other shelter cluster members as the main reason. Informants from the shelter cluster and HCT members are, on the other hand, appreciative of the efforts to save-guard IFRC independence and unbiased image, but lean towards having a less strict interpretation of this practice.

With regard to the handling of the CERF, IFRC is not eligible for CERF funds, and is therefore seen as an unbiased coordinator of the shelter cluster. This could be an argument for flagging the identity rather than hiding it. There is an overweight of informants with the opinion that the SCT could flag the IFRC identity without being perceived as biased, as long as the division of roles between the people working in the IFRC operation and the SCT are made clear.

Some expressed that IFRC should also be able to benefit from the positive results of the SCT. By and large the shelter cluster seems to be one of the most well-respected and well-functioning of the clusters, and IFRC should get the credit for this.

The backside of the coin is that, with the exception of the informant in the second paragraph in 3.2, people are aware of the SCT being from IFRC anyway, and the Red Cross Movement actors: CVM, IFRC operation, Partner National Societies and SCT are regarded as *one* Red Cross by non-red cross partners, regardless of the visibility practice. Therefore, when something goes wrong in the IFRC operation, it also reflects poorly on the SCT.

After the FACT team leader left on 15 February 2013, there was an operational leadership vacuum in the IFRC operation, until an operational manager with the right leadership skills was in place in April. Because of this, government officials and HCT turned to the SCC about operational issues in the IFRC operation. This indicates that the SCT and the IFRC are intrinsically linked, logos or not, and that for a SCT to have the space and independence to perform, there is a need for IFRC to ensure that there is sufficient capacity to lead the IFRC operation as long as the SCT is on the ground, so that a clear division of roles can be upheld throughout the emergency response phase.

**3.3 CVM/IFRC capacity for Shelter Cluster coordination**

CVM is widely recognized and respected as the first responder and front line implementer, when there is an emergency. The following is a quote from one of the respondents: “The role of CVM is outstanding on the ground. Nobody can match coverage and outreach. CVM provides added value” . CVM volunteers are used by many organizations not only for distribution, but also for registration, camp management and distributions. CVM participates in search and rescue, dissemination of messages to communities at risk, evacuations, first aid, provision of shelter, restoring family links and many other tasks[[10]](#footnote-10).

It is, however, also widely known that CVM currently has weakened capacity at Head Quarter level. Another respondent mentioned that “CVM doesn’t have strong capacity at Head Quarter level. A big organization like CVM should have more output.”

Most informants did underline that the shelter cluster coordination role should continue to rest with CVM. There is a need for a strong CVM, and therefore efforts and resources should be dedicated to rebuilding capacity in CVM to take that role.

From 2009 until March 2012 there was a UNV, seconded by UN Habitat, working with CVM with the mandate to build capacity within CVM for coordinating the shelter cluster. Unfortunately, all attempts to train a counterpart failed, as no obvious and committed counterpart was identified in CVM. After the UNV left, there were still funds available for recruitment of a national shelter focal point in CVM, but due to the situation in CVM, no person was ever recruited to assume the shelter focal point function. This is generally seen as a missed opportunity and a true gap.

It is important to state here that even though the CVM programme director is mentioned in the National Contingency Plan as the coordinator for the emergency response phase, she is not able to assume that role when an emergency develops, as she is overwhelmed by operational concerns. This was also the case during the floods in 2013. Coordinating the shelter cluster is a full time job, and cannot be done as a second or third priority by someone with more than full time responsibilities already. This is why IFRC, both in its role to support the capacity of National Societies and as Global Shelter Cluster lead for emergency response, according to the MOU[[11]](#footnote-11) between CVM and UN Habitat is ready to provide additional shelter coordination capacity when required.

There are funds available to co-fund a CVM national shelter focal point with funds from IFRC and Spanish Red Cross for the rest of the year, and more funds can be renegotiated with UN Habitat to extend the CVM shelter focal point as a longer term position. Alternatively, UN Habitat is willing to consider seconding another UNV, if a committed counterpart can be identified with CVM.

