SHELTER PROJECTS

SHELTER AND CASH: 16 Case Studies

CASE STUDIES OF HUMANITARIAN SHELTER AND SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMMES WITH A CASH COMPONENT

Global Shelter Cluster
ShelterCluster.org
Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter
Shelter Projects - Shelter and Cash: 16 Case Studies

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All case studies are available online from www.shelterprojects.org

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This booklet is a compilation of case studies of 16 humanitarian shelter projects compiled from the six past editions of the interagency publication Shelter Projects. The projects have been selected as they used cash transfer programming (CTP) to meet programme objectives. These case studies were drafted by field based shelter practitioners based on projects delivered over the past twelve years, and as such the language or modalities used may not be aligned with current CTP terminology or best practice. Additionally all analysis was undertaken at the time of each publication and focused on strengths and weaknesses from the perspective of shelter project implementation, rather than with a specific cash/market lens.

The shelter sector is working hard to scale CTP within its ways of working. The case studies within this document show that there is a lot of experience and evidence relating to the targeted use of CTP within shelter and settlements programming. However this may not be articulated well within current discussions on cash.

The “opinion piece” included within this document was written in 2012 and has many similarities to the current position of the Global Shelter Cluster on cash based programming. Further support and investment is clearly required to align the thinking of the cash community and the shelter sector and to facilitate increased progress in making the most of opportunities CTP presents to the sector.

For more on the Shelter Cluster work on cash please visit: https://www.sheltercluster.org/working-group/shelter-and-cash-working-group
Introduction

The Shelter Cluster views cash transfer and markets based programming (CTP/MBP) as instrumental modalities for the delivery of humanitarian shelter support and services. The Cluster and operational agencies are committed to scaling up the use of cash and market based modalities to assist crisis affected populations wherever possible. They are also seeking ways to build the necessary capacity and experience in CTP/MBP to meet key sector specific objectives.

To ensure alignment with commitments made as part of the WHS Grand Bargain\(^1\) the broader humanitarian community, donors and policy entities involved in promoting CTP must work with the sectors to help evolve their capacities. All sectors are not equal when it comes to CTP/MBP and the technical specificities of each sector may present constraints or opportunities towards a greatly scaled usage of CTP/MBP, and especially of unconditional cash and multi-purpose grants (MPGs).

Background

The shelter sector has significant experience in the use of CTP and MBP\(^2\). In particular the use of conditionality and restriction-based approaches have worked well and at scale, in settings where technical and quality standards must be met – or instance to mitigate safety risks. Currently however the experience and evidence around the usage of unconditional and unrestricted CTP modalities such as MPGs to successfully meet sector specific technical and social protection objectives and outcomes are limited\(^3\).

Typically shelter programmes are not focused solely on the transfer of assets or commodities but are composed of multiple components designed to achieve a range of outcomes. Good shelter programming relies on balancing the provision of shelter commodities such as plastic sheeting, tools or construction materials with services such as labour or secure rental agreements. Either can be provided through in-kind or cash based modalities – but it is the technical support element of project design that adds the real value and allows the targeting of objectives to ensure physical safety, prevent the use of hazardous materials, and mitigate and respond to Gender-based violence and other sectoral protection concerns such as privacy in shelters or secure and well-lit toilets.

It is therefore evident that the provision of cash (or cash alone) for either sector may not always be the most suitable response option to meet needs appropriately or quickly\(^4\). This is equally true of in-kind assistance, and historically programmes have shown much greater success when support has been provided through combining finance, in-kind materials and crucially, carefully designed technical support. Such support is often managed through qualifying conditions and/or usage restrictions for both cash or in kind components, and ensure that defined objectives and quality assurance standards and specifications related to matters including safety and protection can be met.

This is not to say that in some contexts – and in particular when aiming to meet very basic household requirements or ongoing daily subsistence needs – that unconditional and/or unrestricted cash is not an appropriate response modality for supporting some shelter needs.

Ultimately however it is informed and technically driven response analyses that should define the best combination of modalities that will meet both immediate and longer-term needs of people affected by disasters or conflict. This degree of analysis is often missing from decision making and is also at risk from current trends which are suggesting a default approach of multi-purpose cash as being the most desirable. The shelter sector sees clear opportunity for cash to be a key response modality – with the condition it can be coupled with all other modalities and approaches required to meet identified objectives.

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\(^1\) Grand Bargain Cash Commitments: https://bit.ly/25AoR10
\(^2\) Shelter Cluster position paper: https://bit.ly/2sqRYof
\(^3\) World Bank strategic note: https://bit.ly/2L82DM8 (page 47)

\(^4\) E.g. there is often a high demand for corrugated iron sheets (CGI) in many responses and, although usually available on the local market, this market is often not very elastic and tends to be based on a generally poor quality product.
Position Statements

Based on existing evidence and experience the Shelter Cluster is of the opinion that:

• Common to the Grand Bargain statement – no single modality (cash, in kind, technical support or community engagement), is sufficient for meeting shelter objectives related to achieving safe living environments and outcomes that benefit whole communities and mitigate the impacts of future disasters.

• Any CTP/MBP shelter programme with objectives beyond the basic transfer of assets must include appropriate technical assistance and community engagement.

• Decisions around the use of any modality (or combination) to meet shelter needs – as well as related funding allocations – should be made with the inclusion of sectoral technical specialists, and must be based on sound response analysis that considers all possible options. Where possible markets analysis should be integrated into all needs assessments from the outset of a response.

• There is an urgent need for the development of shelter specific tools, guidance and experience around analysing all relevant shelter markets5. Currently neither the shelter sector – nor humanitarian market specialists – have the right tools, skills or experience to quickly and efficiently map, assess and analyse these varied sectoral markets. As a result, the sector does not have access to the information that would help it to make robust decisions on the viability of MPGs and related unconditional CTP interventions.

• Funding mechanisms for MPGs should not exclude complementary sectoral technical components in their design. These technical components should be prioritized based on needs and context.

Requirements for enhanced MBP/CTP capacity in the shelter sector

The shelter sector is engaged in efforts to adapt existing tools, knowledge and experience to develop sector specific approaches to facilitate the selection of the most appropriate delivery modalities. To deliver on this work more quickly, and thus be able to responsibly increase the scale of support provided via CTP/MBP, as well as where appropriate via MPGs, the shelter sector requires;

• Increased opportunities for closer cooperation and two way dialogue between the broader cash and markets community6 and shelter technical specialists. Mutual education is key in finding the solutions to unlock the potential of CTP/MBP in these sectors without compromising on sectoral outcomes.

• More resources to facilitate the development of the required sector specific CTP/MBP tools, skills, capacity and evidence base that are currently broadly absent in both sectors.

5 Markets include commodities, rent, land, services, transport, debt, remittances and skills/labour across a wide range of disciplines.

6 Cash community would include all entities involved in promoting the increased use of CTP/MBP such donors (DFID, ECHO), policy entities promoting cash (ODI, CaLP, CGD, etc) Working Groups, and cash and markets specialists from other sectors.

In the absence of a collaborative approach and focussed support from the cash and markets community, evolving the sectorial skills, tools and evidence around CTP/MBP will remain difficult. However, both WASH and Shelter sectors are committed to developing the skills required to deliver quality focused CTP/MBP, and see significant potential in the opportunities that this change in the way we do business presents to the populations we work with.

Cash was provided to enable people to purchase elephant grass to upgrade their shelters.
Basic principles

The professionalisation of the shelter sector as a part of humanitarian assistance is often dated to the early 1970s and the work of researchers-cum-practitioners like Fred Curyn and Ian Davis. These grand doyens of shelter after disasters helped establish a number of principles for the sector that remain true today, including:

- The aspirations and capacities of affected populations must be at the heart of all settlement planning and shelter reconstruction activities.
- The majority of people displaced by disasters figure out their own shelter solutions, often through the involvement of other relatives, neighbours, or the host community at large.
- To help regenerate livelihoods and provide income to affected households, preference should be given to the use of local labour and local building materials for construction activities.

In the 40 years since these principles of community driven shelter programmes were first espoused, these ideas have been accepted as axioms by the shelter sector as a whole. Yet many of the current debates about the most appropriate shelter solution for affected populations are led by architects and builders, not community mobilisers or anthropologists. The first two editions of these case study reports, *Shelter Projects 2008* and *Shelter Projects 2009*, are heavily weighted towards "expert driven" shelter options. Of the 81 case studies in these two volumes, less than 15 per cent refer to shelter projects that included a component that offered affected people a greater choice and responsibilities: the provision of cash transfers directly to beneficiaries.

The case studies in *Shelter Projects 2010* highlight how far the shelter sector has come in considering cash transfers as a tool for shelter responses – almost 50 per cent of the projects cited have a cash component, including an early use of shelter-related cash grants and loans for disaster affected people in 1906.

Cash transfers for shelter

Across all sectors, the direct provision of goods and services to affected populations – in kind assistance - remains the most common form of delivering humanitarian aid. The drivers for in kind assistance among agencies and donors are the same across all sectors: the need for highly visible relief operations; the desire to reduce suffering and disease through quickly launched humanitarian responses; and achieving economies of scale and value for money. There is a growing recognition within the humanitarian community that direct cash transfers to disaster-affected people can help agencies, donors and governments fulfil their mandates and meet public expectations.

