

## Review of the Fiji Shelter Cluster in Response to Tropical Cyclone Evan



Tropical Cyclone Evan Makes Landfall in Fiji  
(Source: Fiji Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Tropical Cyclone Evan, 17th December 2012).

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**October 2013**

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFP	Act for Peace
ARC	Australian Red Cross
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BBS	Build Back Safer
DoH	Department of Housing
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission
EU	European Union
IDP	Internally Displaced People
FIE	Fiji Institution of Engineers
FRCS	Fiji Red Cross Society
GNI	Good Neighbour International
GoF	Government of Fiji
GSC	Global Shelter Cluster
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HFHF	Habitat for Humanity Fiji
iTaukei Affairs	Indigenous Fijian Affairs
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies
MoLGUDH&E	Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing & Environment
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDMO	National Disaster Management Office
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NZAID	New Zealand Aid Programme
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCN	People's Community Network
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PHT	Pacific Humanitarian Team
PNS	Participating National Societies
PRO	Pacific Regional Office (IFRC)
ProCap	Protection Standby Capacity Project
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
SCC	Shelter Cluster Coordinators
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TC Evan	Tropical Cyclone Evan
ToR	Terms of Reference
TWIG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

It has been a privilege to undertake this review of the shelter cluster in response to tropical cyclone Evan in Fiji.

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Most importantly, I wish to acknowledge the all of the communities that contributed to this review by affording me the privilege to visit your homes and share your experiences. Ultimately, the objective of the shelter cluster is to reduce the impact of disasters upon peoples around the world. By participating in this review of the shelter cluster in Fiji, you have made a valued contribution to that objective.

Vinaka vaka levu



Peter M Lawther  
Melbourne,  
October 2013

### ***Disclaimer***

*The opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect those of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the author(s). Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by the IFRC of the opinions expressed.*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TC Evan was a category 4 cyclone that passed over the Northern and Western Divisions of Fiji on 16 and 17 December 2012, with winds gusting over 230 kph. TC Evan caused serious damage to housing, key economic and tourist infrastructure, wide power outages and disruptions to water supply. Flooding was recorded across the country. The impact of TC Evan compounded losses experienced by communities and businesses in the wake of the Western Division floods of January and March 2012.

Due to advance warning, no deaths or major injuries were recorded. The total monetary value of the effects of TC Evan is estimated at F\$195 Million (CHF 95 Million), representing approximately 2.6 percent of Fiji's Gross Domestic Product. The total number of houses affected was recorded at 8,497 or approximately 5% of the national housing stock. Of these, 2,094 were totally destroyed and the remaining 6,403 suffered some degree of damage. Following TC Evan approximately 14,000 people were accommodated in 242 evacuation centres; - typically either schools or public halls. Within a month, this number declined to almost zero<sup>1</sup>.

In response, the GoF activated the Fiji National Clusters for the first time in late December 2012. Shelter is one of eight clusters. The lead Agency for the shelter cluster is the Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing and Environment. The co-lead of the shelter cluster is the IFRC. The shelter cluster has a listed membership of 19 key partner Agencies including Government Ministries, NGO's, donors, civil society organizations and professional associations. The GoF took the early decision that they would assume responsibility for shelter responses in the formal settlements (those characterised by having legal title), and the NGO's etc. of the shelter cluster would be responsible for the informal settlements (those without legal title).

As co-lead, the IFRC is mandated to provide active support to the shelter cluster lead Agency. The IFRC has done this through the deployment of three shelter cluster coordinators from January to August 2013, with allied support from the regional office in Suva, the zone office in Kuala Lumpur, and the Shelter and Settlements Department in Geneva.

Largely through the provision of this support, the shelter cluster has achieved the following:

- Created a professional relationship between lead and co-lead Agencies, characterised by relevant and appropriate capacity building and advocacy by the IFRC to the GoF.
- Legitimised the shelter cluster in particular, and the cluster approach in general. This in turn has given positive visibility to the IFRC as an organization.
- Developed an enabling environment allowing members to be aware of the differing roles that exist within the shelter cluster organisations, provide a forum of network and dialogue, and allow Agencies to consider and develop their future role in terms of shelter activities.
- Successfully advocated on behalf of affected people within the informal settlements resulting in GoF approval of their inclusion in housing recovery programming

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<sup>1</sup> Government of Fiji (March 2013). Fiji Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Tropical Cyclone Evan, 17th December 2012. (p.viii).

activities, and of the shelter partner Agencies to deliver these programs.

- Agreement on a transitional shelter design for the informal settlements.
- Developed awareness through the creation and dissemination of build back safer materials.
- Ongoing advocacy to donors of the need for continued funding in the shelter sector.

However, the shelter cluster (and in particular the IFRC as co-lead) has faced a number of challenges including:

- A lead Agency and cluster partners with no previous cluster experience as this was the first time that Fiji National Clusters were activated. This resulted in limited understanding of and capacity to fulfill their shelter cluster responsibilities.
- A difficulty of engaging the key shelter cluster partner Agencies.
- A lack of demonstrable shelter output. The shelter cluster had little input into the emergency response, and no transitional / permanent houses have been constructed in the informal settlements as at July 2013 yet<sup>2</sup>. The number of houses reconstructed by the GoF is also unclear.
- An ongoing lack of clarity of the full extent of either the shelter need or the response, as the damage assessments remain un-reconciled to the GoF stated damage numbers, across both formal and informal settlements.

Despite these challenges, the shelter cluster has clearly established an initial platform upon which to base future progress, and the IFRC's contribution toward that has been notable. In this sense, the response to TC Evan could be regarded as a pilot program for the Fiji shelter cluster. The impact of the work undertaken by the shelter cluster will be evidenced in the next disaster and beyond. The shelter cluster in Fiji is now well placed to make strong contributions to reduce the future vulnerability of communities, both formal and informal. Further, it can also strongly inform the regional shelter cluster conducted under the auspices of the Pacific Humanitarian Team.

Yet much remains to be done, as evidenced by the recommendations contained in this report. It is unrealistic to expect the GoF to unilaterally continue the work of the shelter cluster, at least in the short term, and the platform established by the shelter cluster could unravel unless continued co-lead Agency support is provided. This support could be provided by either the IFRC or another suitable Agency. However, given their established relationship with the GoF through the shelter cluster co-lead role, their allied roles as convener of the regional and global shelter clusters, and also their highly relevant broad view of shelter from preparedness to emergency to permanent housing, the IFRC is strongly placed to provide this support.

However, with the IFRC shelter cluster coordination presence coming to an end in August, the future of the shelter cluster is imperiled. As such, the IFRC is implored to maintain a dedicated shelter cluster coordination presence in Fiji and thus strongly contribute to reduce the vulnerability of people to future natural disasters, both in Fiji and throughout the Pacific region.

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<sup>2</sup> It is understood that 120 transitional shelters have since been constructed.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

This review contains the following recommendations, primarily for the IFRC, but also for the broader shelter cluster where applicable. These recommendations may be considered to represent some of the lessons for the shelter cluster from the TC Evan response.

<b>Coordination Arrangements</b>	
1.	Deploy SCC for a minimum period of 6 months.
2.	Strengthen SCC handover procedures to allow for in country overlap of SCC, or a handover document as a minimum. If necessary, develop a handover document template.
3.	Consider dedicated administrative support being available to SCC, and also known to be available by them.
4.	Streamline human resource activities and deployment procedures across stakeholders through improved communication.
<b>Supporting Service Delivery</b>	
5.	Demonstrate (and remind) partner Agencies how the shelter cluster can and does add value to them. Use capacity building opportunities (see below) for this with a view to developing ongoing SAGs or TWIGs as a means of encouraging Agency engagement in the shelter cluster.
6.	Advocate for local level shelter cluster arrangements to ensure that discussions and decisions held at national level are being received at local level. Conversely, this could also develop “bottom up” information management flows. Involve local Agencies to facilitate this process. E.g. the FRCS and / or Rotary Fiji could be well positioned to take on this role given their on the ground reach, links to government / business respectively, and strong presence in emergency response.
7.	Prioritise the information requirements of the shelter cluster and source a local resource to centralise this data and collate summary information. Distribute such information to all partner Agencies of the shelter cluster.
<b>Informing Strategic Decision Making</b>	
8.	Provide further assessment training as part of ongoing disaster preparedness for staff of shelter cluster Agencies, and as part of a broader multi-cluster assessment tool as applicable. This could also include capacity mapping and pre-determined role / geographic allocation ahead of the next disaster season. Consideration should also be given to deploying a FACT team in response to the next disaster as a service to the shelter cluster.
9.	Give greater promotion and emphasis to cross-cutting issues in the shelter response. Visual media, for example similar to the BBS poster, could be used to promote this.
<b>Planning and Strategy Development</b>	
10.	Finalise the approved shelter cluster strategy and issue as final. Investigate visual and /or other mediums for presentation to partner Agencies of the shelter cluster.
11.	Finalise the approved shelter cluster technical standards document and issue as final.
12.	Consider the provision of quality assurance training to partner Agencies in the overseeing of both transitional and permanent shelter interventions.

13.	Continue advocating for consistent cost effective quality of emergency shelter materials based upon IFRC specifications.
14.	Continue advocacy of the shelter cluster to donors. Develop a pre-prepositioning funding strategy with donors, based upon the developed MoU system, for rolling out for informal settlements in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
15.	Develop a feedback / grievance mechanism for all communities (formal and informal) for implementation by the GoF as lead Agency of the shelter cluster.
16.	Update the logical framework of the shelter cluster operational framework (strategy) to align with the Humanitarian Action Plan (version 2), and expand its activities to include those required to achieve the stated outcomes and outputs.
<b>Advocacy</b>	
17.	Continue promotion of the BBS poster and allied training programs in all areas, but particularly in those areas that experience frequent natural disasters.
18.	Continue advocacy work to donors on behalf of shelter cluster partner Agencies. Some local Agencies reported being daunted by having to deal with large institutional donors and the IFRC can provide valuable support in this area. Further, certain Agencies reported being unable to source EU funding due to registration requirements and requested greater IFRC (in its role as cluster co-lead) “brokering” between donors and Agencies.
19.	Continue to advocate for dedicated GoF resources to be made available for the fulfillment of their shelter cluster leadership role.
<b>Monitoring and Reporting</b>	
20.	Develop and implement a simple cluster monitoring and reporting tool for specific situations such as TC Evan. Continue to follow up the templates issued recently to shelter cluster partner Agencies for completion.
21.	Implement the performance monitoring system earlier in the response.
<b>Contingency Planning</b>	
22.	Complete and maintain the identification and mapping of pre-positioned stocks and capacity of Agencies.
23.	Establish and implement an ongoing training and capacity building program in consultation with shelter cluster partner Agencies. Capture and disseminate (e.g. through a series of workshops tied to shelter cluster meetings) the success and challenges experienced by partner Agencies as a means of both capacity building and promoting shelter cluster engagement.
<b>Fiji Shelter Cluster Moving Forward</b>	
24.	Target Fiji (and the Pacific) for a permanent IFRC shelter cluster coordination presence to address demonstrable and continuing need at both national and regional level. Ultimately, all of the recommendations contained herein depend upon this.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Aim of the Review

The aim of the review is to appraise the performance of the IFRC as co-lead of the shelter cluster in terms of its establishment, operation and service provision in response to Tropical Cyclone Evan in Fiji. Specifically, this will consider coordination arrangements, supporting service delivery, informing strategic decision making and strategy development, advocacy, monitoring and reporting and contingency planning, as detailed in the ToR (Appendix A).

In addition, the review is to assess the shelter response itself in terms of:

- i. The number of shelter initiatives in the Humanitarian Action Plan (Version 2) that have been completed or in progress by June 2013; and
- ii. The percentage of shelter cluster Agencies that have integrated Disaster Risk Reduction elements in their shelter response.