IFRC SSD has a roster of approximately 90 members that can be provided at short notice when there is a need to provide extra capacity for coordination, information management and technical assistance during medium and large scale disasters. Obviously, SSD must be alerted to the need to deploy and receive a request.

In Mozambique there was an IFRC representative, engaged in winding up the administrative remainders from the floods operation in 2012. Her contract was extended as operations manager, when it became obvious that a new disaster was building up. It is fair to note that her core competencies are not disaster management. She didn’t have the background, experience and knowledge of the IFRC disaster management global tools, DM procedures or knowledge about IFRC’s role as GSC convener. Therefore she was not aware of the need to contact SSD in Geneva, neither was she aware of the resources that could be made available from SSD to support the coordination of the shelter cluster.

The FACT team leader, who was deployed early in the disaster, provided quality leadership for the IFRC operation, but did not engage with the shelter coordination, as this was the role of the IFRC Africa Zone Shelter Coordinator. Although briefed by SSD before deployment, she still had limited knowledge of the IFRC GSC role. The FACT team leader left after 15 days and was not replaced. This left a leadership gap in the IFRC operation, which impacted on the SCT.

The IFRC Africa Zone Shelter Cluster Coordinator did provide support for CVM cluster coordination role, identified the need to strengthen CVM capacity, alerted SSD and eventually made a request for the deployment of an SCT.

Besides the Africa Zone Shelter Coordinator there was hardly anyone in the IFRC set up who had awareness about the IFRC shelter cluster role. It is important for IFRC to ensure that people in leadership positions are aware of the expectations of IFRC as a Global Shelter Cluster convener.

1. **INFORMING STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING FOR THE RESPONSE**
	1. **Assessments**

The first rapid shelter assessment was carried out by IOM, UN Habitat and the Government between 24-26 January 2013, just after the GOM declared the red alert.

At the end of February 2013 a second shelter assessment was carried out by the SCT, which helped inform the Shelter Strategy. At this point in time the situation had changed, and there was a need to reassess the situation with a view of adjusting plans. The Shelter Strategy was appreciated, but again, it came late in the disaster.

The government initially wanted to relocate people on a permanent basis to higher lying - safer, but less fertile – grounds. The Shelter Cluster contested this as a general strategy, and the Government eventually modified this policy.

* 1. **Coordination, information management and application of standards**

The shelter standards used by the different actors on the ground differed considerably. Rather soon the shelter cluster members acknowledged the need to develop a standardized shelter kit, based on simple building materials, tools, tarpaulins, poles and rope. Such a kit is very inexpensive, compared to a tent[[12]](#footnote-12). The government was quite adamant that cash distributions as an alternative was not a viable solution.

Because supplies were limited and couldn’t cover the needs the Government insisted on cutting the kits in half. Even though contested by some agencies as this would compromise the application of Sphere Standards, this was based on consultations with the affected population who prioritized coverage over quantity.

The SCT helped developing a standard kit with a simple instruction sheet (Annex 4). This was quoted as one of the important contributions of the SCT, which in an ideal world would have been ready at the early stages of the disaster.

With regard to information management, the SCT produced a steady flow of reliable, verifiable data that was fed to the Government through the COE and the CENOE on a daily basis. This improved informed Government decision making.

* 1. **Accountability to affected populations**

Interviewing the affected population was not a priority in the Review. Many flood affected people had already returned to their places of origin, and inquiring about the aid organizations’ internal coordination did not seem to justify the time that such interviews would have required. Therefore the findings are based on secondary information by interviewees only.

According to the informants community leaders were not only consulted, but very much involved in the assistance, both in the organization of the assistance and the distribution. The community leaders organized the displaced people in their original neighbourhoods. Community leaders were involved in the planning, which helped avoid duplication and “infiltration”[[13]](#footnote-13) and provided transparency to the communities. Finally, the wish of the government to reduce the shelter kits in order to reach more people was based on consultations with the affected population.