As noted in the shelter case studies in *Shelter Projects 2011-2012* and previous volumes, there are two main types of cash transfer methods used in shelter programmes:

- **Cash for Work:**
  - Direct cash payments to beneficiaries for their labour on debris clearance, shelter construction or other community focused infrastructure projects;

- **Conditional Cash Grants and/or Vouchers:**
  - Direct cash payments to beneficiaries or landlords for services defined by agencies or governments; e.g., participating in training programmes; rebuilding homes according to pre-defined plans or construction stages; or rental support;
  - A paper, token, or debit card voucher that can be exchanged or redeemed at pre-selected vendors for a pre-determined quantity or value of construction materials or services.

A third type of cash transfer mechanisms used in humanitarian responses is Unconditional Cash Grants, where direct cash payments are made to selected beneficiaries (usually the highly vulnerable or poorest) without conditions or requirements. While post distribution monitoring of household expenditures suggest that food, health care, or loan repayments are typical purchases made with unconditional cash grants, there is some evidence to suggest that under certain conditions beneficiaries will choose to spend the money on shelter materials. For example, in Pakistan in 2005, over 95% of earthquake affected households who received a small cash grant (US$ 40) spent the funds on shelter construction or material transport.

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1. See C.1 Shelter Projects 2009, and D.1, Shelter Projects 2008
2. See case study B.2, Shelter Projects 2010
Scepticism on cash and shelter

Accompanying the increase in interest by agencies and donors in cash transfers for shelter support programmes is scepticism from some shelter specialists on what is seen as “cash evangelism”. Many of the doubts focus on concerns and perceived risks around unconditional cash transfers and self-built reconstruction. How can we ensure, ask the sceptics, that people won’t rebuild using inappropriate designs, poor quality materials and unsafe construction techniques if we just give them cash? Fortunately, most mainstream agencies and shelter professionals recognize that cash transfers for shelter projects must be accompanied by technical advice and support, or given in tranches based on a phased approach. Like all humanitarian assistance, however, post distribution monitoring of cash or in-kind assistance is essential to ensure that project goals are met and that the aid given “does no harm” to its recipients.

A second set of concerns on cash transfers for shelter relates to the high cost of safe or safer shelter after disaster. By restricting the number of families who receive cash and shelter assistance, isn’t there a risk that social tensions within or between communities will be exacerbated? Does the liquidity of cash potentially increase conflicts between neighbours? While the answers to these questions are possibly yes, humanitarian assistance in all sectors grapple with these questions in each and every response. To date, the best way to avoid these potential conflicts is through coordination, ongoing consultation, and robust accountability mechanisms in place to address community and beneficiary concerns.

Strengths and weaknesses of cash for shelter

Regardless of the sector, the success of cash transfer interventions is highly dependent upon assessments and a thorough response analysis. Key elements to be considered in shelter programme design using cash as a tool are:

- clarity on the programme objectives, and what the shelter programme is trying to achieve within the limits of budgets and time frames
- proper targeting of affected households who are both most likely to benefit from and take advantage of cash transfers programming
- an understanding of household and community economic activity that help inform how cash injections can complement and enhance recovery after disasters
- a market analysis with a sufficient level of detail to know how the disaster or conflict has affected building material supplies, skilled labour, and rental markets, and what might be the negative (inflationary) impact of injecting cash into local economies
- a robust monitoring and evaluation system in place to measure impact and gauge the effectiveness of cash transfers as a programme tool.

“...success of [cash] interventions is highly dependent upon a detailed response analysis.”

Ampara, Sri Lanka.

Photo: Jerry Galea-Cofam

As evidenced in the increasing number of cash transfers in case studies in recent volumes of Shelter Projects, it can be expected that cash will become a more frequent component in humanitarian-driven shelter responses.

Photo: Ivan Maric, Interim.
The Future of Cash and Shelter

As evidenced in the increasing number of cash transfers in case studies in recent volumes of Shelter Projects, it can be expected that cash will become a more frequent component in humanitarian-driven shelter responses. With the proliferation of mobile phone access throughout the world and the increase in security of mobile banking transactions, future cash and shelter programmes are likely to be more digitally oriented than what we see now. In other humanitarian sectors such as Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion (WASH), mobile phones are increasingly used to reach wider audiences with key messages and as project monitoring tools. For a sector such as shelter, where hazard reduction principles and “building back better” are the new axioms, the potential of combining mobile phone technology and cash programming are yet to be explored.

While bankers may not have the skill set that agencies and donors look for to help guide cash and shelter programmes, the architects, engineers and builders of the shelter community would be wise to include cash transfers as a potential instrument in their tool box. As with all innovations, however, care must be taken to avoid cash transfers as the default option for all shelter programmes. Builders and bankers alike know the truth to the old adage: if the only tool you have is a hammer, all problems look like nails.

Rick Bauer. 2012
A.1 Afghanistan – 2012 – Conflict Returns

Case Study: Keywords: Returns, Urban neighbourhoods, Construction materials, Core housing construction, Cash / vouchers, Infrastructure, Training.

Country: Afghanistan
Project location: Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad
Disaster: Conflict returns
Date: 2002 onwards
Number of houses damaged: More than 130,000 houses in project areas (within Kabul)
Number of people returned: Over 5 million people since 2002 150,000 families in Kabul
Project target population: Pilot 295 households (Expanded to 2,075 households)
Project outputs: 295 shelters with hygiene activities
Shelter size: One-room shelter: average 18m²
Two-room shelter: average 30m²
Materials cost per household: Two-room shelter US$ 1,700 (household contributes US$ 500)
One room shelter US$ 800 (household contributes US$ 200)
Project cost per household: Two-room shelter, including indirect cost US$ 2,286

Project timeline
- 12 months – Project completion
- 12 months – Monitoring and quality check
- 8 months – Hand over and assessment of occupancy rate
- 5 months – Hygiene promotion assessments
- 4 months – Shelter construction
- 4 months – Beneficiary selection and community mobilisation
- 1 month – Project planning
- 1st January 2012 – Project start

Project description
This project addressed the poor living conditions of recent refugee-returnees, IDPs and host families through the construction of 295 semi-permanent shelters with household latrines and hygiene promotion. Cash grants gave beneficiaries an active role in the project and allowed the organisation’s staff to spend more time with the community rather than managing contractors. The pilot phase of the project was successful and was scaled up to target a further 2,075 households.

Strengths and weaknesses
✓ The beneficiaries took control of the construction process, and adapted the design of the shelters according to their own needs.
✓ Groups of five beneficiary households worked together to manage the construction process, promoting community cohesion.
✓ Freed from construction management tasks, field teams focused on discussing specific DRR measures with each household.
✓ The cash-grant project resulted in three times the number of shelters being built compared to the previous year’s direct-procurement method.
✗ A gender balance amongst beneficiaries was not achieved, despite using a vulnerability list.
✗ It was challenging to identify the most vulnerable families. The urban context made this more difficult.
✗ The project did not address wider community planning issues of community sanitation and drainage, or community-level disaster risk reduction (DRR).
✗ It was not anticipated that some construction techniques, which returnees had brought back, were not earthquake-resistant, leading to weaker buildings.
- There is ongoing discussion about whether smaller, single-room core shelters provide enough space.
- Allowing households control over design required greater technical support from the organisation.
- Separating chronic needs from returnees needs in urban Kabul was challenging.
Before the conflict

In the 1970s the population of Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, was 500,000. Despite the fact that a range of different ethnic groups lived together in relative peace, some groups were discriminated against, with differing access to resources, property and services. As a result, the Hazara minority were living on the outskirts of the city whilst Pushtoon and Tajik groups occupied more central areas.

The 1978 revolution was followed by civil war and Soviet invasion. This led to a significant growth in Kabul’s population as many people were displaced from rural to urban areas. The city’s Hazara population increased tenfold, establishing new settlements in the western part of the city.

The collapse of Afghanistan’s communist regime in 1992 led to an intensification of conflict, killing tens of thousands of people in just four years. During this period many city residents (mainly Hazaras) had fled to Pakistan, Iran and other parts of Afghanistan.

During this period all the houses in western Kabul were destroyed.

Conflict returnees

Since 2002 and the fall of the Taliban regime, over five million people have returned to Afghanistan.

Most of the returnees found that their own houses had been totally destroyed and rented shelter or stayed with host families. Many had land that they could use to build shelter, but many households lacked the labour and materials.

By the end of 2011, more than 200,000 shelters had been provided for returning refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) by various different organisations under one national programme. However, there remained a national gap of 50,000 shelters.

The government set a target of the end of 2010 for the complete rehabilitation and integration of all displaced people. Two years later housing and landlessness remained significant obstacles.

The lack of available shelter or land in Afghanistan is the primary reason for many refugees remaining in Pakistan and Iran. The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) launched a land allocation scheme at the end of 2005 to deal with this issue. The scheme has so far provided 42,000 families with temporary land ownership deeds.

Selection of beneficiaries

In 2011, districts 13 and 16 in the western part of Kabul were identified as the neediest areas of urban Kabul for shelter assistance.

The organisation worked with beneficiary selection committees established in each community. Each committee consisted of two staff from the organisation (one male and one female), a representative from the government, and the ‘Gozar’s Malik’ (religious leader).

Beneficiary selection forms and the guidelines and criteria for filling them in were explained during workshops with beneficiary selection committees. Land ownership documents were checked by the Malik, who were able to resolve local and non-written issues surrounding tenure.

The pilot phase targeted 295 households, prioritising recent returnees from Pakistan and Iran. These were followed by IDPs, and finally, host communities. In addition to these main target groups, the organisation prioritised according to primarily landless, and then land-owning returnees who had been displaced or returned since 2008.