## 1.2 Methodology

The methodology of the review comprised four main components as follows:

- i. Review of key documents. A list of documents reviewed is included in Appendix B.
- ii. Interviews with 32 key stakeholders. A list of interviewees is included in Appendix C.
- iii. Compilation and submission of a draft report.
- iv. Finalisation of the report based upon feedback received on the draft report.

In-country data collection was undertaken from the 8<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> of July 2013.

## 1.3 Humanitarian Reform and the Transformative Agenda

The Humanitarian Reform process was initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, together with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2005 to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, coordination and partnership.

To address systemic weaknesses in response, the humanitarian reform is based on three 'pillars':

- i. The *cluster approach*: addressing the need for 'adequate capacity and predictable leadership in all sectors' of humanitarian response.
- ii. *Humanitarian financing*: addressing the need for 'adequate, timely and flexible financing' of humanitarian response, notably through the Central Emergency Response Fund.
- iii. *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening*: addressing the need for 'effective leadership and coordination in emergencies' by the senior UN figure in country<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> OCHA, Building a Stronger, More Predictable Humanitarian Response System, [www.ochaonline.un.org](http://www.ochaonline.un.org)

Humanitarian reform acknowledges that effective response depends upon the quality of *partnership* between the UN agencies, NGOs and Red Cross/Red Crescent agencies that respond globally to emergencies. Commitment to partnership between these constituencies was endorsed through a set of principles developed in 2007<sup>4</sup>.

Of particular relevance to this report is the cluster approach. However, the other 'pillars' - *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening, humanitarian finance and partnership* - are interlinked drivers of effectiveness and quality.

The response to the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010 exposed a number of weaknesses and inefficiencies in the international humanitarian response. In light of the growing recognition of these weaknesses and inefficiencies, the IASC decided to review the current approach to multilateral humanitarian response and make adjustments, building on the lessons learned in 2010 and 2011. Based on an analysis of current challenges to leadership and coordination, the IASC agreed in December 2011 to a set of actions that collectively represent a substantive improvement to the current humanitarian response model. These actions are known as the Transformative Agenda, which aims to improve the leadership, coordination, and accountability of humanitarian interventions.

In recognition of these findings, the GSC has placed a special focus on key elements that should enable predictable coordination, ensure coherent cluster and operational leadership at various levels, and improve the accountability and impact of the cluster on affected populations.

#### **1.4 Cluster Approach**

The cluster approach is a component of the Humanitarian Reform and was endorsed by IASC principals in December 2005. A cluster brings together groups of organisations and other stakeholders to address needs in one of the specific response gap areas identified by the reform process. These are predominantly sectoral groups. The cluster approach aims to address gaps and strengthen humanitarian response in the sector concerned.

There are eleven global clusters, which are seen as a mechanism that can strengthen response by ensuring predictability, accountability and partnership among agencies in different sectors. All clusters have focal points, known as Cluster Lead Agencies, which operate at the global and country level. Cluster lead agencies are responsible for setting standards and policy, building response capacity, and providing operational support to country level clusters. At country level, the cluster approach is expected to ensure a coherent and effective sectoral response.

#### **1.5 The Shelter Cluster**

The GSC is co-chaired by UNHCR and IFRC. UNHCR leads the GSC in the area of conflict generated IDPs while IFRC is convener of the GSC in natural disaster situations. Leadership may be less clear when natural disasters occur in countries also affected by conflict. In this situation, the role of the IFRC is dependent upon the role of ICRC and whether ICRC leads operations for the Movement or not. Generally, IFRC will not take the lead of the Shelter Cluster in an operation following a natural disaster if ICRC is the lead agency for the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. In such circumstances the Humanitarian Country Team may ask another agency to take the lead of the Shelter Cluster, particularly if UNHCR is not active in the country.

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<sup>4</sup> Global Humanitarian Partnership (2007) Principles of Partnership, <http://www.icva.ch/doc00002628.doc>

The IFRC has signed a MoU with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) defining the conditions upon which the IFRC will lead the Shelter Cluster. The MoU emphasises that the IFRC's commitment at country level is not open-ended and that it is not 'Provider of Last Resort' if a gap in the provision of shelter goods and services remains unfilled.

The GSC supports country-level shelter clusters and other non-refugee<sup>5</sup> coordination mechanisms by providing predictable, effective and timely shelter coordination services in order to improve humanitarian response. The GSC strengthens system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies through improved coordination at the global, regional, and national levels.

The GSC acknowledges that for the affected population the shelter recovery process starts immediately: households initiate the process of re-building their lives as soon as they can. Consequently, the GSC's scope includes all aspects related to achieving the right to adequate shelter / housing with a humanitarian focus: household-related NFIs, emergency and longer term shelter support, housing construction and reconstruction, and settlement support such as site and urban planning. The GSC acknowledges the variety of response methodologies that shelter actors use to provide support and that shelter options vary according to context, protection aspects, climate and other issues. The nature of these shelter responses are defined in collaboration with local governments and in line with local regulations. Furthermore, the GSC acknowledges the invaluable contributions made by national-level shelter stakeholders to response and recovery efforts and declares its commitment to actively include those stakeholders in the work of the GSC.

## **1.6 Tropical Cyclone Evan**

TC Evan was a category 4 cyclone that passed over the Northern and Western Divisions of Fiji on 16 and 17 December 2012, with winds gusting over 230 kph. TC Evan caused serious damage to housing, key economic and tourist infrastructure, wide power outages and disruptions to water supply. Flooding was recorded across the country. The impact of TC Evan compounded losses experienced by communities and businesses in the wake of the Western Division floods of January and March 2012.

On 18 December 2013, the Government of Fiji declared a State of Natural Disaster for the Northern and Western Divisions effective for 15 days. This was subsequently extended for a further seven days in the Western Division.

Due to advance warning, no deaths or major injuries were recorded. The total monetary value of the effects of TC Evan is estimated at F\$195 Million (CHF 95 Million<sup>6</sup>). This represents approximately 2.6 percent of Fiji's Gross Domestic Product. Of this, Housing represents 26.1% (FJD\$50 million / CHF 24 Million) of the total, second only to Hotels and Restaurants (35.5%). In terms of the infrastructure sector alone, the monetary value of damage to the housing sub-sector is estimated to be 5 times greater than the next sub-sector, transport, and almost 5 times greater than the combined losses of the communication, electricity, water and government building sub-sectors<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> UNHCR has a mandated responsibility to coordinate multi-sectoral response to refugee needs and clusters are not established in this context. In a humanitarian crisis involving both refugee and non-refugee populations, UNHCR will participate in shelter cluster meetings at national and sub-national levels, and refugees' needs for shelter assistance will be reflected in consolidated appeals under "multi-sectoral" response to refugees.

<sup>6</sup> Exchange rate as at 6th August 2013.

<sup>7</sup> Government of Fiji (March 2013). Fiji Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Tropical Cyclone Evan, 17th December 2012. (p.viii).

The total number of houses affected was recorded at 8,497, or approximately 5% of the national housing stock. Of these, 2,094 were totally destroyed and the remaining 6,403 suffered some degree of damage<sup>8</sup>. A map showing the extent and location of damage is included in Appendix D. Following TC Evan approximately 14,000 people were accommodated in 242 evacuation centres; - typically either schools or public halls. Within a month, this number declined to almost zero. On the 20th December the Prime Minister activated the Cyclone Housing Relief Assistance program to facilitate the immediate reconstruction of damaged houses<sup>9</sup>.

More broadly, a sectoral based HAP was released on the 8<sup>th</sup> of January 2013 and then updated (Version 2) on the 8<sup>th</sup> of February 2013. From the latter version, a total of 47 activities were identified to be implemented in response to TC Evan. Of these, shelter had the second highest number at seven, or 15% of the total. In terms of funding, these shelter activities require the greatest funding (F\$14 Million / CHF 6.8 Million) or 33% of the total. Further, shelter represents by far the largest proportion of unmet funding at approximately 50% or F\$6.8 Million (CHF 3.3 Million).

A summary of the activities from the HAP (Version 2) is shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 1 – Summary of HAP (Version2) Activities by No. and Financial Requirements**

	<b>Cluster</b>	<b>No. of activities</b>	<b>Requirements F\$M</b>	<b>Unmet F\$M</b>
1	Health & Nutrition	9	2.154	1.407
2	Education	4	7.778	4.189
3	WASH	7	1.234	0.345
4	Logistics	4	0.445	0.415
5	Shelter	7	13.977	6.813
6	Public Works & Utilities	4	12.875	0.000
7	Safety & Protection	6	0.110	0.050
8	Food Security & Livelihood	6	4.033	0.625
	<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>42.606</b>	<b>13.844</b>

The seven activities listed under the shelter sector in the HAP (Version 2) are:

- i. Ensure the urgent provision of emergency shelter materials (including tarpaulins, tents, shelter kits and NFIs) for those people whose shelter was impacted.
- ii. Coordinate the completion of a comprehensive evaluation of the suitability of evacuation centers through assessment of structural integrity to withstand high winds and flooding rains, provision of drinking water and appropriate sanitation, accessibility for disabled persons, safety and security for women, children and other vulnerable groups and any other issues for protection of those seeking shelter.
- iii. To provide assistance with repairs and replacement dwellings for those that qualify under the GoF Housing Policy dated 21 Dec 2012, including Vakavanua settlers<sup>10</sup>.
- iv. Undertake detailed shelter assessment of all affected informal settlements.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. (p.x).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid (p.3).

<sup>10</sup> Vakavanua settlers are those on customary land given to them upon mutual agreement between the land owner (Chief, Mataqali) and the recipient. The recipient has to vacate if the land owner requests the recipient to do so.

- v. Based on the working group direction and the results of the detailed shelter assessment, undertake activities to rebuild/repair in informal settlements.
- vi. Based on initial assessment data, other GoF assessments, and the detailed shelter assessment in the informal settlements, prepare an agreed response from all parties for assisting those identified as requiring assistance and coordinated these efforts.
- vii. Carry out an awareness training program for home repairers and builders, both men and women, to provide advice and improved understanding of the principles for building, strengthening and repairing dwellings to withstand high winds and flooding rains.

## 2 COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT

### 2.1 In Country Coordination Modalities

The Fiji National Clusters were activated for the first time in late December 2012 during the response to TC Evan. There are eight Clusters as follows: WASH (Water, Sanitation & Hygiene), Health & Nutrition, Shelter, Logistics, Food Security & Livelihoods, Safety & Protection, Education, and Public Works & Utilities. The Fiji National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) sits at the “core” of the Cluster system as illustrated in Figure 1 below to provide overall coordination and to facilitate central planning and funding issues.