**5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

* 1. **Understanding the Mozambican context**

In Mozambique knowledge of the context, knowing systems, structures, the actors in shelter cluster and the government – and being known by the government - is critical. Mozambique is prone to recurrent natural disasters. Because of the cyclical nature of the disasters, the Government has established a permanent system for contingency planning and response. Sector Working Groups are active throughout the year, which not only enhances the preparedness for response, but as a positive side effect means that people in the working groups know each other. Personal connection with structures and people, both IASC partners and Government, are key to understanding how things work in Mozambique. Continuity is another key criterion for ensuring success in Mozambique.

The “parachuting” in of the team one month into the disaster in the middle of the next disaster is not advisable. Even though the existing coordination mechanism in Mozambique was far from ideal, had technical deficiencies and didn’t match the scope of Shelter Cluster responsibilities, there was good understanding and cooperation amongst the partners on the ground. If a SCT arrives late into a similar situation in the future it would be desirable that they take this into account, and focus on filling the gaps for technical capacity and coordination.

Furthermore, it is important to underline that GOM is leading the coordination of disaster management in Mozambique. HCT and IASC partners, including the clusters, are there to support the Government.

If IFRC wants to demonstrate a willingness to support CVM in the coordination of the shelter cluster, IFRC will have to invest in preparedness and in a closer connection with CVM and the Mozambican context. Ideally, IFRC should have a permanent presence in Mozambique, at least until CVM capacity has been restored. If resources cannot me mobilized for a permanent representation in Mozambique, at least a seasonal presence for the contingency planning and potential emergency period must be ensured, coupled with frequent visits from SARO, AZO, as well as from SSD in Geneva. This must go hand-in-hand with the recruitment of a CVM shelter focal point.

Even though language wasn’t identified a big issue for the SCT, Portuguese is definitely an advantage, especially in the relationship building with the Government. Deploying a non-Portuguese speaking SCT would be less of a problem, if there was a CVM shelter focal point that could provide the liaison and induction into the national context. IFRC should ensure Portuguese language skills and Mozambique knowledge on the Shelter Cluster roster for future deployments, knowing that sooner or later deployments to Mozambique will be requested again. If at least one of the SCT members speaks Portuguese, it will facilitate the liaison with the Government

**5.2 Options for CVM/IFRC**

Some informants raised the question, whether the 2013 floods were of such a scale that they merited the deployment of an external SCT, or if it could have been managed with existing resources and organizations.

CVM did not have the capacity to manage coordination of the shelter response. It is the role of IFRC to provide extra capacity when the national society doesn’t have the required capacity. There was capacity and resources in SSD to draw on, but the mechanism to alert SSD at an early stage of the disaster failed. Furthermore, there seemed to be a disconnect in the internal IFRC system.

It would have been good, if there had been early contact between IFRC SSD and IFRC representative in Mozambique and CVM. Subsequently, contacts should have been pursued between SSD and other shelter cluster members such as IOM to ensure that there was agreement on the coordination arrangements. The formalization of such an agreement in the future is desirable, ideally through the National Contingency Planning process.

**5.3 Building CVM capacity**

Given that CVM currently has weak capacity, a question that was raised time and again was if another organization with a permanent presence should have the role as shelter cluster coordinator for emergency response, at least for the moment, until CVM capacity has been restored. This is definitely an option, that could be considered, but most informants expressed that the role should ideally rest with CVM, and that the desired solution would be rebuilding of CVM’s capacity to perform that role. Furthermore, most informants mentioned that it was important to have a cluster coordinator who is perceived as unbiased (e.g. with regard to the coordination of the CERF), and has the capacity to provide full time capacity for coordination and technical capacity for information management.