The final section was based on the following criteria:

- female headed households
- disabled headed households
- child headed households
- elderly headed of households
- victims of Gender Based Violence (GBV)
- large families
- very low income families with no regular income.

The most vulnerable families were given additional financial and technical assistance.

“...The Community Driven Method (CDP) allowed me to purchase the material for my shelter according to my own choice. The design of my shelter unit was finalised in consultation with my family members...”

Abdullah - Shelter beneficiary
Implementation

The organisation had been building shelters in Afghanistan for a number of years, but had previously directly provided construction materials. This was the first time that a cash-based, owner-driven approach had been attempted by the organisation in Afghanistan. The pilot project was implemented in 2011.

After signing a memorandum of understanding with the provincial authorities, the selection of beneficiaries began.

The project established beneficiary groups of 4 to 5 members to create community networks that would support vulnerable beneficiaries (especially women and disabled people). The whole group would not receive their grant instalments if one of the group members had not reached the agreed stage of construction. This condition forced the group members to help each other and work together.

Grants were paid out in hard currency (cash in envelopes) in four instalments. The cash was to be used for purchasing shelter materials. Mobile phone banking options were investigated but rejected as being too complicated.

In the original pilot project in Kabul, 102 out of 295 families opted to construct a single room shelter. This was mainly because the shelter plots were not large enough for the two-room shelters. As the shelters were constructed by the affected households, the dimensions of each shelter varied.

Technical assistance

During the shelter construction, households received support from the project technical staff. This included advice on the plot layout, ground clearing and foundation digging, stone masonry, brick masonry, seismic risk reduction measures and roofing design.

Handover

The houses were handed over to the households when they were completed and well dried. However some of the neediest people, who had urgent sheltering needs and who could not afford rent, did not wait until the handover to move into their new shelters.

Technical issues

Key to the success of the project, the returnee population had the skills to build their own houses. Some people had learnt these in the construction industry in Iran.

Instead of providing fixed designs, the project provided a generic bill of quantity and technical advice to individual households to address disaster risks. This included advice on proper jointing for stone and brick masonry, the proper placement of lintels and roofing beams, and proper roof drainage.

The training provided by the field teams was accompanied by illustrated construction drawings.

The decision to give homeowners flexibility in what they could build was based on learnings from previous projects where a single, standard shelter design was issued. Plot sizes in Kabul vary greatly and flexible design allowed households to adapt constructions to the space available.

Some families piled sandbags around the foundations as a preventative measure to prevent erosion in case of flooding.

DRR components

Since Kabul has earthquake risks, timber braces were provided to all households to be used at each corner of each shelter. Families were also provided with technical training on disaster risk reduction.

As the cash-based approach allowed team members to spend more time with households, they were able to better explain seismic mitigation measures compared to previous projects.

Many people were interested in more modern materials and construction methods but were unaware of the greater seismic risks that such materials carry. Encouraging families to use more traditional materials and methods was challenging.

Logistics

In previous projects the country programme had directly managed procurement and logistics, and this had led to many challenges. In contrast, in the community-driven approach, only timber for bracing, tool kits and hygiene kits were procured by the project and delivered to the beneficiaries.

The rest of the materials such as lintels, roofing materials, doors, windows and latrine slabs were procured by the households themselves. Households made a personal contribution of around one third of the costs of construction and materials.

Project follow up

The pilot project team was made up of six people with mixed skills, including engineers, community mobilisers and people with data-collection experience. In previous years this team had built 100 shelters per year using the direct procurement method. The cash-based approach nearly tripled this figure.

The success of the pilot project led to the implementation of the cash-based approach in other parts of Afghanistan and by the end of 2012, 60 per cent of the planned 2,075 shelters had been built in Kabul, Jalalabad and Herat.
A.2 Chile - 2010 - Earthquake

Case study:

**Country:**
Chile

**Disaster:**
Earthquake

**Disaster date:**
February 27th 2010

**No. of houses damaged or destroyed:**
More than 200,000 houses

**Project target population:**
10,000 households

**Shelter size:**
Variable

**Materials Cost per household:**
375 USD value per household on the card

![Chile map with project timeline]

**Project timeline**
- Project completion
- Final delivery of cards
- Number of beneficiary households increased
- First delivery of cards
- Partnership agreement with supporting company signed
- Start
- Project coordinator hired
- Shelter specialist arrives to support the country team
- February 27th 2010 - Earthquake

**Project description**
Following a non-food item distribution to 10,000 households, plastic cards with magnetic strips were given to earthquake-affected households. These cards were valid for 30 days from manufacture and could be redeemed in 40 pre-designated hardware stores located in the affected regions.

**Strengths and weaknesses**

✓ In general, the project was well received by beneficiaries giving them flexibility to spend resources as they saw fit.
✓ The project team invested time to explain the project to the beneficiaries. Suppliers were also able to explain the process well to beneficiaries.
✓ Community members were encouraged to group their purchases together to receive free or reduced price delivery of their materials from the merchants.
✗ The process of choosing beneficiaries was not as clear as it should have been. Many affected people felt that many of those who received assistance didn't suffer major damage to their homes. Others noted that the project excluded some families who they thought should have been eligible to receive the assistance. This led to some jealousy and resentment from community members who did not receive cards.

✗ More time should be given for the use of the card or it should have been distributed earlier than it was.
✗ The project did not provide technical support on safer and more earthquake-resistant construction. It did not build on the experiences of recent programmes in neighbouring Peru.
✗ The prices of a basket of selected materials at various hardware stores should have been monitored over the course of the project. At the start, a baseline price survey could have been conducted to check that the project had not led to price escalation. However, in a mid-term evaluation, 80% of the targeted families found the prices in the stores acceptable, and there was little evidence of price escalation due to the project.
After the earthquake

On 27 February 2010 an earthquake of magnitude 8.8 struck Chile. The epicentre was located 60km southeast of the nearest city in the Maule region (400km south of Santiago).

The earthquake generated a tsunami, affecting 500km of coastline. The earthquake and successive tsunami caused hundreds of deaths and serious damage to homes and other infrastructure, primarily in the Maule and Bio Bio regions.

The survivors of the earthquake had to survive the remaining months of the winter without appropriate shelter.

According to the Chilean Ministry of Planning, in the worst affected region (Maule) nearly one in five people had a damaged or destroyed house. The earthquake affected 5 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, 45 other cities with over 5,000 inhabitants each, and more than 900 villages. It affected both rural and coastal communities.

Emergency response

During the emergency phase of operations, the organisation distributed the following non-food items:

- Tents (1,587 families)
- Tarpaulins (20,650 families)
- Blankets (44,740 families)
- Hygiene kits (11,290 families)
- Kitchen sets (11,175 families)
- Buckets (22,370 families)

However this first phase of the response was slow and did not meet all of the needs. As a result other approaches were developed.

Implementation

It was decided to implement a voucher scheme using a plastic card with a magnetic strip.

The voucher scheme complemented the delivery of the emergency items, as it allowed for the improvement of housing solutions through the purchase of different household items, as well as material for the reconstruction of damaged homes. The monetary value of the card (equivalent to 375 USD) was decided in line with the legal minimum wage at the time.
The organisation trained both staff from the participating suppliers and beneficiaries on the use of the cards. In a project evaluation, recipients of the cards generally found the staff at participating hardware stores knowledgeable about the project.

Staff from the hardware stores travelled to communities with product catalogues. This assisted affectees who had limited access to transportation.

A partnership was established with the Corporate Social Responsibility programme of a Chilean company. The company verified beneficiary data, printed relevant documentation and opened a permanent call centre to answer any questions about using the card.

A call centre was also established to allow beneficiaries to verify the amount of funds remaining on their card along with the location of participating stores.

The validity of the card was set on the magnetic strip by the manufacturer, but an expiration date was also printed on each card. Due to the time needed to distribute the card, some beneficiaries had less time to purchase material.

**Selection of beneficiaries**

The criteria for selecting beneficiaries was very broad, and took into account which families had received relief kits. No detailed damage and needs assessment was conducted. In practice, the project relied on beneficiary lists that were provided by local authorities and community leaders along with lists provided by project staff. These lists were developed during the distribution of relief supplies in March and April 2010, some months before the distribution of cards.

In some cases the data in the lists wasn’t accurate, leading to mistranscription and subsequent voiding of the cards at the distribution sites. During distributions there were families at the distribution sites who claimed that they should be included in the project. In these cases, they were added to a waiting list and told that there would be a second distribution in the community at a later date.

There was also the risk that segments of the affected population were not included because they did not have good relations with the community leaders or they lived in sites between targeted communities.

**Technical solutions**

Once the users received their cards, they had one month to use it. Partial purchases were allowed, meaning that they could buy several times during the month in smaller volumes. One other way to use the funds on the card was to make a bulk purchase for the total value of the card.

At a later stage, initial home repair guidelines were delivered at the same time as the cards. These were in line with an agreement signed for future collaborations between the organisation and the relevant government Ministry. During an interim project review, approximately 80% of respondents stated that they had the knowledge to make their own repairs with the materials purchased with the card, 17% paid for someone else to do it, while 4% stated that they did not have the knowledge and would have liked to have been trained in how to make the repairs themselves.