Figure 1: Fiji National Cluster System

The ToR developed for the shelter cluster identifies its objectives and the responsibilities of the lead and co-lead Agencies, and key partners, as follows:

*“The objective of the shelter cluster is to plan and implement proportionate, appropriate and timely shelter responses in humanitarian crisis situations which will address both the immediate and longer term shelter needs of affected populations whilst at the same time integrating disaster risk reduction activities into shelter programs. This is to be achieved through providing*

*predictable, systematic and country-driven services, and includes the need to:*

- *Facilitate effective sharing of information amongst agencies and organizations, including local organizations and local government partners involved in shelter response efforts, preparedness and recovery;*
- *Ensure adequate shelter contingency and preparedness planning, and support cluster members to provide timely response during emergencies;*
- *Ensure coordination of the emergency shelter programs and activities amongst the partners engaged in emergency response including non members and local partners;*
- *Address disruption in the provision of existing government services during emergencies and liaise accordingly with government partners;*
- *Ensure early recovery planning as well as prevention and risk reduction concerns are addressed and incorporated where possible at all stages of emergency planning and response;*
- *Liaise and coordinate with other clusters as required.*

The lead Agency for the shelter cluster is the Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing & Environment (the Ministry). Under the Shelter Cluster ToR,

*“the Ministry is accountable for the performance of the shelter cluster. The Ministry is to ensure that:*

- *Key Partners are included in the work of the cluster.*
- *There is appropriate coordination within the cluster and with the other National Clusters and other national and international agencies.*
- *Cross-cutting issues are addressed.*
- *There is effective needs assessment and analysis.*
- *Adequate contingency and preparedness planning is carried out.*
- *Appropriate standards are in place together with necessary arrangements for monitoring and reporting.*
- *There is suitable advocacy for the objectives and activities of the cluster.*
- *Arrangements are in place for any necessary resource mobilisation, and*
- *Appropriate training and capacity building is carried out to ensure that cluster activities are well-informed and relevant.”*

The co-lead Agency of the shelter cluster is the IFRC. The role of the co-lead Agency is to provide active support to the Ministry in fulfilling its shelter cluster lead role as outlined above.

The key partner Agencies of the shelter cluster listed in the ToR for the shelter cluster are:

- Act for Peace (AFP).
- Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).
- Community Support Network (CSN).
- Fiji Institution of Engineers (FIE).
- Fiji Red Cross Society (FRCS).
- Good Neighbour International (GNI).
- Habitat for Humanity Fiji (HFHF).
- iTaukei Affairs.

- International Federation of Red Cross / Red Crescent Agencies (IFRC)
- Local Government Units (LGU).
- Ministry of Education (MoE)
- Ministry of Health (MoH).
- Ministry of Labour (MoL).
- Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing & Environment.
- Ministry of Provincial Development and National Disaster Management– (Divisional Offices, NDMO, Rural Housing Unit).
- New Zealand Agency for International Development.
- UNOCHA.
- People's Community Network (PCN).
- Rotary Fiji, Rotary Lautoka.

Key Partners of the shelter cluster are “*expected to also support the lead and co-lead Agencies in facilitating the cluster objectives and activities, to meet on a regular basis to share information and set the priority activities of the cluster*”.

The shelter cluster had little input into the emergency shelter response, which was implemented by the GoF and partners. Importantly, the GoF took an early decision to segregate the non-emergency (i.e. transitional and permanent) shelter response between formal and informal settlements<sup>11</sup>. Under this segregation, the GoF has taken responsibility for the non-emergency shelter response in the formal settlements, whilst the NGO Agencies of the shelter cluster have been allocated responsibility for non-emergency shelter response in the informal settlements.

## 2.2 Cluster Activation

The Fiji Cluster system was adopted by the Government of Fiji in late December 2012 in response to TC Evan. The cluster system is now operational at the National Level. Procedures to implement the System at Divisional and Provincial/District Levels are yet to be developed. Importantly, the National Cluster system is believed to be activated on an “open ended” basis, although this status is not entirely clear.

The IFRC was requested to co-lead the shelter cluster in December 2012.

## 2.3 Staffing

The IFRC has provided three in-country SCC to fulfill its responsibilities as shelter cluster co-lead Agency, as shown in Table 1 below:

**Table 2: Shelter Co-ordinator Arrival and Departure Dates**

<b>Coordinator</b>	<b>Arrival</b>	<b>Departure</b>	<b>Funder</b>
David O'Meara	3 <sup>rd</sup> January 2013	23 <sup>rd</sup> January 2013	Australian Red Cross
Michael Gloeckle	30 <sup>th</sup> January 2013 3 <sup>rd</sup> March 2013	21 <sup>st</sup> February 2013 4 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	Australian Red Cross
Steve Barker	18 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	12 <sup>th</sup> August 2013	ECHO

<sup>11</sup> Formal settlements are those in which dwellers hold secure tenure through legal title. Informal settlements (also commonly referred to as “squatter settlements”) where no legal title exists. The current extent of informal settlements is not accurately known, although was estimated to be approximately 7% of the housing stock in 2010. Informal settlements are thought to be increasing because of both general rural urban drift, and also non-renewal of agricultural leases resulting in occupiers being forced to seek alternative employment and shelter, more often in urban areas.

Notwithstanding short gaps upon crossover of staff, the IFRC has admirably maintained a shelter cluster coordinator presence within the resourcing constraints that it has faced. This has enabled the shelter cluster to progress on its objectives and provided valuable support to the GoF cluster lead. However, the lack of continuity of staff is not ideal as is evidenced by requirements for renewed learning curves and relationship building for the new coordinators, and adjustment to varying personal styles by key partners. Whilst this was ameliorated to some extent by recent prior Fiji experience of the first two coordinators, it nevertheless provides for reduced consistency in terms of relationships with the key partner Agencies. On the other hand, the value of a fresh “set of eyes” cannot be underestimated.

Despite these shortcomings, the IFRC provision of SCC has been appropriate given the scale of the response. The lack of continuity has been preferable to any larger gaps in the SCC presence.

Nevertheless, longer term deployments (for a minimum of 6 months) for SCC was identified by many informants as a key recommendation. This is considered necessary to develop the level of stakeholder relationships required to facilitate decision making in disaster response and recovery / preparedness contexts. This role does not necessarily require previous Pacific experience to be successful, as evidenced by the third SCC, but it does require time in the role.

In addition, handover processes between SCC could be strengthened to include in-country overlap where possible, and at the very least a handover document prepared by the outgoing SCC (there was no handover document prepared in one handover instance). A handover document template would assist in this regard.

Deployment of SCC was considered “confusing” by ARC. The “disjointed nature” of the arrangement whereby ARC had to deal with, variously, IFRC Suva, Kuala Lumpur and Geneva, made it unclear to ARC what activities they were actually being asked to fund.

Further, there was some concern raised as to the level of IFRC in-country support provided to the ARC funded SCC. One SCC required a personal reimbursement of over AUD\$10,000 (CHF 8,280) and thus had, in effect, largely self-funded his own deployment. However, this issue was discussed and agreed between IFRC Suva and the SCC concerned who was happy to follow this path. This suggests, however, that communications between ARC and IFRC could be improved.

Local administration support has been provided to SCC through the IFRC regional office administrative staff. Dedicated administration support would have assisted the SCC in their roles by organizing and following up of routine tasks (e.g. minutes of meetings). One SCC became aware of the availability of a dedicated local part-time administrative support function within the IFRC regional office only toward the end of deployment, which points to a lack of clarity as to the processes by which such support is made available.

There has been no IFRC in-country information management resource available to the SCC. This is considered further in the information management section below

## **2.4 Cluster Convenor Agency support**

The Ministry was appointed by the GoF to be the lead Agency for the shelter cluster, and specifically this fell to the DoH within the Ministry. This responsibility was allocated as an additional duty but with no inclusion in the existing performance assessment criteria of the DoH, and no provision of additional resources. This has proven problematic for an organization that primarily fulfills a regulatory, rather than a response, role.

The DoH has a full staff complement of ten. Two of these staff were assigned responsibility for the shelter cluster. The allocation of the shelter cluster responsibility as an additional duty has proven problematic as staff, notwithstanding their best endeavors, are stretched to fulfill their shelter cluster commitments. This has inevitably impacted upon the Ministry's performance as shelter cluster lead, and in turn the role of the IFRC as co-lead. At certain times the IFRC have been required to assume the lead Agency role, which they have been willing to do. However, this also results in abrogating the responsibility of the GoF, and thus can become counter-productive to the longer-term objective of the GoF being a self-sufficient cluster lead Agency. This highlights the at times difficult role for the IFRC as cluster co-lead in not wanting to usurp the role of the lead Agency, but at the same time wanting to ensure that cluster objectives are achieved.

The Ministry has made office space available to the IFRC SCC and this has been utilised, although not consistently or permanently. This is not considered to have adversely impacted upon the effectiveness of the SCC role. However, consideration should be given to future co-location as a means to further develop the shelter cluster through the capacity building of, and relationships with, the relevant staff within the Ministry.

Further, the Ministry convene the meetings of the shelter cluster and the IFRC has assisted in this regard through scheduling, preparation of agendas and meeting minutes.

## **2.5 Remote Support**

The IFRC provided remote support to the shelter cluster through both the zone office in Kuala Lumpur and the Shelter and Settlements Department in Geneva. This support has included assistance to the SCC with the development of the cluster strategy, technical guidelines, assessment data analysis through access to Survey Monkey, the ECHO funding proposal, posting of information and key documents on the shelter cluster website, contingency planning, document templates for performance monitoring, and general regular contact with the SCC.

## **2.6 Handover of the Shelter Cluster Co-Lead Role**

The shelter cluster co-lead role has not been handed over to any Agency at this point. Current suggestions include handover to UN-Habitat although this is problematic as they only have one human resource within Fiji and are unlikely to provide further resources. Further, UN-Habitat are unclear on the shift of emphasis from emergency shelter to longer term recovery of shelter, and the role of the shelter cluster in this. OCHA have made it clear that they do not believe that handover of the shelter cluster to UN-Habitat is a realistic plan of action.

The issue of handover raises the question of the future of the shelter cluster and the IFRC role within it. This issue is considered in section 10 of this report.

## **2.7 Recommendations**

- 2.7.1 Deploy SCC for a minimum period of 6 months.
- 2.7.2 Strengthen SCC handover procedures to allow for in country overlap of SCC, or a handover document as a minimum. If necessary, develop a handover document template.

- 2.7.3 Consider dedicated administrative support being available to SCC, and also known to be available by them.
- 2.7.4 Streamline human resource activities and deployment procedures across stakeholders through improved communication.

### 3 SUPPORTING SERVICE DELIVERY

#### 3.1 Coordination Management

The Ministry and the IFRC have combined well as lead and co-lead Agencies of the shelter cluster. This has resulted in a platform conducive to the delivery of co-ordination management. This has manifested itself most obviously in the form of shelter cluster coordination meetings. Overall, the shelter cluster is understood to have met 12 times as shown in Table 3 below.

**Table 3: Shelter Cluster Meetings Held**

No.	Date	Agencies Attending
1.	14 <sup>th</sup> January 2013	N/K
2.	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2013	N/K
3.	11 <sup>th</sup> February 2013	10
4.	12 <sup>th</sup> February 2013	6
5.	18 <sup>th</sup> February 2013	5
6.	26 <sup>th</sup> February 2013	5
7.	12 <sup>th</sup> March 2013	9
8.	26 <sup>th</sup> March 2013	5
9.	9 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	N/K
10.	23 <sup>rd</sup> April 2013	8
11.	5 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	4
12.	24 <sup>th</sup> July 2013	N/K

Ministry representatives were highly appreciative of the support provided by the IFRC to them in performing their newfound shelter cluster duties, and the relationship between the GoF and IFRC has been very positive in relation to the shelter cluster. Other partner Agencies generally stated that the IFRC have done a very commendable job, taken a proactive approach, and that without the IFRC, the vast majority of communications within the shelter cluster would not have occurred.

Indeed, the criticality of the IFRC to the success of the shelter cluster was identified by informants. In this sense, the IFRC has been instrumental in establishing the shelter cluster as an enabling environment for dialogue between the GoF, NGO's / private sector, and the donors. This has been important for all parties. For the GoF, it has enabled the inclusion of informal settlements in the overall recovery programming<sup>12</sup>. For the NGO's, they have been able to gain legitimacy of their operations through signed MoU's with the GoF and also identify where they may be able to contribute to both TC Evan and future shelter responses. For donors, the shelter cluster has provided a forum for efficiently disseminating donor processes and procedures, for assessing NGO capacity, and also provided the legitimacy of operating through a government sanctioned mechanism.