**It is therefore recommended** that efforts be put into developing capacity within CVM to implement the role as shelter cluster coordinator for emergency response. This entails:

* Recruitment of a permanent shelter focal person within CVM as soon as possible. A person who is Mozambican, speaks Portuguese and English
* Training of the CVM shelter focal point in the shelter cluster functions, procedures and protocols
* Providing close follow up from the IFRC Africa Zone Office and SSD in Geneva.
* Ensuring that there is shelter knowledge at IFRC Southern Africa Regional Office to provide monitoring and early warning. Training a SARO staff with shelter as part of his/her portfolio.
* Identification of people on the SSD roster with Portuguese skills and knowledge of Mozambique to be stand-by for the cyclone and rainy season.
* Deploying the shelter stand-by person for a short mission to Mozambique in November-December to familiarize with the systems and the actors in the infrastructure working group, the shelter cluster and INGC and liaise with the CVM shelter cluster focal point. Ideally the selected stand-by person should participate in the HCT preparedness planning workshop held in November/December. Even when deployment ends up not being needed, this would be a good investment.
* During the development of a new disaster scenario, SSD and/or the Africa Zone needs to stay in close contact with the CVM shelter focal person, and be prepared to deploy the stand-by person, if needed a full SCT, immediately from the very on-set of the disaster.
* SSD should conduct a shelter training in Mozambique at the end of 2013, ideally in connection with the HCT preparedness planning workshop November/December 2013.
* SSD should renegotiate funding of a shelter focal person in CVM with UN Habitat and formalize it in a written agreement *as soon as possible*.
* Given that CVM is going through a period of unusually low capacity at Head Quarters right now, it would be advisable for IFRC to consider having an IFRC representative in Mozambique to support senior management with organizational reform and as part of the portfolio to accompany the building up of the CVM capacity to coordinate the shelter cluster in between disasters. There are four PNS with country representation in Mozambique who have a vested interest in rebuilding CVM capacity. It should be possible to mobilize resources for a Federation representative amongst the stakeholders.

**5.4 Formalizing temporary arrangements for Shelter Cluster coordination**

**It is recommended** to that the standard procedure in the Global Shelter Cluster activation protocol be enforced.

It should furthermore be pursued that a paragraph is added to the National Contingency Plan for the Rainy and Cyclone Season 2013-2014 saying something to the extent of: “When the shelter cluster is activated in Mozambique, IFRC has no permanent presence, and another organization takes on the cluster coordinating function, temporarily or even for the full length of the disaster, the organization shall contact the Global Shelter Cluster Convener in Geneva immediately, notifying the convener of this coordination arrangement until IFRC comes in to assume the coordination role, or for the agreed length of the arrangement.”

If sufficient resources for shelter cluster coordination by CVM/IFRC for the preparedness and emergency response cannot be assured for the time being, i**t is recommended** that IFRC and CVM should acknowledge the lack of capacity to provide support for the on-going shelter cluster coordination efforts in Mozambique, and ask the best placed organization in Mozambique to assume the Shelter Cluster Coordinator role in Mozambique *for an agreed period*.

**5.5 Aspects of cluster coordination that compromised CVM/IFRC**

Claiming the shelter cluster coordinator role in Mozambique without committing adequate resources and adequate timing would signify incurring a great reputational risk for IFRC. It is recommended that IFRC ensures timely deployment from the onset of the next disaster that merits deployment of a SCT.

**It is recommended** that SCTs that are deployed to Mozambique are properly briefed about the government structures for disaster management and how the shelter cluster fits into the overall sector working group structure.

**5.6 Dissemination of IFRC Role as GSC Convener**

There is limited awareness of IFRC role as Global Shelter Cluster Convener for emergency response within part of the IFRC Secretariat and with RC national societies. There is a need to ensure that permanent secretariat structures and delegates deployed in emergencies are aware of the GSC role in order to ensure that the IFRC as a whole looks coordinated and organized. There is a need to disseminate IFRC role as GSC convener both within all the IFRC secretariat structures: Geneva, DCM, the Zone offices and the regional offices, and the PNS and the National Societies, in this case CVM.

**It is recommended** to use every opportunity within IFRC: FACT induction and refresher trainings, ERU trainings, regional disaster management meetings, Disaster Management Working Group meetings to present the GSC convener role, in order to ensure that the awareness level is heightened in all entities involved in Disaster Management.