**Project conclusion**

Initially the project targeted 8,400 households, but this was later increased to 10,000 families. The project was implemented in one year – from May 2010 to May 2011. It took a little longer to close the project as some transactions could only take place once all invoices had been received.
**CASE STUDY**

**DR CONGO 2008-2016 / NFI VOUCHER FAIRS**

**KEYWORDS:** Non-food items, NFI voucher fairs, NFI distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>Multiple conflicts / Complex, two decades long and ongoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PEOPLE DISPLACED AND RETURNED</td>
<td>2.82 million people (new displacements in 2016: 922,000 people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATIONS</td>
<td>DR Congo, country wide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOUCHER FAIRS BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>3,950,530 persons (790,106 households) in the period 2009-2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN-KIND DISTRIBUTION BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>4,471,250 persons (2009-2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 2.2 million IDPs between 2008-2016, 620,000 returnees since July 2015 (Source: OCHA 2016 IDP factsheet, [http://bit.ly/2DgHtZx](http://bit.ly/2DgHtZx)).
2 The number of people is calculated in an average of five persons per household.

**SUMMARY**

Since 2008, the NFI sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) has undergone a dramatic transformation from a response strategy dominated by in-kind distribution of basic household, personal and hygiene items, to the use of cash-based vouchers. The NFI voucher fair approach has allowed families to select items based on their own priorities, while also supporting local economies. By 2013, over 50% of all NFI beneficiaries in DR Congo were assisted using the NFI voucher fair approach. Since the first pilots in late 2008, local and international humanitarian actors have reached over 790,000 families – nearly 4 million people – using this approach.

**TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS ASSISTED WITH VOUCHER FAIRS AND IN-KIND DISTRIBUTIONS, 2009-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NFI Distributions</th>
<th>NFI Voucher Faits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>104,857 (23.6%)</td>
<td>113,260 (33.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>174,176 (39.4%)</td>
<td>110,298 (32.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>128,331 (30.7%)</td>
<td>154,214 (41.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>119,204 (31.0%)</td>
<td>120,500 (32.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>100,328 (27.5%)</td>
<td>100,912 (27.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>80,253 (22.2%)</td>
<td>80,253 (21.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>75,252 (20.1%)</td>
<td>75,252 (20.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>69,354 (18.9%)</td>
<td>69,354 (18.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**STRENGTHS OF THE FAIRS**

- Beneficiary preference, as they choose their own items.
- Reinforcing beneficiary dignity as actors in their own assistance.
- Cost savings in logistics, transport and warehousing.
- Supporting local economies.
- Speed in setting up, when vendors are familiar with the approach.

**CHALLENGES / WEAKNESSES**

- Smaller scale than in-kind distributions.
- Dependence on market capacity.
- Dishonest vendors can take advantage of beneficiaries.
- Lack of formal registration and tax documents can limit the participation of small vendors.
- Challenges in using the vouchers for some users.

Organizations’ staff explain the use and different values of coupons to beneficiaries before they enter the stall (Mutare II, South Kivu province).
BACKGROUND

For over two decades, the eastern provinces of DR Congo have been plagued by the humanitarian consequences of multiple conflicts, involving dozens of militia groups and government forces. Although often described as a protracted emergency, eastern DR Congo is characterized by a series of distinct, acute, crises, spread across a landscape of continually shifting zones of violence, displacement and insecurity, and areas of relative stability, where return and recovery are possible.

At the end of 2016, OCHA estimated that there were 2.2 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the country; 922,000 of these people were newly displaced in 2016. Additionally, there were hundreds of thousands of returnees. Nearly 80% of displaced families lived in the homes and compounds of local host families who, although often extremely vulnerable themselves, are the first to provide assistance.

One of the most critical needs of families on the move is access to essential non-food items (NFI) to carry out daily activities. These activities include: clothing oneself, preparing and serving food, collecting and using water for washing and cleaning, carrying out livelihood activities, storing belongings and sleeping. The ability of displaced families, returnees and even some host families, to undertake these essential activities in dignity and security, is undermined by lack of access to essential items. NFI needs are particularly acute in conflict areas, where families flee with very few belongings and — although host families may share some of their resources such as food or cooking utensils — other items such as clothing and bedding are less likely to be shared.

NFI VOUCHER FAIRS

In 2008, some of the NFI actors in DR Congo began to look at cash-based options to meet the NFI needs of affected populations. This shift happened primarily for two reasons:

1) NFI needs of affected populations varied widely. Highly divergent and varied needs made the typical one-size-fits-all kit approach of standard NFI assistance less appropriate.

2) Markets were quite dynamic for imported and locally produced NFIs in DR Congo, and supply chains seemed robust, flexible and able to respond to increased demand.

Food security actors in DR Congo had been using seed fairs since the early 1990s. Based on this model, NFI actors began to conduct pilot NFI cash-voucher fairs.

HOW THE FAIRS WORK

The approach since the initial pilots is to invite beneficiary families to an organized, artificial, market place or “fair” (using the same targeting criteria as direct in-kind distributions). Each family receives cash-valued coupons — an average of USD 75 — which they can exchange for goods. A selected number of vendors — both larger wholesalers and smaller local traders — offer a wide array of NFIs for sale, just like in a regular market. The range of items can be as limited or unrestricted as determined by the organization managing the fair, who sets the “rules” on what items can be sold.

A typical fair includes dozens, even hundreds, of different types of NFIs — sandals to soap, clothing to locally produced cooking pots, foam mattresses to plastic basins, farming tools 1

1 The initial choice of USD 75 for a family of 4-6 persons was based on the cost of items and transport of the recommended standard family NFI kit in DR Congo.
to flashlights. Depending on the total number of families to be served, the organizing agency sets up several days of fairs in a row, with anywhere between 300 and 700 families participating each day.

Where there might be concerns about vendors charging unfair prices, the organizing agency can set price ceilings on certain key items with representatives of the beneficiaries and vendors, however, bargaining is always encouraged. Selected vendors have to sign an agreement that lays out rules and responsibilities, including no guarantee of sale, respect of price ceilings (and sanctions should these not be followed) and modes of payment. In some instances, a complementary distribution of items such as plastic tarpaulins, jerry-cans, or female hygiene kits, is included, particularly in areas where the market is limited (in quality or quantity) or where the vendor prices for these items are too high.

In line with recommended Cluster practice for direct NFI distributions, adult women in the household are registered as the family's primary beneficiary to attend the fair — although it is encouraged that she come with her spouse or another family member, to help transport the purchases home.

**SCALING UP**

Since the pilots, the NFI community in DR Congo has scaled up the use of the NFI voucher fair approach. Initially, humanitarian actors and the NFI-Shelter Cluster believed that while fairs were an innovative alternative to direct distributions, their scope would remain limited due to market capacity. This concern proved to be unfounded, as vendors were able and willing to travel to remote areas to participate. They were also often more effective and resourceful than the best NGO logistics operators (renting small trucks, motorcycles, and even bicycles) in moving supplies to areas where a direct distribution would have been impossible. In addition, the smaller vendors often pooled resources to transport their merchandise to the fairs.

The NFI-Shelter Cluster actively promoted response analysis to inform programming by hosting multiple training and learning events, as well as by accompanying partners on the ground through “coaching visits”. Each year, provincial and national cluster coordinators and NGO co-facilitators conduct field visits to NFI fairs and the distribution sites of different organizations, to provide feedback and coaching on their activities. While direct distribution remains an essential part of NFI response in DR Congo, the Cluster has helped in training and supporting organizations to use the fair approach, reaching a point where all major international and national NFI actors now use voucher fairs, for at least some portion of their response.

**EVOLUTION OF THE APPROACH**

In the last few years, NFI actors have made significant progress in areas such as:

- **Collaborating** with food aid actors on joint NFI and food fairs;
- **Improving market and purchasing pattern analysis** to better determine an appropriate voucher value for affected zones, as well as to consider simultaneous distributions of certain items;
- **Promoting inclusion of locally made NFIs**;
- **Integrating new technologies** for improved data collection and analysis — particularly of purchasing patterns;
- **Piloting the use of electronic vouchers**;
- **Setting fair price ceilings**;
- **Experimenting with using vouchers in existing markets** (open market vouchers).

Another, more recent, improvement (which some of the major NFI actors have adopted) is adjusting the value of the vouchers by family size. Instead of the standard USD 75 per family, these NGOs now have three different voucher values:

1) USD 55 for families of 1-3 persons;
2) USD 75 for families of 4-6 persons;
3) USD 90 and up for families of 7 or more persons.

Post-fair monitoring has shown significant improvement in NFI Score-Card vulnerabilities, by using this approach, compared to the standard one. Some actors have started looking at the option of moving to direct cash to meet NFI needs. Purchasing pattern analyses of organizations using unconditional cash transfers typically reveal 40%-50% of cash being used on NFIs. While unconditional cash to address NFI needs remains an option to explore, it may not be the best in all settings. A 2010 study of 1,688 families revealed that, in terms of availability, over 66% of beneficiaries indicated that items they purchased at the fairs were not regularly available at the markets where they would typically purchase NFIs. Indeed, vendors travelling from significant distances of over 100km to participate in the fairs, are often providing a range of choice that families would not find in their local markets.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

Driving the transformation was the recognition of the fair approach as a “win-win-win” for affected people, for humanitarian organizations and for the local economy.

+ **Beneficiary preference.** Monitoring visits with assisted families have shown a significant preference for fairs over distributions. Having choice over one’s own assistance reinforces the dignity of beneficiaries, and was continually cited as an overwhelming advantage of the fairs. The concern that vendors might not be able to provide the quality and quantity to meet needs proved unfounded. In the same 2010 study of 1,686 families beneficiaries stated that 96% of items bought at the fairs were of very good or acceptable quality.