Other clusters considered the shelter cluster to be amongst the best organised and were impressed with the role of the IFRC in achieving this.

<sup>12</sup> The GoF were unwilling to provide assistance to affected people in the informal settlements beyond emergency shelter as they did not wish to be seen to be legitimising these settlements.

One of the difficulties faced by the shelter cluster lead / co-lead has been to maintain the engagement of key partner Agencies. There was a general feeling among Agencies that, whilst doing some good work, the shelter cluster was not necessarily value adding to their operations, as Agencies had mostly been unable to secure funding to implement any shelter programs, notwithstanding the strong advocacy work of the SCC in this regard. The task of maintaining the engagement of partner Agencies has largely fallen to the IFRC as shelter cluster co-lead whom have admirably embraced this, although not with overly successful results. This situation is considered similar to other clusters in Fiji and not symptomatic of the shelter cluster solely.

Nevertheless, shelter cluster meetings, held at the Ministry, were considered to be well organized, inclusive and always held in English – a language common to all participants. Isolated criticisms included the unwillingness of the cluster to fully consider shelter solutions of one Agency, the haste of one SCC to promote ideas as opposed to cultivating them in conjunction with the cluster lead, and the perceived pressure placed upon one Agency to deliver an output, resulting in them “leaving” the cluster. Another informant bemoaned the “bureaucratic” lack of affirmative action from the shelter cluster in terms of preparation for the next response.

A SAG was formed to finalise key documents, but this stalled due to lack of participation. No other operational SAGs or TWIGs were formed in the shelter cluster.

One finding from the local level was that the shelter cluster operates very much at a national level, and that the results or outcomes from the cluster do not freely trickle down to the local level. This was confirmed by both Agencies and local government. It would seem therefore that greater emphasis needs to be given to expanding the reach of the shelter cluster at the local level.

### **3.2 Information Management**

No in country information management resource was provided by IFRC. Remote information management support was provided primarily in terms of uploading documents to the shelter cluster website. However, one of the challenges faced by the shelter cluster has been establishing who is doing what and where (3Ws). This challenge is compounded by the difficulty of obtaining regular and consistent 3W information from the GoF in terms of their own shelter response operations in the formal settlements.

This has resulted in an unclear situation as to the full extent of the impact of TC Evan upon the shelter sector. The Humanitarian Action Plan (Version 2) dated the 8<sup>th</sup> of February identifies 1555 houses as either destroyed or damaged, and notes that assessments by NDMO are ongoing. The post disaster needs assessment of March 2013 lists official shelter damage numbers at 8,497. An assessment of informal settlements in January 2013 by partners of the shelter cluster identified approximately 200 shelters requiring reconstruction / repair. No consolidated list of damaged / destroyed shelters could be found. Isolated documents refer to certain numbers of shelter reconstruction, but fail to identify authoring Agency, date etc., or indeed reconcile with the official figures cited above.

The result is that the true extent of the shelter damage from TC Evan remains unclear, as does the response and any gaps therein. This was confirmed at the district (local) government level where the extent of shelter damage remained unclear, as did the extent of the response, particular in the formal settlements.

Given that information management is one of the core activities of the shelter cluster and provides a platform for participation of Agencies, as well as accountability to affected

populations, this could be considered as a shortcoming of the shelter cluster in the TC Evan response. The provision of an information manager tasked with obtaining and maintaining this information would have given greater credence to the role of the shelter cluster in the response. This role need not necessarily be an international deployment – indeed a local position, perhaps co-opting the skills of the Fiji Bureau of Statistics, may be better placed to achieve this objective, and will of course be more cost effective. Notwithstanding the lack of an in country information management role, the reconciliation of damage and response should be attempted by the shelter cluster.

An allied information management role related to the use of the BBS poster. The digital version received more attention than the paper version, but the electronic file size was too large to be accessed easily. When the same digital images were shared with much smaller file sizes through email the response was very positive even though the same images had been available on the shelter cluster website as larger files for some time. An information manager may have appreciated the significance of both methods of sharing information and of the importance of file size in a more timely manner. This suggests a lack of utilisation of the remote information management support available.

### **3.3 Recommendations**

- 3.3.1 Demonstrate (and remind) partner Agencies how the shelter cluster can and does add value to them. Use capacity building opportunities (see below) for this with a view to developing ongoing SAGs or TWIGs as a means of encouraging Agency engagement in the shelter cluster.
- 3.3.2 Advocate for local level shelter cluster arrangements to ensure that discussions and decisions held at national level are being received at local level. Conversely, this could also develop “bottom up” information management flows. Involve local Agencies to facilitate this process. E.g. the FRCS and / or Rotary Fiji could be well positioned to take on this role given their on the ground reach, links to government / business respectively, and strong presence in emergency response.
- 3.3.3 Prioritise the information requirements of the shelter cluster and source a local resource to centralise this data and collate summary information. Distribute such information to all partner Agencies of the shelter cluster.

## **4 INFORMING STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING FOR THE RESPONSE**

### **4.1 Assessments**

The initial damage assessments were undertaken by the GoF with support from the FRCS and others. It is not clear as to the methodology used for these assessments, their veracity or current status. However, the GoF shelter assessments (and subsequent non-emergency assistance) exclude the informal settlements.

Thus, following the GoF decision to demarcate the post-emergency shelter response between formal and informal settlements (with the non-government organisations of the shelter cluster being responsible for the latter), the shelter cluster conducted a 2 day damage assessment of 41 informal settlements in the Western Division on the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> of January 2013. The objective of the assessment was to *“contribute to an effective response in these settlements by informing the humanitarian community of the needs of the*

*most vulnerable affected population*<sup>13</sup>.

The assessment comprised analysis of secondary data, interviews with local government officials, household surveys and GIS mapping. Data was collated using survey monkey and subsequently analysed. Seven Agencies contributed to the assessment, including the GoF. This assessment was initiated and coordinated by the IFRC. Training was provided to staff of partner Agencies whom were allocated various geographic locations to assess. In total this multi-Agency assessment surveyed 177 households, identifying 120 as being houses completely destroyed, and 57 significantly damaged.

Informants to the review reported some confusion regarding the data entry which undermined their confidence in its results. Further, the analysis of the data fell within the changeover gap from one SCC to the next, resulting in some lack of understanding and reticence, which also undermined the veracity of the results. There was a suggestion that, notwithstanding the training given, the technical shelter capacity of those directly undertaking the assessments required improvement. Subsequent consideration was given to the matter of damage assessments at the shelter cluster contingency planning workshop held in late June 2013.

Nevertheless, the assessment was considered to be a notable attempt by the IFRC to bring shelter cluster partner Agencies together in a coordinated manner, and assisted in the understanding of extent of shelter damage in the informal settlements. This ultimately resulted in HFHF agreeing to construct 120 transitional shelters in these settlements<sup>14</sup>.

## **4.2 Cross-cutting Issues**

In the strategic operational framework and technical guidelines documents (see below), the shelter cluster promoted the incorporation of the following cross cutting issues into its strategy: age, protection, disability, HIV / Aids, gender, environment, housing, land and property. Some of these issues were identified as vulnerability criteria to be addressed in the shelter response. Other issues were identified from relevant Agencies (e.g. Protection requirements for emergency shelter from UNFPA, and disability response criteria from Handicap International), and included as an annex in the strategic operational framework. In addition, review informants reported that the promotion of cross-cutting issues was done regularly at the shelter cluster meetings.

However, it is unclear to what extent these issues have found their way into the overall shelter response. GoF at the local level were unaware of any information being provided or made available on cross cutting issues. Yet there is evidence of the shelter cluster promoting gender / disability access and Gender Based Violence protection issues into the NDMO operational documents regarding evacuation centres. Further, evidence was obtained of two Agencies within the shelter cluster sharing vulnerability information with a view to incorporation into the transitional shelter response in informal settlements. It can be reasonably inferred that this has resulted from promotion of cross-cutting issues within the enabling environment of the shelter cluster – indeed one Agency confirmed that without the shelter cluster, this level of information sharing would simply not have occurred.

Beyond the above, there is no evidence of the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues into the overall shelter response.

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<sup>13</sup> Emergency Shelter Assessment Tropical Cyclone Evan, Fiji, 16-17 December 2012 Fact Sheet, Informal Settlements.

<sup>14</sup> It is understood that no response has been planned in relation to the 57 significantly damaged houses.

### **4.3 Recommendations**

- 4.3.1 Provide further assessment training as part of ongoing disaster preparedness for staff of shelter cluster Agencies, and as part of a broader multi cluster assessment tool as applicable. This could also include capacity mapping and pre-determined role / geographic allocation ahead of the next disaster season. Consideration should also be given to deploying a FACT team in response to the next disaster as a service to the shelter cluster.
- 4.3.2 Give greater promotion and emphasis to cross-cutting issues in the shelter response. Visual media, for example similar to the BBS poster, could be used to promote this.

## **5 PLANNING AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT**

### **5.1 Strategic Planning**

The strategic planning of the shelter cluster was instigated by the IFRC and embodied in the strategic operational framework document (draft revision 3 dated 19<sup>th</sup> May 2013). This document identifies the organization and membership of the shelter cluster, and strategic options matrix to address the shelter response and recovery interventions of different tenure classifications (displaced / non-displaced), and situations (e.g. in evacuation centres, host families, partially / significantly / fully destroyed homes). Within these classifications, further distinction is made between formal and informal settlements. The strategic operational framework document also identifies and incorporates cross-cutting issues as noted above.

It is clear that the strategic operational framework document has been distributed for comment by members of the shelter cluster, and that some feedback into its development was given. The document was adopted at the shelter cluster meeting of the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 2013, yet it is not clear if it has been issued as a final version. The version on the shelter cluster website is an outdated draft. Nevertheless, the strategy provides a strong reference point for future response and formal issue would be a positive step in disaster preparedness. Buy-in from members of the shelter cluster may be stimulated if the strategy could also be presented in non-written mediums, such as visual.

In addition, the shelter cluster did contribute to the strategic planning of the GoF Humanitarian Action Plan (shelter component), and also the development of the NDMO strategy documents in relation to the use of evacuation centres following a natural disaster<sup>15</sup>. This input heeded tangible results by informing the decision of one donor to fund the upgrade of evacuation centres, in terms of setting technical standards of what is required. Ultimately, this assists in the disaster preparedness and response in Fiji.

### **5.2 Technical Coordination and Application of Standards**

The IFRC instigated the development of the shelter guidelines and standards documents for the shelter cluster. This document incorporates shelter design principles (e.g. climatic and cultural suitability, resource efficiency) and technical standards for various response options ranging from tarpaulins to permanent housing.

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<sup>15</sup> National Guide to the (i) Selection and Assessment, and (ii) Management and Operation of Evacuation Centres. Both documents are in final draft form and are yet to be formally issued

As per the strategic operational framework, the document was adopted at the shelter cluster meeting of the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 2013, yet it is not clear if it has been issued as a final version. The version on the shelter cluster website is an outdated draft.

There is also evidence that the IFRC advocated for the shelter designs in accordance with the Fiji building code, thus promoting standards. The shelter cluster provided a forum for the private sector (Fiji Institute of Engineers) to demonstrate in practical terms how the Fiji building code could be incorporated into shelter design. This was considered useful by Agencies whom often comprise staff with a non-technical background. This was most evident in the HFHF transitional shelter design for the informal settlements which took a collaborative design approach through the shelter cluster and facilitated by IFRC, in conjunction with the GoF.