**It is recommended** to include a section on the GSC Convener role and implications for IFRC disaster management in the IFRC Global Standard Operating Procedures for Disaster Management.

**5.7 IFRC visibility in SCTs**

IFRC visibility in SCTs has both pros and cons. “We are one Red Cross” was mentioned by several, meaning that there will always be a common identity, and that too much separation seems like compromising the Red Cross principle of “Unity”. Most saw it as an advantage to have clear division of roles between IFRC operation and SCT, in order to make sure that there is transparency and accountability to the shelter cluster members. Coordinating a cluster is a full time job – or two full time jobs – and cannot be handled as a side task in a medium to large scale emergency.

Few saw it as a problem that the SCT flags its IFRC identity, as long as the different roles are made clear. In general, informants thought that it is a bit artificial to have a water tight shelter cluster identity with no IFRC visibility. When something goes wrong in the IFRC operation it reflects back on the SCT, regardless of the firewall.

**It is recommended** that the practice of downplaying IFRC visibility in SCTs be loosened up a bit, but that the firewalling policy of establishing a clear division of labour between the SCT and the IFRC operation is maintained, when a SCT is deployed, through the provision of dedicated shelter coordination capacity independent of IFRC operations. Furthermore, that IFRC ensures sufficient capacity to lead the IFRC operation throughout the emergency response phase, so that division of roles are not blurred.

**Annexes**

*Annex 1 TOR Review of the 2013 Mozambique Floods IFRC led Shelter Cluster*

*Annex 2 SCC TORs*

*Annex 3 CCGC Mozambique Contingency Plan 2012-2013*

*Annex 4 Shelter Kit Flyer Instructions*

*Annex 5 Shelter Cluster Strategic Operational Framework Mozambique*

*Annex 6 Informants for the Review*

*Annex 7 Sources and References*

*Annex 8 Interview Guide*



*Strategy 2020* voices the collective determination of the IFRC to move forward in tackling the major challenges that confront humanity in the next decade. Informed by the needs and vulnerabilities of the diverse communities with whom we work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms to which all are entitled, this strategy seeks to benefit all who look to Red Cross Red Crescent to help to build a more humane, dignified, and peaceful world.

Over the next ten years, the collective focus of the IFRC will be on achieving the following strategic aims:

1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises
2. Enable healthy and safe living
3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace
1. OCHA, Building a Stronger, More Predictable Humanitarian Response System, [www.ochaonline.un.org](http://www.ochaonline.un.org) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Global Humanitarian Partnership (2007) Principles of Partnership, <http://www.icva.ch/doc00002628.doc> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. UNHCR has a mandated responsibility to coordinate multi-sectoral response to refugee needs and clusters are not established in this context. In a humanitarian crisis involving both refugee and non-refugee populations, UNHCR will participate in shelter cluster meetings at national and sub-national levels, and refugees’ needs for shelter assistance will be reflected in consolidated appeals under “multi-sectoral” response to refugees. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. UNOCHA Financial Tracking System [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. She was later appointed Head of Sub-Office for IOM Gaza [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. UNRCO Sit Rep 1 of 20 January 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Cluster leadership arrangements communicated to Global Cluster Leads through the ERC [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. “Shelter Project” 2008 and 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. SCC TOR: Purpose: In support of the government’s overall leadership, the purpose of the Shelter Cluster Coordinator is to contribute towards the effective provision of shelter assistance to the affected population by humanitarian agencies, in fulfilling the Shelter Cluster mission to:

	* provide leadership in emergency and crisis preparedness, response and recovery;
	* work in partnership to prevent and reduce shelter-related morbidity and mortality;
	* ensure evidence-based actions, gap-filling and sound coordination; and
	* enhance accountability, predictability and effectiveness of emergency shelter actions. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. An example given was that the CVM first aid post in Chiaquelane was open 24/7 during the emergency phase. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Acordo de Entendimento (MOU) CVM e UN Habitat signed 20 October 2008 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. 6 USD vs. 300 USD [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Potential deviation of resources [↑](#footnote-ref-13)