+ **Cost savings.** With savings on logistics, transport, and warehousing, the fair approach is cheaper per family than an in-kind distribution. It also reduces the risks for implementing organizations, who are no longer responsible for the warehousing and security of NFIs before and during distributions. Recognizing the value for the beneficiaries of dignity and choice, as well as the value for money of their contributions, donors were also a catalyst behind the transformation. Humanitarian donors in DR Congo no longer accept proposals of a traditional distribution approach, if the organization has not demonstrated why a cash-based approach is not possible.

+ **Local economy.** Thousands of local traders and producers of locally made NFIs have benefitted from participating in the fairs. Since the first pilots in late 2009, over USD 59 million has been injected into the local Congolese economy, by organizations using the fair approach. Monitoring with vendors shows how this secondary “impact” of fair programmes has created new employment, opened markets in new areas, and increased the capital and diversified merchandise of local traders.

+ **Speed.** As the fair approach became more common, humanitarian organizations were also able to increase the speed of implementation, particularly in areas where they were able to draw upon vendors with previous experience in fairs. As of 2016, vendors in some areas were able to access NFIs for fairs and organize their logistics within less than a week (this can take up to three weeks in cases where vendors are not familiar with the fair approach).

CHALLENGES AND LEARNINGS

- **Scalability.** One important limitation of the fair approach is the scale. Experienced organizations can do a fair for up to 700 families in a day. This mainly depends on the time families are allowed to “shop” and the need to count the vouchers that vendors received, at the end of the day. Fairs normally happen between 10am and 3pm for these two reasons. Organizations usually do 3-4 days of fairs in a row, depending on the number of families to be reached. A well-organized distribution, on the other hand, can reach two to three times as many families in a day. Therefore, NFI distributions are still an essential part of the response in DR Congo – particularly for large-scale interventions, or in new areas, where there are few vendors with experience in the fair approach.

- **Market capacity.** While the dynamism and reach of the markets in DR Congo has surpassed expectations, there are areas where markets are not able to provide the quantity, scope, and quality of items needed. Strong market and response analyses are needed to enable NFI actors to choose the best modality between fairs, distributions, or a combination of the two.

- **Dishonest vendors.** Vendors may attempt to take advantage of beneficiaries, despite agreements and monitoring by staff, by not respecting price ceilings, or working with other vendors to fix a price and not allowing beneficiaries to negotiate.

- **Smaller vendors.** Local / smaller vendors, local producers and artisans sometimes do not have the legally required registration and tax documents. This can be mitigated by encouraging vendors who do have all their registration papers with authorities, to team up with smaller vendors and producers of locally made NFIs, to sell these items at their stands.

- **Restricted items.** There has been much discussion on what and how to put limitations on the types of items permitted at fairs, or whether organizations should set price caps on certain items, so as to ensure that they remain focused on basic needs – for example permitting items such as shoes, but not shoes which are priced over a certain amount. Monitoring has shown that families tend to spend vouchers on the same types of items as those found in a standard NFI kit. However, questions are raised on whether items like radios, plastic chairs, or small solar panels can be considered essential household NFIs. While the Cluster has developed some guidance, it ultimately remains an issue for each organization to examine with their donors and the communities they are serving, in consideration of the objective of their programme.

- **Use of the vouchers.** A small minority of beneficiaries have reported having difficulties in using the vouchers. This is particularly true for the elderly, or illiterate. It is critical to ensure that these beneficiaries are encouraged to come to the fairs with someone who can assist them. The organization should also have workers who can help accompany such beneficiaries at the fairs. The learning in DR Congo has been that there is never too much education and information sharing about using the vouchers.
### Case study: Distribution, cash and training

**Disaster:**
- Hurricanes and tropical storms

**Disaster date:**
- 1st September 2009.

**Number of people displaced:**
- 165,337 families; half of the population of Gonaives were displaced.

**Project target population:**
- Initially 60,000 people in collective centres. Later programmes targeted smaller numbers of those who had not returned.
- 1000 family cash distribution
- 1222 families in timber framed shelters (735 half kits, 487 full kits) and cash to cover transport

**Shelter size:**
- Cash was provided to support families to rent a room for six months.
- Transitional shelter kits provided materials for an 18m² shelter

**Occupancy rate:**
- Unknown

**Project timeline**
- 6 months
  - Programmes complete
- 12 weeks
  - Registration complete
- 11 weeks
  - Shelter prototype constructed
- 9 weeks
  - Schools re-open
- 8 weeks
  - 2,000 families in collective centres
- 4 weeks
  - 6,619 families in collective centres

**Summary**
These shelter projects were in the complex urban environment of Gonaives, Haiti. Multiple approaches were used to support families living in collective centres and temporary sites to return. Initially programmes focussed on distributions of shelter items and toolkits. Later programmes diversified to include cash to support families that were renting, and shelter materials and support for those who had identified land.

**Strengths and weaknesses**
- Programmes were able to adapt over the course of the emergency, taking into account changing conditions and learning from previous programme successes and challenges.
- The programme ensured that families living in collective centres had options for return.
- Use of different sized transitional shelter kits allowed for support to be scaled according to needs.
- Cash for those who rented shelters allowed families without land to be supported by the programme.
- By supporting families in collective centres and camps early on in the response, people were encouraged to remain displaced.
- Shelter tool kits were found to be of limited use for families who previously rented houses or whose houses remained buried.
- When distributions of return kits were made, it was not clear that those who received them would not qualify for future support in displacement locations. As a result, many families took the return kits but did not return.
- Despite prolonged negotiations, it was not possible to identify safe land on which to relocate those families whose houses remained at risk from future flooding.
- The funding was extremely limited for the response. This limited options and reduced the capacity of international organisations to provide support.
- As the result of challenges in beneficiary identification, the project was not able to support host families to provide much of the shelter. However, there were separate food distributions, cash for work, clean up programmes and water and sanitation programmes in the host communities within Gonaives.
Before the flooding
In 2004, the city of Gonaïves was hit by tropical storm Jeane. The ensuing flooding killed over 2000 people.

By 2008, the city of Gonaïves had an estimated population of 300,000 people

After the flooding
In 2008, hurricanes and tropical storms Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike led to severe flooding. Eight percent of the Haitian population, were affected, 793 people were killed and crops were destroyed.

The town of Gonaïves was most severely affected. 80 percent of the city was submerged under two metres of water. Although the death toll was lower, the damage was greater than in the floods of 2004. The receding flood waters left more than three million tons of mud.

Over half of the population of Gonaïves was displaced, finding refuge with friends and family or in over 200 collective shelters in schools, churches and warehouses.

Major clean-up operations ran for many months. Many families were not able to return to their houses until the mud was cleared.

The response was significantly underfunded; the United Nations appeal reached only 40% of its target.

First return kits
In the first months after the flooding, relief items were distributed, with a focus on families living in collective centres.

The government kit consisted of one foam mattress, one sleeping bag, one blanket, one hygiene kit, and one jerry can.

The organisations involved agreed to distribute return kits which were intended to support families to repair their houses. These kits contained one reinforced tarpaulin, five corrugated iron sheets, and a tool kit (one saw, a hammer, a shovel, a trowel, 1kg of nails and two polypropylene sleeping mats).

Unfortunately, a significant number of families who received return kits remained in the collective centres. The kits proved to be of limited success because:

- Many families did not own a house that they could repair
- The kits were distributed unconditionally so that families were able to receive them and remain in collective centres awaiting further relief distributions
- The kits were suited to timber frame construction. In the city many of the shelters were built with blocks or masonry.

Collective centres

The need to restart schools and further pressure by the owners of the buildings that were being used as temporary accommodation lead to pressures to evict the affected families, but many had no other options. The closure of the first collective centre led to the establishment of temporary sites with tents for shelter.

The implementing organisation supported the families on these tented sites by improving the site layout, and improving the drainage.

Finding a solution for those living with host families was a lower operational priority due to reduced risk of evictions, as well as significant challenges in identifying families.

As the programmes took place in an urban environment, identifying who actually lived where was challenging. Many families left a single family member in displacement sites to receive additional distributions. In some cases families had members in several sites.

Registration
Two months after the disaster, a survey was conducted to gain a better understanding of what was preventing families from returning home. All of the major organisations operating in Gonaïves took part in these surveys, and registered the families. Teams surveyed families in the collective centres between 3am and 4am to ensure that those surveyed were in fact resident in the shelters.

Once families were registered, additional families would not be added to lists and would not be able to receive support.

Exact address and mobile phone numbers of those in collective centres were collected and houses were visited one by one to assess damage. Houses were assessed as being either destroyed or damaged.

When it was not possible to verify property titles through paperwork, ownership of houses was verified by discussions with those in the neighbourhood.

The transparency of the process was a key part of it being accepted by the displaced families.

Implementation

After the registration, just over 2000 families were found to be remaining in the collective centres and sites. For these families two approaches were adopted. Depending
Upon their circumstances, families would either:

- receive cash for rental or
- support with transitional shelter materials and construction.

**Cash distribution**

Approximately 1000 families remaining in collective centres received cash, up to an agreed value. This value was equivalent to a one-year rental of a room for a family. To qualify for this, families living in collective centres either:

- were tenants prior to the disaster, and hence did not want to repair a houses belonging to someone else, or
- were owners whose home was still flooded or covered in mud or they lived less than 10m from a main city canal.