However, the extent of harmonisation between this shelter design and that used by the GoF for the formal settlements is not clear, as there are some key differences between the two. Firstly, the GoF (permanent) housing design is 16' x 24', whereas the HFHF transitional shelter design is approximately 20' x 11.5'. Secondly, the GoF design is a permanent house, whereas the HFHF design is a transitional shelter with only tarpaulin cladding to the walls. This could, and probably will, be replaced by beneficiaries with a permanent lining. Finally, the GoF design has a pitched roof, whereas the transitional shelter design has a skillion roof.

Such differences possibly point to a lack of consistency; - which is understandable given the context of political demarcation of formal and informal settlements. Indeed, the MoU between the GoF reinforces this demarcation by stipulating that a transitional shelter will be provided to informal settlements. However, the same MoU also requires the shelter cluster to:

*“advocate for a uniform response between all communities and minimize conflict between beneficiaries as well as between formal and informal communities”.*

There would seem to be little further the IFRC could have done to redress the situation. Ultimately, however, this disparity contributes to inequitable recovery patterns between communities.

It was also felt by informants that the shelter cluster could play a greater role in terms of quality assurance of permanent shelter interventions. This is because the overseeing is currently done by different Agencies (e.g. Army Engineers, Ministry of Health, Local urban authority) depending upon where the shelter is located. Concerns were raised regarding the capacity / consistency of certain Agencies to oversee the reconstruction of shelter.

The IFRC has contributed to setting standards on emergency shelter items and in particular tarpaulins. One donor was able to utilise the IFRC standards provided through the shelter cluster to advocate for better quality of tarpaulins and shelter kit tools with the GoF, which are now being procured in anticipation of the next response. This has provided the donor with reassurance regarding quality of investment. However, further work is required in this area as some local Agencies appear to be “going their own way” in terms of tarpaulin quality and procurement.

### **5.3 Resource Mobilisation and Appeals**

There were no IFRC appeals resulting from TC Evan. There was no DREF or FLASH appeal. The HAP (version 2) identified that the response was under funded by 32.5%. The largest component of this was clearly shelter (approximately 50%). It is not clear as to the extent of subsequent funding received, but certainly in the shelter sector it was minimal. The IFRC were able to source ECHO funding (initiated in country through the IFRC Regional

Office Disaster Management Team and the SCC) which enabled the IFRC to continue the SCC role for a further four months.

Nevertheless, the IFRC has undertaken tireless advocacy of donors on behalf of the shelter cluster (refer section below). However, it should be noted that no NGO shelter intervention has received specific earmarked donor funding. The GoF response to the formal settlements is internally funded. The HFHF response is funded through an existing relationship with NZAid and this did not require the support of the shelter cluster to secure it. Nevertheless, the role of the shelter cluster in undertaking the joint assessment of the informal settlements and obtaining the MoU's with GoF have no doubt assisted to facilitate this particular funding, if only indirectly.

#### **5.4 Accountability to Affected Populations**

It is difficult to identify a tangible mechanism linking affected populations to the shelter cluster in terms of creating accountability of the cluster to them. No specific feedback or grievance mechanism could be identified. The effect of this situation was evident from the plight of one affected community member whom had received no less than 12 visits from different Agencies and yet was still living under a tarpaulin in a makeshift shelter of salvaged materials.

However, this is not to say that the shelter cluster has had no accountability to affected populations. The household surveys undertaken as part of the assessments of informal settlements coordinated by IFRC, and the subsequent MoUs that were signed by GoF and partner Agencies of the shelter cluster, demonstrate a strong commitment to affected populations, if not a direct accountability.

Other evidence of this commitment includes the inclusion of the Fiji Building code into the transitional shelter design, the advocacy with donors on behalf of the cluster for assistance to affected populations, a willingness to introduce standards in terms of shelter response, and the development and distribution of the BBS poster.

#### **5.5 Recovery Guidance**

Both the shelter cluster strategic planning framework and the shelter guidelines and standards documents make clear reference to both relief / response activities and also longer term shelter activities. The most recent draft of the shelter cluster planning framework (19<sup>th</sup> May 2013), includes a logical framework which clearly articulates outcome 1 as referring to emergency shelter, and outcome 2 as:

*Cluster agencies provide appropriate support to the most vulnerable families affected by TC  
Evan so they can recover their homes.*

Under this outcome, the following outputs are identified, although not articulated in any detail.

Output 2.1 – Build Back Safer Training and Posters.

Output 2.2 – House Repairs.

Output 2.3 – Permanent Housing.

Thus it remains unclear as to how outcome 2 will be achieved, although it (and the associated outputs) are somewhat aligned with certain Humanitarian Action Plan (Version 2) shelter activities as follows:

- iii. To provide assistance with repairs and replacement dwellings for those that qualify under the GoF Housing Policy, 21 Dec 2012, including Vakavanua settlers.
- v. Based on the working group direction and the results of the detailed shelter assessment, undertake activities to rebuild/repair in informal settlements.
- vi. Based on initial assessment data, other GoF assessments, and the detailed shelter assessment in the informal settlements prepare an agreed response from all parties for assisting those identified as requiring assistance and coordinated these efforts.
- vii. Carry out an awareness training program for home repairers and builders, both men and women, to provide advice and improved understanding of the principles for building, strengthening and repairing dwellings to withstand high winds and flooding rains.

Further work is required to complete the logical framework as part of the strategy finalisation process.

## **5.6 Recommendations**

- 5.6.1 Finalise the approved shelter cluster strategy and issue as final. Investigate visual and /or other mediums for presentation to partner Agencies of the shelter cluster.
- 5.6.2 Finalise the approved shelter cluster technical standards document and issue as final.
- 5.6.3 Consider the provision of quality assurance training to partner Agencies in the overseeing of both transitional and permanent shelter interventions.
- 5.6.4 Continue advocating for consistent cost effective quality of emergency shelter materials based upon IFRC specifications.
- 5.6.5 Continue advocacy of the shelter cluster to donors. Develop a pre-positioning funding strategy with donors, based upon the developed MoU system, for rolling out for informal settlements in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
- 5.6.6 Develop a feedback / grievance mechanism for all communities (formal and informal) for implementation by the GoF as lead Agency of the shelter cluster.
- 5.6.7 Update the logical framework of the shelter cluster operational framework (strategy) to align with the Humanitarian Action Plan (version 2), and expand its activities to include those required to achieve the stated outcomes and outputs.

## **6 ADVOCACY**

### **6.1 Communications**

The main form of public advocacy has been the development and distribution of the BBS poster. This informative two-page poster was developed under the banner of the shelter

cluster by the Fiji Institute of Engineers with funding from AusAID. Importantly, the principles contained within the poster are believed to reflect the requirements of the Fiji Building code in a way that allows for implementation by non-technical people.

To date, over 10,000 copies of the poster have been distributed to affected populations, in both formal and informal settlements. In addition, the poster has been incorporated into broader disaster management programs of a number of Agencies, and also in non-disaster shelter work<sup>16</sup>. The overall impact of the poster is difficult to gauge although in one affected household visit, the use of appropriate cyclone strapping in the house repairs was clearly evident and had resulted from “the advice from the carpenter”. Whether directly derived from the BBS poster or not, the poster is a very useful communication mechanism for advocating for improved sheltering construction practices. Further possibilities for dissemination of the BBS poster are currently being investigated by the IFRC SCC (e.g. television advertisements and engaging the support of the Fiji Rugby international players).

Apart from the BBS poster, no other examples of public information communications strategies, feedback mechanisms, or grievance redress mechanisms developed by the shelter cluster were identified. This was evident in the community visits where affected households did not appear to understand the processes they were required to go through to obtain assistance for reconstruction (e.g. obtaining written landlord consent), or that there may be further assistance available (e.g. the previously mentioned beneficiary whom had 12 prior visits from various Agencies, yet whose family was still living in tarpaulins and salvaged materials).

These instances must be tempered by the knowledge that some vulnerable groups, particularly squatters, do not necessarily wish to promote their plight for fear of being evicted from the land they occupy. Nevertheless, this simply lends weight to the need for the shelter cluster to develop an appropriate communication mechanism that deals with all affected populations, but vulnerable groups in particular. Any such mechanism would need to be implemented by the GoF as shelter cluster lead Agency.

## **6.2 Advocacy**

One of the most significant achievements of the shelter cluster (and largely driven by the IFRC as co-lead) has been the advocacy undertaken on behalf of people affected by TC Evan living in informal settlements. The shelter cluster was perhaps used by the GoF as a somewhat convenient mechanism to delineate the shelter recovery activities between formal and informal settlements. The GoF took responsibility for the former, but unwilling to give legitimacy to the latter, handed this responsibility to the NGO's of the shelter cluster.

The IFRC were astute in then undertaking the common assessment of informal settlements in the Western District and also instigating the subsequent MoU process between GoF and NGO's. This process legitimized the shelter recovery response in informal settlements by requiring the GoF to acknowledge them. Whilst the recognition of informal settlements is not new to the GoF<sup>17</sup>, the MoU process by all accounts required some tactful negotiations on behalf of the IFRC. It is unfortunate that by the time the MoU's were completed, the donor funding had expired, and there is evidence to suggest that more communication and awareness around the role and limitations of the MoU would have been useful<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> E.g. For sheltering of people moving into informal settlements as a result of a downturn in economic conditions.

<sup>17</sup> Refer Republic of Fiji National Housing Policy 2010.

<sup>18</sup> One Agency reported being under the impression that the MoU process would automatically bring funding from the GoF. This was clearly not the case, and the Agency concerned was somewhat disgruntled when they realised this.

Nevertheless, the MoU mechanism, whilst only applicable to TC Evan, has set a valuable precedent for shelter recovery interventions in future disasters to be more timely, particularly in terms of having funding in place to undertake such interventions. The MoU's also move to align the work of the shelter cluster with the GoF national housing strategy. Such alignments can only serve to enhance both the TC Evan and future shelter responses.

Conversely, the demarcation between formal and informal settlements, whilst convenient for the GoF, did not fully reflect the operational realities of some Agencies whom were working in both formal and informal settlements prior to TC Evan. Some informants queried whether the IFRC could have advocated more strongly for NGO's to work in both sectors, although this would not have been easy given the strong stance taken by the GoF. It is somewhat incongruous that the clusters, being part of the GoF mechanisms, has a responsibility for all sectors and should therefore be able to intervene in all sectors. Yet at the same time, there is a clear political demarcation between formal and informal settlements in the disaster response. This was in turn reflected in the shelter cluster, between the GoF and the NGO's and their respective responsibilities.

The advocacy by the IFRC on behalf of vulnerable people in informal settlements has enhanced both the visibility and credibility of the IFRC, whilst not undermining their independence. Indeed, it has enhanced the latter by being seen to voice support for what would otherwise have been a neglected section of affected people, and doing so through a GoF endorsed cluster system. This was evidenced when during field visits for this review the GoF identified 40 shelters that, originally thought to be in formal settlements, were discovered to be in informal settlements, and hence not entitled to GoF assistance. Nevertheless, the GoF contacted HFHF to request that these people be catered for under the latter's transitional housing program. It is doubtful that such action would have occurred without the linkages established by the shelter cluster, and largely facilitated by the IFRC.

The IFRC SCC have also worked tirelessly to advocate the work of the shelter cluster with donors. This has resulted in the ECHO funding of the third shelter cluster coordinator which is understood to be the first time that an institutional donor has directly funded IFRC for a SCC position. In addition, the BBS poster was funded by AusAID, and the contingency planning workshop (see below) was also funded. In addition to the two principal donors of AusAID and NZAid, advocacy on behalf of the shelter cluster has also been undertaken with USAID, Japanese and Swedish donor Agencies. It is understood that USAID are considering funding a Fiji shelter program in 2015. This advocacy is critical to embedding donor participation in the shelter cluster; and such donor participation is in turn critical to actively engaging key partner Agencies in the shelter cluster.