The distribution was conducted in partnership with another international organisation who distributed to approximately half of the families, using identical distribution and verification systems. The process for cash distribution was:

- Once assessed, families had a maximum of four days to rent a room for one year. People did not have any problems in finding somewhere to rent.
- The families would bring a signed a pre-agreement with landlord stating the rental rate. From this the maximum amount that the organisation would pay was agreed. The organisation would only pay rent up to an agreed maximum.
- The organisation would visit the house and verify with the landlord.
- The organisation would give agreed lists to the banks for the rental allowance to be paid direct to beneficiary.

**Transitional shelters**

Two types of repair or reconstruction kits were developed. These included materials to build an entire timber framed shelter (full reconstruction kit) or a reduced set of materials to repair damaged shelters (half repair kit). These kits were combined with technical assistance, and some cash for transport.

1,222 families (54% of the targeted families) living in non-school temporary shelters and tent sites received repair kits. Of these, 735 families received the smaller (half repair) kits and 487 received full reconstruction kits.

All kits were purchased by the implementing organisation and distributed with the assistance of partner organisations in three different sites in the city. Some of the materials were distributed through vouchers that the families could redeem for agreed shops within an allotted timeframe.

Given the various constraints, including budget deadlines and limitations it was decided that materials would be distributed in a one-off distribution rather than with a phased approach. This led to several families not building or completing shelters with the materials.

There were several cases where vouchers and distribution cards were faked. The organisation noted that harder-to-copy vouchers would be required for future programmes. The short time periods in which they could be redeemed helped to reduce the risk of forgeries.

The distributions were conducted in conjunction with one partner organisation provided technical support. There was additionally follow up and monitoring of families who had moved.

**Closure**

The programmes had proven very labour intensive, with multiple processes depending upon on previous processes. This did lead to delays but proved largely effective in offering families options away from collective centres.

Following the cash and materials distributions as well as public information, the numbers of people remaining in camps and collective centres was very small. Targeting the final families was then very easy.

As a result of the cash programme, rents did rise, but not excessively.

With the closure of collective centres, the organisation began a programme to rehabilitate them. This was followed by a nationwide assessment of building that could be used as collective centres in case of other disasters. Of these 40 were targeted for use as hurricane shelters. These buildings were repaired and upgraded to improve preparedness for future disasters.

**Materials list**

A full repair kit given to each family, allowed for construction of a floor slab, a frame and a roof of approx 18m². It was not enough for rendering the walls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wood (roof) (1&quot; x 3&quot; x 16&quot;)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood (frame) (2&quot; x 4&quot; x 12&quot;)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails (3&quot; x 75mm x 2mm)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails (roofing) (3&quot; x 75mm x 3mm)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>4 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrugated iron (1.8 x 0.9m)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat sheet for roof ridge</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Families were responsible for masonry and sand. If rocks were not available they need 240 construction blocks (30x20x15 cm).

**Tool kit to be shared between 5 families:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spades</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood saw (750mm)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claw hammer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll of wire</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape measure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trowel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pick axe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pliers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sack</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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Prototype transitional shelter

Photos: Joseph Asghar
A.6 Haiti – 2012 – Hurricane Sandy

Case study

Keywords: Housing repair and retrofitting; Cash / vouchers; Training; Structural assessment.

Emergency: Hurricane Sandy, Haiti.
Date: 23-26 October 2012.
Damage: 6,666 houses destroyed, 24,348 damaged, and 9,832 flooded.
People affected: 195,300 affected, 20,000 evacuated, 2,298 homeless.
Project location: Grand Anse Department.
Beneficiaries: 1,700 households (8,500 people).
Outputs: 100 new houses, 414 houses repaired. Over 1,000 households received cash for NFs and DRR training. Around 84% were completed within the project timeframe.
Occupancy rate: 89% of completed new houses and 100% of completed repaired houses.
Shelter size: Varied: model houses = 20-30m², beneficiary houses = 16-40m².
Cost: US$ 2,050 cash grant for new construction, or US$ 750 for repair. Beneficiaries also made their own contributions.

Project description:

Following an initial emergency response, the project distributed conditional cash grants and technical supervision to support beneficiaries in the construction or repair of houses. Builders were trained in Improved Vernacular Construction (IVC) techniques, using local materials.

Emergency timeline:

[a] October 2012: Hurricane Sandy hits.

Project timeline (number of months):

1-2 November 2012: First phase planning.
2-4 November 2012: First implementation phase (emergency distribution).
4-18 November 2012: Second phase planning and implementation.
9 Vernacular construction training begins.
10 First model house completed.
11 First cash instalment.
14 Second cash instalment.
15 First repaired house completed.
16 First new house completed.
19 May 2014: Project ends, some repairs not complete.

Strengths

✓ Existing local knowledge on safer construction was improved, with the new techniques replicated by non-beneficiaries.
✓ Multiple model houses were adapted to the different environmental and cultural contexts in the area, reflecting the materials locally available.
✓ Beneficiaries were empowered to take ownership of the project by managing the construction process themselves.
✓ The project integrated DRR, Shelter and WASH programming.

Weaknesses

✗ Limited availability of qualified technical project staff made for a lengthy recruitment process.
✗ The integration between Shelter and WASH teams could have been improved, with joint-planning and joint training to enable both teams to better supervise the beneficiaries’ work.
✓ The close work with the community resulted in better investment of staff numbers beyond the means of the project budget.
✓ A complete market assessment was not carried out at the beginning of the project and subsequent shortages of materials caused some delays.
✗ Although transport costs were factored in to the grants, some beneficiaries preferred to buy lower quality, locally available materials which did not need to be transported.

Observations

- Some of the beneficiaries in the repair category managed to build a new house, salvaging materials from the old one.
Situation before the disaster

People were living in rural areas and the majority of houses in the affected areas were poorly constructed with low-quality materials, reflecting both the level of poverty and lack of technical knowledge.

The location of many of these houses in areas prone to strong winds and flooding magnified the risks posed by the sub-standard housing construction.

Situation after the disaster

In the aftermath of the disaster some households were hosted by family or friends, some were evacuated to emergency shelters and some stayed in their damaged houses. Many families had lost their livelihoods.

Shelter strategy

Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, there was plenty of good practice to draw from in project planning. However, as Grand’Anse Department had not really been affected by the earthquake, most agencies were not operative in the area and few intervened after Sandy hit. The disaster attracted a limited response from donors.

No coordination strategy was officially activated and the Shelter and CCCM Cluster in Haiti did not dedicate a working group to the Sandy response.

Guidelines for response did exist in the form of a best-practice manual published by the Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics in 2010, but these rarely referred to local building technologies or vernacular materials.

Project implementation

Emergency phase

Any family whose house had been completely destroyed or severely damaged was given an unconditional cash grant of US$ 100, paid through a money transfer company. This intervention was completed within four months of the disaster and involved 761 families.

The households mainly used the money to buy food and non-food items or to replace household livelihood assets as well as paying school fees for their children or buying materials to rebuild their houses.

Recovery phase

After the initial beneficiary registration, verification visits were conducted to the families to assess the damage to the house.

Three categories of assistance were provided:

- Category 1: House destroyed. Conditional cash grant of US$2,050 to rebuild the house and latrine (100 households).
- Category 2: House damaged, vulnerable household. Conditional cash grant of US$750 to rebuild the house and latrine (414 households).
- Category 3: House damaged, household does not meet vulnerability criteria. Unconditional cash grant of US$100 (1,186 households).

The third category was added to the project plan based on the findings of the assessment.

Some of the beneficiaries claimed that the grant was too small, but most completed their houses with the grants.

A training programme for masons and carpenters was established, whilst beneficiaries received key sensitisation messages.

Construction

Beneficiaries were given the responsibility for managing the construction process, with technical support from the organisation through the lifetime of the project. This method was difficult for some beneficiaries to accept initially, since a great deal of humanitarian assistance in Haiti has been implemented directly by aid organisations.

Motivating beneficiaries was one of the biggest challenges, as it required a great deal of staff input and energy, and breaking a long-term culture of dependency was not always possible.

After ten months, the training of carpenters and masons was complete, and beneficiaries were encouraged, but not obliged, to hire a builder from the approved list. The design of the house was up to the family, but they had to observe the implementation of improved construction techniques.

Cash was paid in two instalments. The first instalment (approximately 40%) was paid upon signing the agreement. The second instalment was paid upon verification of the first phase of works by the project’s technical team. For Category 1 this meant completing the foundation
and structure, while Category 2 repair phases were defined on a case-by-case basis.

Cash was transferred through a money transfer company. The beneficiary list with mobile phone contact numbers was given to the company who sent an SMS with a code to the beneficiary which was then used to collect the money from an authorised distributor. In areas where there was no network, or a beneficiary did not have access to a phone, community mobilisers gave the code directly to the beneficiary.

**Beneficiary selection**

Two assessments were made. The emergency assessment identified 761 households with damaged or destroyed houses who needed immediate support.

A second, more detailed assessment resulted in 1,700 households being allocated to the three different categories of assistance. Households were selected against vulnerability criteria with an emphasis on female-headed households, physically handicapped persons, and elderly persons living alone.

In order to participate in the project, beneficiaries had to provide the organisation with proof of property and land ownership, and sign an agreement with the organisation detailing the conditions of how the grant was to be used.

A small number of beneficiaries were unable to produce ID cards, but this was mostly resolved on a case-by-case basis with the local authorities and other family members. In cases where no solution could be found and the agreement could not be signed, the Category 3 US$ 100 was awarded instead.

Some beneficiaries were unable to find a plot of land in a safe area and others did not wish to move. The organisation conducted a significant amount of advocacy to explain the dangers of staying in high-risk areas, but ultimately the beneficiary had the final decision.

**Coordination**

The project benefitted from a Memorandum of Understanding between the implementing organisation, and a technical partner organisation which provided both technical expertise and training.

**Technical solutions**

Improved construction techniques were based on existing local traditional techniques with new disaster-resistant features.

Traditional local houses were built on wooden posts dug directly into the ground, which quickly rotted, weakening the structure. The new design introduced a proper foundation of cement and stones and added cross-bracing to the walls.

Diverse ways to strengthen the joints between the different structural elements were also introduced, or adapted from current local best practices.

To resist high winds, houses were built with four roof slopes, using corrugated iron sheets or straw.

**Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)**

DRR was integrated into the project through the plot selection process, and through training and sensitisation on safe construction.

The technical partner provided the first Improved Vernacular Construction (IVC) training, based on a detailed assessment of local construction techniques and included topics such as the selection of safe sites, basic architectural and construction principles, and the properties of local materials.

Ten carpenters and masons were trained as facilitators, who in turn trained 130 builders (five of them women). The training involved the building of twelve different model houses, all of which were adapted to the specific contexts of the area they were built in.

In order to reach the wider population and other NGOs, a one-day practical workshop in IVC techniques was facilitated by the technical partner.

The DRR sensitisation received by Category 1 and 2 families was more detailed than for Category 3 households, as the first two groups received a greater number of direct visits from community mobilisers.

Some Category 2 repairs were of poor quality, mostly due to a lack of motivation on the part of the beneficiaries.

**Wider project impacts**

Some families that did not receive direct assistance have begun to replicate the construction techniques used in the project. Some of the carpenters and masons trained by the project, advocate for their customers to implement the IVC techniques.
**A.13 Indonesia - Sumatra - 2009 - Earthquake**

**Case study:** See “A.12 - Indonesia - Sumatra - 2009 - Overview” p.38, for background

**Country:** Indonesia, Sumatra, Padang

**Disaster:** Earthquake

**Disaster date:** September 30th 2009

**No. of houses damaged:**
- 115,000 destroyed houses
- 135,000 damaged houses

This was a market assessment into brick production and so did not directly lead to the construction of shelters.

**Project description**
This project surveyed brick production and anticipated supply and demand. It was conducted one month after the earthquake. The survey was conducted as a trial of the EMMA (Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis) methodology. The survey findings were used to inform the adopted strategy of using cash to support the construction of shelters that used both timber and bricks.

**Strengths and weaknesses**
- The assessment was conducted with team members from nine different organisations. This process increased buy-in to the findings of the assessment report, and helped to form consensus on the issues surrounding markets in the response.
- The bricks survey findings were used to advocate for a cash based response, and for a move away from solid masonry buildings which potentially carried a greater risk of causing injury in an earthquake.
- The survey came at an opportune moment after the earthquake. The timing of the survey needed to be long enough after the earthquake that team members could be identified, access was possible and those working at brick kilns could easily be found. Had it been any later it would not have been able to inform the strategy.
- Surveys looked at the use of bricks but not the use of timber to make the bricks.
- The survey did not address issues of the living and working conditions for those in the brick kilns.
- The survey used human resources, meeting time and vehicles that could otherwise have been used in implementing the response.
  - It is difficult to accurately measure the impacts of this survey. Whilst it used human resources and absorbed time during an emergency response, there is some evidence that it helped to inform the strategies and programmes adopted.
  - There are many markets that could have been surveyed. Bricks were chosen following experiences in Aceh (2004) and Yogyakarta (2005).
Background

After the earthquake
The earthquake in September 2009 destroyed or damaged over 200,000 houses in West Sumatra. Poorly built brick-based masonry caused many of these buildings to collapse.

The Indonesian Building Code specifies that a "Permanent House" means masonry, "Semi Permanent" means masonry sub walls and timber above, whilst "non-permanent" means timber or bamboo.

Experience from previous disasters in Aceh (2005) and Yogyakarta (2006) showed that the demand for bricks for housing reconstruction quickly outstrips the available supply. This often led to an increase in the price of bricks, and / or periodic supply shortages that delay reconstruction progress.

What is EMMA?
This research was conducted to trial EMMA (Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis). EMMA is a tool designed to analyse markets following a disaster. EMMA uses background research, interviews, and graphic representations of market systems to help inform humanitarian response options. EMMA defines a market system as “a web of people, businesses, structures and rules that take part in producing, trading and consuming a product or service.”

For more information on the EMMA methodology, download the EMMA Toolkit from: http://emma-toolkit.org

Brick making in Sumatra
Brick making involves five steps and is labour intensive.
1. Mixing: Clay, sand and water are mixed together in open pits by foot, shovels or water buffalos. Larger manufacturers use mechanical mixers.
2. Shaping: The mix is compressed in wooden frames. On average, a skilled labourer can produce 1,000 - 1,500 bricks per day.

3. Air drying: The bricks are laid to dry in the sun for 5 days. Bricks are then stacked and air dried for 30 - 60 days, depending upon the weather.

4. Kiln drying: The dry bricks are loosely stacked in open air kilns without chimneys. These kilns are rectangular or circular shapes. Mud is plastered around the outside of the brick kilns to trap the heat from the fire, with space for smoke to escape and oxygen to enter. The average height of a brick kiln is 2m tall. Bricks are typically kiln dried for 10 - 14 days.

5. Distribution: Manufacturers sell their bricks directly to masons, home owners, brick distributors, and / or building supply stores. Transportation charges are typically 30 - 60% of the total brick price.

Damage to supply
The survey suggested that over 50 million bricks were damaged in the earthquake.

The majority of the supply was through small scale suppliers. There
were 1,800 small scale brick manufacturers, who produce an average of 15,000 bricks per month. These were the most severely affected of all brick manufacturers. The financial capital of these producers was often tied up in the number of bricks they had in their kiln, making it difficult to restart manufacture.

Medium scale manufacturers (45,000 bricks per month) also suffered production losses due to the earthquake, but their stronger financial position meant that they were better able to resume production. It was estimated that it would take 6-8 weeks for these manufacturers to bring new bricks to the market.

Most of the larger scale brick manufacturers were located up to 90km North East of Padang. Some large brick manufacturers reported losing 35% of their brick production in the earthquake, while others did not report significant losses.

Brick prices and financing
Pre-earthquake brick prices ranged considerably according to quality, seasonality and transport costs.

Following the earthquake brick prices from suppliers for mid range quality bricks increased by between 25% and 50%. The assessment found that these prices were likely to continue to rise to 150% of their pre-earthquake cost.

Two years after the survey, brick prices in Padang were between 60% and 100% higher.

Both small and medium scale brick manufacturers used informal credit and selling arrangements with their customers and distributors. Local supply stores typically paid small-scale manufacturers for bricks once they had sold them.

All brick manufacturers, but especially small and medium scale producers, had limited storage and warehousing space. These space limitations forced manufacturers to move their bricks to market quickly. It encouraged large suppliers and distributors to increase their prices to meet speculative market demand.

Brick demand
60% of all households interviewed indicated that they would re-use as many bricks as possible. A rough estimate suggested that many households would be able to salvage 800-1200 bricks from the rubble. As an average size brick masonry house of 10m X 12m used approximately 10,000 bricks, approximately 10% of this demand would come from recycled materials.

Although 67% of all households interviewed said they lived in a brick masonry house before the earthquake, 54% of the brick masonry households indicated they would prefer to rebuild timber and brick houses. Safety concerns were most often cited as the reason for this preference, followed by cost considerations.

There was some concern raised that recycled bricks would not perform so well as new bricks because as cement mortar cannot bind to them so well.

Gender issues
Women made up 40-60% of the labour force of small and medium scale brick manufacturers. They were typically paid on a piecework basis for each brick they made. Male brick labourers are likely to receive a daily wage for their work.

As current brick production for many small-scale producers is affected, the ability of brick making women to earn wages was temporarily disrupted.

Possible scenarios
The analysis suggested that:

- Earthquake damage to regional brick production capacity would likely lead to higher brick prices and delays in rural housing reconstruction. Large brick manufacturers were likely to reach previous production capacity within two months. Resulting transportation cost increases could lead to a price increase of between 100% and 150% per brick.
- Small-scale brick manufacturers would be slow to resume pre-earthquake production levels without financial assistance or favourable credit terms. Their ability to resume production was restricted due to capital shortages, or favourable credit arrangements.
- The demand for timber and bricks was high, and was likely to increase. Over 60% of earthquake affected households interviewed in this survey indicated that they planned to rebuild (or would prefer) timber frame houses with brick masonry infill walls over full masonry construction. Concerns over seismic safety, speed of construction, and lower costs were the main reasons for this change in preference.

Impacts of the survey
Because the survey was conducted by teams from many organisations, it helped to get support for the findings. Although not all of the recommendations were implemented, it did help organisations and coordination teams to form an advocacy position away from building full masonry structures, instead promoting semi-timbered structures with support provided in cash.
Case study: Cash and transitional shelter

Project type:
- Community-built transitional shelter
- Self-build, cash grants for materials
- Skills transfer through volunteers living in communities

Disaster:
Jogyakarta/Central Java earthquake, 24 May 2006

No. of houses damaged:
303,000 destroyed or seriously affected

Project target population:
12,250. 22.5% of UN/OCHA-recorded shelters

Occupancy rate on handover:
100% (according to an independent student survey)

Shelter size
4 x 6m² (minimum 2m height)

Summary
This organisation developed a locally appropriate shelter design based on traditional building materials and construction techniques. It delivered cash with support to affected families to build their shelters. It set up a community-built transitional shelter programme supported by hundreds of volunteers and extensive instructional and promotional materials, including short training manuals, video compact discs, posters and radio advertisements.