The nature of this advocacy should also be noted. The SCC approach of bringing the GoF representatives to meet with the donors is a clear and laudable demonstration of capacity building which, in the view of the GoF officials, would simply not have occurred without the brokerage of the IFRC. This evidences the seeding of relationships to promote the ongoing work of the shelter cluster. Further it is not necessarily straightforward for, nor does it sit comfortably with GoF officials, to advocate directly with donors, thus highlighting the importance of the IFRC role, and the independence attached to it.

This type of advocacy also manifested itself in other ways. By creating an enabling environment to allow partner Agencies to consider shelter responses and where they could possibly fit into them, the IFRC have advanced the shelter cause in subtle ways. This is evidenced through the previously mentioned information sharing of the FRCS with HFHF in targeting vulnerable households in the informal settlements. It is also evident in the evolving role of the FRCS in the shelter sector. The FRCS are a leading Agency with respect to emergency response, including emergency shelter and the distribution of tarpaulins etc. They do not, however, see their role encompassing transitional or permanent housing.

However, through their exposure to the shelter cluster, the FRCS have indicated a willingness to incorporate shelter as part of their preparedness programming, and are now seeking donors to support this. The IFRC shelter cluster should be credited for this positive development.

The IFRC SCC have advocated the GoF to include funding for human resources in the forthcoming budget cycle to fulfill their shelter cluster commitments. This is particularly important to ensure the ongoing and effective work of the shelter cluster<sup>19</sup>.

### **6.3 Recommendations**

- 6.3.1 Continue promotion of the BBS poster and allied training programs in all areas, but particularly in those areas that experience frequent natural disasters.
- 6.3.2 Continue advocacy work to donors on behalf of shelter cluster partner Agencies. Some local Agencies reported being daunted by having to deal with large institutional donors and the IFRC can provide valuable support in this area. Further, certain Agencies reported being unable to source EU funding due to registration requirements and requested greater IFRC (in its role as shelter cluster co-lead) “brokering” between donors and Agencies.
- 6.3.3 Continue to advocate for dedicated GoF resources to be made available for the fulfillment of their shelter cluster leadership role.

## **7 MONITORING AND REPORTING**

### **7.1 Reporting Systems and Monitoring**

Monitoring and reporting of the shelter cluster has been a challenge for a number of reasons. Firstly, the shelter strategy remains to be issued in its final format and is thus problematic to report results against. Secondly, obtaining information from shelter cluster member Agencies, in particular the GoF, remains a challenge. The lack of a dedicated information management resource tasked with obtaining this data is notable in this context. Thirdly, the shelter cluster Agencies responsible for the shelter activities in the informal settlements have not commenced any on the ground reconstruction activities<sup>20</sup>, thus there remains little to report against save for preparatory activities.

In addition, the lack of a FLASH appeal following TC Evan has meant there are no specific reporting requirements tied to funding. In this sense, there are no official reporting requirements of the shelter cluster, which has possibly reduced the perceived need to both monitor and report against the shelter cluster strategy. This lack of reporting has also proved somewhat problematic for ARC to in turn identify the value of their funding of the SCC deployments to their back donor.

Nevertheless, all shelter cluster members have both a duty and a need to monitor and report to support the fulfillment of its objectives. An activity format has been developed and distributed to Agencies, but it has proved challenging to have Agencies respond. One Agency reported difficulty in understanding the format. One donor has recognized this reporting need more broadly and is instigating reporting requirements tied to funding. In time,

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<sup>19</sup> The Education Cluster is case in point. They have no GoF focal point which makes it very difficult for the Agencies to obtain any information etc.

<sup>20</sup> At the time of writing.

this will have a downstream impact upon the reporting compliance of shelter cluster partner Agencies.

## 7.2 Performance Monitoring

It is understood that a cluster performance review should occur once or twice during the response. This has not occurred to date. It is also understood that the generic reporting template to facilitate this process (based upon the very recently approved IASC standard) has been modified by the shelter cluster and has only recently being distributed to partner Agencies. Responses were due to be received by the Shelter cluster lead / co-lead on the 20<sup>th</sup> of July, but this has again proven problematic. Otherwise, the only other known report has been the interim report to ECHO dated 25<sup>th</sup> June 2013.

Notwithstanding the recent approval of IASC standard, the earlier implementation of a similar performance monitoring tool, might have been utilised to stimulate engagement of shelter cluster partner Agencies.

## 7.3 Recommendations

- 7.3.1 Develop and implement a simple cluster monitoring and reporting tool for specific situations such as TC Evan. Continue to follow up the templates issued recently to shelter cluster partner Agencies for completion<sup>21</sup>.
- 7.3.2 Implement the performance monitoring system earlier in the response.

# 8 CONTINGENCY PLANNING, PREPAREDNESS AND CAPACITY BUILDING

## 8.1 Contingency Planning

A disaster management workshop was held prior to TC Evan on the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> of November 2012. One of the objectives of the workshop was to “*identify Clusters, Leads, Co-Leads and Key Partners*”<sup>22</sup>.

In terms of the shelter cluster, the relevant Agencies identified at this workshop are shown in Table 4 below:

**Table 4 – Shelter Cluster Leads, Co-Leads and Key Partners identified prior to TC Evan<sup>23</sup>**

	<b>Evacuation Centers</b>	<b>Temporary Shelter</b>	<b>Permanent Shelter</b>
Government Lead:	NDMO	NDMO	NDMO & Rural Housing
Co-lead:		FRC	FRC
Key partners:		IFRC	MoSW, IFRC, HFHF, UN-Habitat.

This table is interesting because it differs significantly from what actually occurred in the TC Evan response. Firstly, the NDMO did not assume the role of government lead of the shelter cluster and secondly, the FRCS did not assume the role of cluster co-lead at any stage. The IFRC are not listed as co-lead yet they had been the PHT shelter cluster lead Agency since 2008. Given this, and the global role of the IFRC in the shelter cluster, it would seem

<sup>21</sup> Postscript – It is understood that this has been done.

<sup>22</sup> Refer file 20121119 DM Fiji Ex 4\_Notes, from IFRC Dropbox folder

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

incongruous that IFRC were not nominated in the co-lead role prior to TC Evan, although this was of course subsequently rectified. Further, that the NDMO did not undertake their designated pre-disaster role would suggest a lack of preparedness in so far that the Ministry were nominated (after the event) as the GoF lead Agency of the shelter cluster, but without dedicated resourcing to do so.

Nevertheless, the shelter cluster did contribute to some of the pre TC Evan shelter cluster objectives, including developing TOR's and communication lines within the cluster, and also the cluster lead Agencies assisted the NDMO by taking more responsibility for cluster activities.

Post TC Evan, a contingency planning workshop for the shelter cluster was convened by the IFRC in late June 2103 and was attended by many of the partner Agencies. The workshop reiterated the importance of issues such as data collection, methods of communication, needs assessment, 3Ws etc. However, there was no report of this activity available at the time of writing this review, thus it is difficult to gauge the extent of this or how it will inform subsequent shelter responses.

The shelter cluster has developed templates for the identification of pre-positioned emergency stocks and capacity mapping of Agencies, as management and planning tools. Both of these are currently in circulation awaiting completion by shelter cluster partner Agencies, and thus remain a work in progress. Both activities could be further assisted by a locally sourced in country information management role (as above).

## **8.2 Training**

The shelter cluster has undertaken a number of training and capacity building activities (primarily facilitated by the IFRC) as follows:

- Emergency shelter kit training conducted in December 2012 by the IFRC in conjunction with the Solomon Islands RC to assist the GoF / FRCS response to TC Evan.
- Assessment training to partner Agencies involved with the joint assessment exercise of the informal settlements.
- Capacity building to GoF through administrative co-ordination processes such as running meetings, establishing agendas, and recording and distributing minutes.

## **8.3 Recommendations**

- 8.3.1 Complete and maintain the identification and mapping of pre-positioned stocks and capacity of Agencies.
- 8.3.2 Establish and implement an ongoing training and capacity building program in consultation with shelter cluster partner Agencies. Capture and disseminate (e.g. through a series of workshops tied to shelter cluster meetings) the success and challenges experienced by partner Agencies as a means of both capacity building and promoting shelter cluster engagement.

# **9 SHELTER CLUSTER RESPONSE TO TC EVAN**

The shelter cluster response to TC Evan in Fiji is considered firstly in terms of the extent of

implementation of the HAP, and secondly in terms of the number of shelter Agencies who have incorporated Disaster Risk Reduction in their response. Both of these contain objectively verifiable indicators in the agreed ECHO funding proposal.

The first objectively verifiable indicator contained in the agreed ECHO funding proposal is the number of shelter activities identified in the HAP that have been completed or are in progress by June 2013. These activities and the extent of implementation are summarised in Table 5 below.

**Table 5 – Humanitarian Action Plan Indicators and Extent of Implementation**

<b>Activity No.</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Extent of Implementation</b>
A1	Ensure the urgent provision of emergency shelter materials (including tarpaulins, tents, shelter kits and NFIs) for those people whose shelter was impacted.	This activity has been completed, although it is not clear as to the extent of emergency shelter kits distributed.
A2	Coordinate the completion of a comprehensive evaluation of the suitability of evacuation centers through assessment of structural integrity to withstand high winds and flooding rains, provision of drinking water and appropriate sanitation, accessibility for disabled persons, safety and security for women, children and other vulnerable groups and any other issues for protection of those seeking shelter.	National Guide to the (i) Selection and Assessment, and (ii) Management and Operation of Evacuation Centres. The Shelter Cluster has made contributions to both of these documents. Both documents are in final draft form awaiting formal issue by NDMO. It is believed that NDMO are utilising these documents to undertake pilot assessments of evacuation centres in the Western and Northern Divisions.
B1	To provide assistance with repairs and replacement dwellings for those that qualify under the GoF Housing Policy, 21 Dec 2012, including Vakavanua settlers.	Ongoing implementation by the GoF. It is unclear as to precisely how many repairs and replacements have been undertaken.
C1	Undertake detailed shelter assessments of all affected informal settlements.	Detailed assessments undertaken of 41 informal settlements in the Western Division.
C2	Based on the working group direction and the results of the detailed shelter assessment, undertake activities to rebuild/repair in informal settlements.	Based upon the results of the detailed assessments in activity C1 above, HFHF have agreed to construct 120 transitional shelters in informal settlements. Construction has not commenced as yet due to supposed funding requirements and / or material shortages <sup>24</sup> .
D1	Based on initial assessment data, other GoF assessments, and the detailed shelter assessment in the informal settlements prepare an agreed response from all parties for assisting those identified as requiring assistance and coordinated these efforts.	Shelter cluster strategy detailing response options for categories of affected persons has been prepared and accepted, although is yet to be issued as final. , This has broadly taken the approach of the GoF being responsible for formal settlements, and the NGO sector for the informal settlements. Within the latter, co-ordinated damage assessments have been undertaken, MoU's signed, a transitional shelter design developed and soon to be implemented <sup>25</sup> .

<sup>24</sup> It is understood that 120 transitional houses have now been constructed.

<sup>25</sup> Ditto.

Activity No.	Description	Extent of Implementation
E1	Carry out an awareness training program for home repairers and builders, both men and women, to provide advice and improved understanding of the principles for building, strengthening and repairing dwellings to withstand high winds and flooding rains.	The BBS poster has been prepared and over 10,000 copies distributed. A number of Agencies reported having incorporated this into broader disaster management training activities.

The target value for the objectively verifiable indicator in the agreed ECHO funding proposal is five activities. From the results of this review, it is established that all activities (i.e. seven) have either been completed or are in progress as at June 2013.

The second objectively verifiable indicator contained in the agreed ECHO funding proposal is the percentage of shelter cluster agencies that have integrated Disaster Risk Reduction in their shelter response. Shelter cluster implementing partner Agencies and their integration of DRR in shelter response is shown in Table 6 below.

**Table 6 – Shelter Cluster Implementing Agency and Integration of DRR in their Shelter response.**

Agency	Integration of DRR in Shelter Response
Government of Fiji	Yes – Poster and Housing reconstruction.
Act for Peace (AFP)	Yes – Poster and Training.
Community Support Network (CSN)	Yes – When funding received.
Fiji Institution of Engineers (FIE)	Yes – Poster and Training.
Good Neighbour International (GNI)	Yes – Poster and Training.
Fiji Red Cross Society (FRCS)	Yes – Poster and Training.
Habitat for Humanity Fiji (HFHF)	Yes – Poster and transitional shelter design.
Rotary Fiji, Rotary Lautoka	Yes – Pre-positioning of shelter kits.
People's Community Network (PCN)	No – (although not an implementing Agency)

From table 6, it can be seen that from the nine Agencies listed, at least eight of these have integrated (or intend to integrate) DRR into their shelter response in some manner. This represents 88%. One Agency, PCN, is not strictly an implementing Agency and thus 100% percentage would be achieved if they are removed from the list.

## 10 FIJI SHELTER CLUSTER MOVING FORWARD

The IFRC have performed commendably as co-lead of the Fiji shelter cluster in response to TC Evan, particularly given the challenging circumstances in which it found itself. These circumstances emanated from this being the first role out of the cluster system in Fiji. Although Fiji has had sectoral responses to natural disasters previously, the official adoption of the cluster system meant, for the shelter cluster, a new and under resourced GoF lead Agency, coupled with cluster partners with no previous experience of the cluster role and responsibilities. Further, the GoF decision to demarcate non-emergency shelter responses between formal and informal settlements has left the IFRC in the difficult position of being unable to establish the full extent of shelter damage and response required.

However, much of the benefit from the IFRC's role as the shelter cluster co-lead in Fiji will not be seen in the response to TC Evan. Rather, it will be evidenced in future responses where more tangible evidence of the impact of the IFRC's role will emerge, assuming that the shelter cluster coordination work continues. This can be expected to be realised in the form of outputs from the TC Evan response such as the MoUs, the transitional shelter design, the BBS poster, improved evacuation centres, improved assessment procedures

and more informed understanding of donor requirements etc. In addition, the benefit of brokering of relationships by the IFRC between members of the shelter cluster should not be underestimated. These relationships, if maintained, will translate into a more effective response in subsequent disasters.

However, the work of the shelter cluster in this regards is by no means completed, which in turns begs the question as to the future role of the shelter cluster in Fiji, and the IFRC role in it?

In considering this position, it is important to appreciate that many people in Fiji are in a perpetual cycle of shelter damage and repair, with often little or nothing being done to break this cycle, particularly given the now seemingly annual occurrence of events such as flooding and/or cyclones. This is evident from aspects of the TC Evan response, and also from earlier responses. For example, one Agency relayed that after the 2012 floods they had received FJD\$110,000 to undertake repairs to damaged houses. This they did in the form of materials distributions. However, without adequate supervision of BBS messaging, these repair works were subsequently destroyed by TC Evan.

The current TC Evan response has made some headway in this regard with the development and implementation of the BBS poster and associated training activities. This work needs to be continued, but requires ongoing long term advocacy with Agencies and communities. The benefit of investing in such preparedness programs is obvious and has already been proven by those programs that do. For example, the Koropita Housing scheme in Latuoka invests heavily in the message of the BBS posters. It is worth reflecting that, as a result, their housing stock suffered no damage from TC Evan. Thus, there needs to be a more seamless link developed in terms of preparedness and response. The shelter cluster is well placed to develop this link.

Coupled with this is the ongoing and seemingly growing issue of informal settlements. The people in these settlements, with no secure land tenure and often low incomes, are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. The GoF, through the National Housing Policy, has made a commitment to assist these people through (for example) the upgrading of such settlements, subsidised home purchasing arrangements and the introduction of rural livelihood programs. The implementation of these schemes will ultimately increase the disaster resilience of vulnerable communities in Fiji.

Clearly there is a role for the shelter cluster to play in addressing these particular issues and contributing to building the resilience of vulnerable communities to natural disasters. Within the shelter cluster, the GoF has demonstrated limited capacity to deal with the TC Evan response. Whilst more resources for the GoF commitment to lead the shelter cluster are being advocated for (both by the DoH and the IFRC), the most likely scenario is that the GoF will continue to rely heavily, although not exclusively, on the assistance provided by the co-lead Agency. The best placed Agency to fulfil the co-lead role is the IFRC, as it could most seamlessly straddle both disaster and non-disaster periods. To hand the shelter cluster co-lead role to UN-Habitat (as has been suggested) makes little sense when it may well (most likely) be handed back to IFRC in six months time following the next cyclone or flooding event.

However, the current SCC role comes to an end in August 2013, with no known replacement identified or funded. Without a replacement, the future of the Fiji shelter cluster is imperilled.

On a regional basis, the IFRC also has a commitment as the lead / convening Agency of the

Pacific Humanitarian Team regional Emergency Shelter Cluster<sup>26</sup>. The role of the PHT regional clusters is similar to clusters in other parts of the world<sup>27</sup>. However, what makes this situation unique is the regional, as opposed to national, focus given that many events are regional in nature (e.g. TC Evans affected both Fiji and Samoa). This regional arrangement is recognised by the IASC.

In addition, the regional clusters are open ended, or permanently activated. Thus they have a role to play in non-disaster season; a role clearly identified as strengthening the disaster preparedness of both the humanitarian sector and National Agencies on an ongoing basis<sup>28</sup>. According to OCHA, the Pacific had five regional emergencies in the last season alone; four of which had a shelter component as part of the response. Since 2006, the Pacific regions of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia have had 117 natural disaster events, with 1,618 deaths and 1,330,144 people affected. These numbers may be lower than other regions, but so is the population of the Pacific and the capacities of national governments to respond to natural disasters. Thus, the formulation of a regional based cluster approach makes sense in terms of harnessing and combining the available resources.

It should also be noted that key donors such as AusAID are currently in the process of significantly increasing their pre-positioned emergency stocks in the Pacific region. It is understood that they are at the same time increasing standards with regards to tarpaulins etc. Whilst increases in standards are clearly welcome, they need to be cost-effective for all Agencies involved in a disaster response, and also provide equitable solutions for communities. The IFRC, in its role as convenor of the regional shelter cluster role has an important role to play in advocating for consistent, cost-effective emergency shelter response.

Given the above, the need for a permanent IFRC shelter presence in the Pacific region is clear. Such a presence is also in accordance with the draft IFRC Pacific regional strategy 2013-2015 outcomes 2 & 3 as follows:

*Outcome 2: The emergency shelter sector has appropriate regional and in-country coordination and support in preparedness.*

*Outcome 3: Emergency shelter sector has appropriate regional and in-country coordination and support in response.*

Fiji would seem the logical location to base a permanent IFRC shelter presence given both the National and Regional shelter cluster requirements, its central geographic and bureaucratic location. Whilst it is up to the Regional and Zone Office to determine what such an arrangement would look like, as a suggestion the following is proffered.

1. SCC (Internationally or locally sourced) based in Suva with regional responsibility and local oversight in terms of national cluster and;
2. Two Shelter Delegates (locally sourced) in counterpart roles (to the SCC) based in Suva with national shelter cluster co-lead, and national society capacity development<sup>29</sup>, responsibilities respectively.
3. Locally sourced information management and administrative support as deemed

<sup>26</sup> This includes the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Republic of the Marshall Islands Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

<sup>27</sup> Pacific Humanitarian Team and Pacific Clusters.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> This is outcome 1 of the Draft Pacific Regional Shelter Strategy.

required.

This resourcing could be supplemented as necessary in emergencies with surge coordination capacity sourced through the existing global shelter cluster roster.

Discussion of such an arrangement could be had with ARC whom have previously funded shelter delegates and shelter cluster deployments to both Fiji and other countries in the Pacific, with a view to potentially securing long term funding for same through AusAID or other interested donors (e.g. ECHO).

## **11 SUMMARY**

The IFRC has performed commendably as co-lead Agency of the shelter cluster in response to TC Evan in Fiji. Largely through the efforts of the IFRC, the shelter cluster has established an initial platform upon which to build. This achievement has come despite some significant challenges principally including an under resourced lead Agency with no prior experience in clusters, and limited engagement from shelter cluster partner Agencies.

In this respect, the impact of the efforts of the IFRC cannot be considered in the context of the TC Evans response alone, although some notable achievements have made in this regard, such as the co-ordinated assessments, advocacy for informal settlements, and development of the BBS poster.

Rather, the gains made are likely to reap greater return on investment in future disaster events. This is contingent upon the IFRC maintaining its presence as co-lead Agency of the shelter cluster. By doing so, the IFRC will provide the vital support needed to the broader efforts of the GoF, NGOs, donors and the private sector as they strive to reduce the vulnerability of the Fijian people to the now regular occurrence of natural disasters.

## **Appendices**

Appendix A	Terms of Reference.
Appendix B	Key Documents Reviewed.
Appendix C	Key Stakeholders Interviewed.
Appendix D	Extent and Location of Damage.

# TERMS OF REFERENCE TEMPLATE

## Terms of reference for consultancy

### Purpose of Project and Background

The following are the Terms of Reference for a review of the Fiji Shelter Cluster in response to Tropical Cyclone Evan. IFRC is the shelter cluster lead for the Pacific region since regional clusters were formally activated in the Pacific in January 2012. Tropical Cyclone Evan hit Fiji from 16 to 18 December 2012 as a Category 4 storm, heavily affecting the shelter sector. The Government of Fiji established the cluster system to coordinate the response of humanitarian agencies. Clusters in Fiji are national coordination mechanisms led by the government, with humanitarian partners acting in a co-lead capacity to provide technical assistance and support to the government lead. The Government of Fiji requested IFRC to provide support in convening the shelter cluster in Fiji in response to Tropical Cyclone Evan. As a result, IFRC has been co-leading the shelter cluster in Fiji since December 2012.

The Australian Red Cross and ECHO have provided support to IFRC and the shelter cluster in Fiji to improve the humanitarian shelter response to Tropical Cyclone Evan. The Secretariat of the IFRC seeks to review the effectiveness of the shelter coordination services provided by IFRC as well as of the shelter humanitarian response to Tropical Cyclone Evan in Fiji, to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future response.

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## Alignment to the IFRC's objectives and strategy

(IFRC's *Strategy 2020*)

This project aligns with strategic aim 2 of IFRC Strategy 2020, to save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crisis. It will provide key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future shelter response in Fiji. Through improved shelter coordination, humanitarian agencies can strengthen the shelter response to disasters.

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## Project objectives

The objectives of the review are to:

- Appraise the service provided by IFRC as shelter cluster co-coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors.
- Review and analyse the experience of IFRC with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations.
- Provide recommendations with regard to IFRC's leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities in Fiji, for preparedness and emergency response and the resources required to perform such a role.
- Examine if there were aspects of IFRC's cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.
- Assess the Fiji Shelter Cluster response to Tropical Cyclone Evan, to inform future humanitarian shelter response in Fiji.

In the framework of these objectives, the review will encompass, but not be limited to, the following areas:

- **Coordination Arrangements:** in-country coordination modalities; activation of the cluster process; staffing; access to equipment and supplies by and funding of the Shelter Coordination Team (SCT); understanding, support, and impact of IFRC's shelter coordination role within the in-country IFRC team and National Society regional delegation, the Zone office and the secretariat in Geneva; value of linking and/or separating the SCT and the Red Cross relief operation; issues with regard to visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement; remote support; and design, implementation and timing of the exit/handover strategy.
- **Supporting service delivery:** coordination management; design, timeliness and implementation of the SCT, including factors and determinants which provided the SCT's strengths and weaknesses; linkage of IFRC's shelter coordination role with any coordination system set up by the national authorities; extent to which national actors (NGOs, affected population, civil society and private sector as relevant) were included in the coordination mechanism; relations with other sectors, the UN system, the Government and other coordination mechanisms as applicable; information management.
- **Informing strategic decision-making of the humanitarian response:** assessments and response gap analysis and how these fed into the appeal process; extent to which cross-cutting issues were included in the situation analysis and design of the shelter response.
- **Planning and strategy development:** strategic planning; technical coordination and application of standards; resource mobilization and appeals; accountability to affected populations; recovery guidance and involvement of the SCT in the transition from meeting emergency shelter needs to durable shelter solutions.
- **Advocacy:** communication and public information strategy and activities; identification of advocacy concerns and advocacy activities undertaken on behalf of cluster participants and the affected population.
- **Monitoring and reporting:** reporting systems to monitor the implementation of the cluster strategy and corrective action when necessary; cluster performance monitoring.
- **Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity building:** national contingency plans identified and shared if available; extent to which response followed previously established contingency plans; development of cluster-based contingency plans when relevant; risk assessment and analysis carried out; readiness status enhanced; regular distribution of early warning reports; training; the feasibility and conditions required for CVM/IFRC to continue to lead the shelter cluster during the preparedness and relief periods in Mozambique
- **Shelter Cluster response:** effectiveness and timeliness of the shelter response to Tropical Cyclone Evan; relevance of the shelter section of the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) and extent to which the HAP has been implemented; integration of Disaster Risk Reduction elements in the shelter response of shelter cluster agencies.

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## Desired outcomes

Through the conduct of a review of the Fiji Shelter Cluster in response to Tropical Cyclone Evan, the following outcomes will be achieved:

1. IFRC (Pacific Regional Office, Asia-Pacific Zone Office and the Shelter and Settlements department) will identify lessons and act on recommendations to improve future deployments.
2. Shelter Coordination Team members and the Global Shelter Cluster Support Team will learn from the findings and apply them to revise tools and guidelines to improve shelter coordination policy and practice.
3. Fiji shelter cluster partners and government will use it as reference to improve their shelter response in future disasters as relevant.

4. The Pacific Humanitarian Team and other clusters in Fiji and the region will identify good practices and areas for improvement that may be relevant to their own coordination responsibilities.
  5. Donors and other humanitarian actors will use it to inform planning and funding decisions for future shelter coordination and response in Fiji.
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## Consultancy outputs

1. An **inception note** (2-3 pages long) detailing the proposed methodology, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the evaluator.
  2. **Debriefing / feedback to IFRC at all levels** – The evaluator will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC (in-country, region, zone, and Geneva) in a timely manner, before leaving the country. The evaluator will present the draft report to IFRC within two weeks of the return from the field.
  3. **Draft report** – A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future shelter coordination and response, will be submitted within two weeks of the consultants' return from the field for review and feedback.
  4. **Final report** – Concise, written report in English (20-25 pages long) with key findings and recommendations and supporting information. The final report will contain a short executive summary and a main body of the report in the standard IFRC shelter coordination review template. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders, and address the objectives and areas of inquiry outlined above (Project objectives). The final report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.
  5. **Annexes** - Additional notes, summary of review activities undertaken including interview guide, list of stakeholders interviewed, questionnaire or survey if applicable, visits conducted with dates, list of documents reviewed, timeline that captures the milestones regarding the deployment of the SCT and shelter coordination and response, and any other supporting documentation as appropriate, as annexes to the report.
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## Method of delivery and reasons for selecting that method

The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluations, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An **IFRC evaluation management team** will oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluator, to ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three people, one of which is from the Shelter & Settlements department, one from the Asia-Pacific Zone Office and one from Pacific Regional Office.

The **external evaluator** will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical expertise to the evaluation, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he should not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired in accordance with the IFRC procedure for the contracting of consultants, through a transparent recruitment process, based on their professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation. It is expected that the evaluator will be able to conduct a reliable and informed assessment of the shelter coordination and response to Tropical Cyclone Evan in Fiji that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

**The specific evaluation methodology will be further detailed in the inception note in close consultation between the evaluator and the IFRC evaluation management team**, but will draw upon the following methods:

1. **Desktop review:** Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Fiji Shelter Cluster, relevant background documents and background and history, including prior IFRC Shelter Cluster evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites in Fiji.
3. **Key informant interviews**, with key internal stakeholders within the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, the Asia-Pacific Zone Office, the Pacific Regional Office, and the deployed shelter cluster co-coordinators, as well as with external stakeholders, including government officials, shelter cluster agencies, donors, OCHA, the Pacific Humanitarian Team, and others as relevant.

Other methods, such as a possible online survey or focus group discussions, will be detailed in an inception note to be developed by the consultant, as time and capacity allows.

An initial draft report will be prepared for a **review process**, which should occur within 2 weeks of submittal of the draft report to the evaluation management team, and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

1. **Week 1 of review:** the evaluation management team to check content is in line with TOR and standards .
2. **Week 2 of review:** stakeholders participating in the evaluation.

The review process will be followed to ensure stakeholder input while maintaining the integrity and independence of the report according to the following criteria:

- **Inaccuracy.** Inaccuracies are factual, supported with undisputable evidence, and therefore should be corrected in the evaluation report itself.
- **Clarifications.** A clarification is additional, explanatory information to what the evaluator provided in the report. It is the evaluators' decision whether to revise their report according to a clarification.
- **Difference of opinion.** A difference of opinion does not pertain to the findings (which are factual), but to the conclusions and/or recommendations. These may be expressed to the evaluator during the review process. It is the evaluator's decision whether to revise their report according to a difference of opinion.

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## Support to be provided to the consultant

The Senior Officer, Shelter Coordination, will brief the consultant and provide backstop support in dealing with any questions the consultant may have regarding the scope and content of the review. The IFRC Fiji Shelter Cluster Co-coordinator and the IFRC Pacific Regional Office will provide the required administration and logistics support to organize the field visit and required interviews with stakeholders, as well as the information and background documentation required to gather data and analysis.

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## Schedule for payment of fees

The consultant will be paid the full amount upon satisfactory completion of the work in accordance with the terms of reference.

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## Time Allocation, for budget purposes

This assignment is for a maximum of 25 working days, during the period July 5, 2013 and August 31, 2013.

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## Management of consultancy

Version 1<sup>st</sup> April 2013

The consultancy shall be managed by the Senior Officer, Shelter Coordination. He will provide the required briefing to the consultant and have weekly monitoring discussions to assess progress. Other ad hoc communications with the consultant will be held as required.

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## APPENDIX B – SELECTION OF KEY DOCUMENTS REVIEWED


- Draft Shelter Cluster Strategic Operational Framework Tropical Cyclone Evan December 2012 (Rev3).
- TC Evan 2012 Shelter Guidelines and Standards Shelter Cluster Technical Guidance (19/05/2013).
- Terms of Reference Fiji National Shelter Cluster.
- ECHO Signed agreement dated 10<sup>th</sup> April 2013.
- Disaster Rehabilitation Housing Policy (Undated).
- Republic of Fiji, The National Housing Policy (Undated).
- Government of Fiji – National Guide Selection and Assessment of Evacuation Centres – June 2013 – in Draft.
- Government of Fiji Humanitarian Action Plan for Tropical Cyclone Evan – 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (8<sup>th</sup> February 2013).
- Operational Update on progress to date in the implementation of the ECHO funded shelter cluster in Fiji in response to TC Evan.
- Fiji – Post Disaster Needs Assessment, Tropical Cyclone Evan, 17th December 2012, March 2013.
- TC Evan National Debrief Workshop - Report on Outcomes.
- Terms of Reference - Pacific Humanitarian Team - & Pacific Clusters.

## APPENDIX C – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (in order of interview)

Name	Designation	Organisation
Masi Latianara	National Director	Habitat for Humanity Fiji
Azad Khan	ER/EIE Coordinator	Save the Children Fiji
Vuli Guana	Disaster Program Manager	IFRC, Suva
Sarah Mecartney	Pacific Program Manager	UN Habitat
Annie Madden	Director	Community Support Network
Rev. Paul H. Ramswarup	Chairman	The Good Neighbour International
Peter Drysdale	Founder	Koroipita Housing Scheme
Ruth Atu		Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development
Charles	Field Officer	People's Community Network
Dr Steve Barker	Shelter Cluster Co-ordinator	IFRC, Suva
Greg Grimish	OIC	UNOCHA
Rashmi Rita	Information Management Officer	UNOCHA
Vula Shaw	Director of Housing	Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing and Environment
Anuragh Narayan	Data Statistician / IT Officer	Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing and Environment
Tu Tangi	Program Manager	Australian Agency for International Development
Richard Dirks	First Secretary	New Zealand Agency for International Development
Filipe Nanoca	Director General	Fiji Red Cross
Eseroma Ledua	Disaster / Youth Co-ordinator	Fiji Red Cross
Imanueli Koroituinakeao	Country Manager	Act for Peace
Pratarp Singh	Former President	Fiji Institute of Engineers
Major Tavita	Major	Fiji Army Corps
Lewis Boulton	Manager	Logistics Cluster
Aurelia Bape	Head of Regional Delegation	IFRC, Suva
Ysabeau Rycx	Disaster Management Co-ordinator	IFRC, Suva
Marc Overmars	WASH Specialist	UNICEF
Michael Gloeckle	Former Shelter Cluster Co-ordinator	IFRC, Suva
Ken Collis	Co-ordinator	National Disaster Management Office
Patrick Elliot	Zone Shelter Delegate	IFRC, Kuala Lumpur
Pablo Medina	Senior Officer - Shelter Coordination, Shelter & Settlements	IFRC. Geneva
Natasha Freeman	Logistics Co-ordinator	Australian Red Cross
David O'meara	Former Shelter Cluster Co-ordinator	IFRC, Suva
Warwick Pleas		Rotary Fiji

# APPENDIX D – INDICATIVE LOCATION OF DAMAGE

This map shows damages to dwellings recognized by the Government of Fiji as having legal owner occupiers, legal tenants or recognized settlements. NGOs will be undertaking a detailed shelter assessment of all informal settlements not included in formal assessments to be completed by the end of January. This map will be revised to include all housing damages once assessments are finalized. This map also identifies schools which have reported damages.



Housing Damages (Excludes Protected Lanes and Villages) as at 18 Jan 2013

District	Partially Damaged	Completely Destroyed	Total
Rakiraki	130	63	193
Tavua	120	63	183
Ba	81	87	168
Lautoka	81	53	134
Nadi	32	18	50
Nadroga	81	114	195
<b>Western Division (All Levels) Total</b>	<b>585</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>1072</b>
<b>Western Division Total</b>	<b>1071</b>	<b>537</b>	<b>1608</b>

\* Highlighted in a separate map

**Legend**

- Affected Schools
- Affected Communities
- Affected Villages
- Major Towns
- Division (Admin 1) Boundary
- Province (Admin 2) Boundary
- Formal Housing Damage by NDRO District
- Partly Damaged
- Completely Destroyed
- Roads
- Rivers
- Coastline



Creation date: 22 January 2013. OCHA number: TC-2012-08029-8888. Sources: OCHA, Global Administrative Layers (GAL), Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics (FIS), Fiji Meteorological Services, Fiji NDRO, Fiji Land Information Systems. File path: hqpa@unhcr.org www.unhcr.org www.fiji.gov.fj www.fiji.gov.fj. The boundaries and the designations shown on this map do not imply a view or acceptance by the United Nations.