Project timeline

Strengths and weaknesses
X Emphasis on community participation empowered communities in their reconstruction process and resulted in community engagement and ownership of the programme.
X The project was able to build on the Javanese self-help culture of ‘gotong royong’ (working bee).
X The project successfully used materials that kept funds in the local economy.
X Maintaining volunteers to live within the communities was essential for effective knowledge transfer.
X Cash grants gave communities responsibility and engagement with the programme.
X Once new permanent houses were inhabitable, transitional shelters were used as kitchens, sheds, small shops, workshops, storehouses, etc.

W Environmental groups expressed concerns about the widespread impact on Java’s bamboo forests. This could perhaps have been alleviated or averted by altered procurement mechanisms.
W A supply of treated bamboo would have greatly extended the usable lifespan of these structures (from two years to 25 years) and enhanced community recovery.
W Faster implementation, scale-up and scale-down of the shelter programme would have reduced the problems of overlapping with permanent reconstruction.
W Without the incentive of further funding, minor issues of accountability and transparency occurred with the final installment of funding. Clearer contracts, penalty clauses, training or incentives may have alleviated this.
Beneficiary selection
Small cash grants were given out via traditional mutual support mechanisms to neighbourhood groups to buy tools and basic materials to build temporary shelters.

Meetings were held with each group to discuss the project and to sign a contract with the community. In order to participate, each neighbourhood (20-50 houses) had to form a shelter committee that had to include a head of the group, a treasurer (who had to be a woman) and a secretary. The positions could not be held by local officials or their family members.

The committee was responsible for the selection of beneficiaries, who could be anyone currently living in a tent or under a tarpaulin, with a house unsuitable for habitation. Priority was given to vulnerable people such as widows, orphans, disabled people, pregnant women, the sick and the elderly. Funds were delivered through group bank accounts in three to four instalments. The community contributed labour and materials recovered from the rubble.

Design process
This project aimed to empower community members to rebuild their lives, starting with the construction of a transitional shelter. The transitional shelter design was developed through an understanding of locally available materials, community needs and the capacity and objectives of the organisation.

It took one month for the design process, one month for community preparation and demonstration shelters, and one week to build 740 ‘model’ houses through a public competition.

The competition involved three categories and offered prize money that went to the neighbourhood for:
- the most number of houses;
- the most beautiful houses; and
- the involvement of women.

The programme was rolled out over seven months, with 12,250 shelters built in 761 communities. Shelters cost under US$ 200 per unit.

Community-built shelter
Beneficiaries were strongly encouraged to follow the design, but not compelled. In some cases people ignored or modified the design, such as in Delingo, a remote community with widespread construction skills and local construction resources.

The volunteers/supervisors were essential to guide and support good construction. The more the volunteers were confident and engaged in the process, the more the construction followed the design and was of sufficient quality. Variations were not problematic as long as the general principles were followed and the essential points (such as building size, safe connections, etc.) were satisfied.

Delay in project startup
The organisation was initially hesitant to give cash directly to beneficiaries. If there had been quicker institutional support for the project, it could have been scaled up faster and reached more people.

Community knowledge
Community levels of knowledge about the use of bamboo varied. The more urbanised the environment, the lower the level of traditional knowledge in the community, which led to a lower quality of bamboo construction.

The rural mountainous communities recovered relatively quickly, despite higher levels of damage from the earthquake and higher levels of general poverty. One of the reasons for this was that many locals had worked in the construction industry prior to the earthquake.
Community training lasted up to one week. During this time the volunteers and the community built the first shelter together, with supporting media (a step-by-step guide, an informative video about using bamboo in construction, safe construction advertisements and a booklet). Volunteers lived in the communities in a tent or transitional shelter and worked with the communities every day.

Working with volunteers allowed a large-scale programme to be set up. The volunteers were often enthusiastic and very willing to help, but some had a low level of confidence or experience. This led to some challenges in ensuring adequate quality control.

Volunteers were paid a small stipend and supported with cooking equipment, sleeping gear and field support. A weekly reflective learning/training session was held.

The Shelter Cluster design guidelines included seismic resistance, lasting up to two years, using materials that could be recycled and that cost under US$ 200.

**Ongoing use of shelters**

In the densely populated area of Klaten, the transitional shelters were eventually demolished to make room for permanent housing.

In the rural areas, the majority of the transitional shelters were still being used after permanent shelters were built, but for purposes such as storage sheds, shelter for cattle and livestock or for small restaurants.

As per the requirements of the cluster-wide transitional shelter design, untreated bamboo was used (which deteriorates after two years). If treated bamboo had been integrated into the programme, the shelter structures could have been safely used in communities for up to 25 years.

**Resource management**

The shelter programme built 12,230 transitional shelters that used more than 100 culms of bamboo per shelter, using a total of more than 1.2 million culms of bamboo.

To avoid deforestation of the bamboo stock, this project could have set up purchasing control mechanisms to manage the bulk procurement of bamboo that controlled quality, environmental impact, procurement methods and treatment of the bamboo. It would have also been possible to allocate money to reforestation programmes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Materials</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bamboo mats</td>
<td>10 mats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 walls, 3 ceiling, 1 door</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round poles (for columns)</td>
<td>12 poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3’ diameter, 3m long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round poles (for beams</td>
<td>1 pole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and roof joists)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5cm diameter, 3m long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber for fixing the mats</td>
<td>7 beams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced plastic sheet</td>
<td>3m x 15m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails</td>
<td>2.2 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5cm, 7.5cm and 10cm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire</td>
<td>1 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinges</td>
<td>3 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock</td>
<td>1 units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Working with volunteers**

The shelter programme mobilised volunteers as community trainers, with two volunteers per neighbourhood. The volunteers first went through three days and nights of hands-on training making straw models and a mock-up frame, as well as finance training and team-building exercises. They then worked with communities on selecting and buying materials, the technical aspects of working with bamboo and building the shelters.

Public information was a critical component of the project.
A.11 Jordan – 2013 – Syria conflict

Case study

Keywords: Rental support; Housing repair and retrofitting; Cash / vouchers; Advocacy / legal.

Emergency: Syria crisis, refugees in Jordan
Date: Conflict begins: March 2011 (ongoing).
People affected: Over 3.1 million refugees from Syria. Around 620,000 in Jordan, 10% of population (October 2014).
Project location: Irbid and Jerash Governorates.
Beneficiaries: Approximately 12,250 Syrian refugees.
Outputs: 4,000 housing units, 2,000 completed (August 2014).
Occupancy rate: Around 97%.
Shelter size: Units vary in size, but meet Sphere standards.
Cost: Grant depends on period of rent waived by landlord e.g., 12 months = 1,000 Jordanian dinars (US$ 1,400). Total costs per unit = US$ 2,500.

Project description:

The upgrading programme is made up of several projects, financed by different donors, aiming to increase the number of rental properties available to refugees by supporting landlords to complete unfinished housing units. Landlords are given a conditional cash grant to pay for the construction, paid in advance, which covers a rental period for 12-18 months for a refugee family.

Emergency timeline:


Project timeline (number of months):

[2] Implementation begins. Turn-around time from identification of property to beneficiary family moving in is around 3 months.
[14] 2,000 properties completed, 1,000 under construction.
[15 ongoing] Project has funding to continue to July 2015.

Strengths

- Shelter was identified as the highest priority need.
- Unlike a simple cash-for-rent intervention, the project created additional housing units, contributing to a more sustainable solution.
- Easing the pressure on the rental market should benefit both the refugee and host community, though the scale is currently too small to have a major impact.
- The project created income-generation opportunities.
- The organisation’s legal staff are able to monitor evictions, and mediate disputes between beneficiary tenants and their landlords.

Weaknesses

- The implementation is labour-intensive and difficult to scale-up in order to significantly contribute to the control of inflation of rents. Interventions in sectors of the market such as access to mortgages for refugees, might have a greater impact.
- A small number of landlords have cancelled their involvement after receiving their payment(s) towards the construction work.

Observations

- It is essential to monitor for signs or threats of eviction.
- It is important to ensure that landlords understand their contractual obligations, and to develop a mechanism for resolving disputes with the organisation or tenants.
- Transparency regarding criteria for both beneficiary and property selection is extremely important, given the fact that the waiting list is so long and frustration levels are high.
Situation before the crisis

In the seven years before the Syrian refugee crisis, the Jordanian housing market faced an annual shortfall of around 3,400 housing units per year.

The shortage of affordable housing has been compounded by the rising number of Syrian refugees, which has increased significantly from December 2012 onwards.

Situation after the crisis began

According to an INGO assessment, shelter was the single most pressing need for refugees.

The conflict in Syria has resulted in a need for an additional 120,000 housing units to accommodate an estimated 600,000 Syrian refugees. While more than 100,000 refugees are sheltered in camps, around 80% of families have found shelter in rental accommodation.

It has been estimated that more than 75% of the refugees living in host communities are extremely vulnerable, living in rudimentary shelters or tents, abandoned or partially constructed buildings, or in flats that are often overcrowded and poorly maintained.

Syrian families tend to pay higher rents than Jordanians and contracts are typically insecure, with many families worried about eviction. High rents and limited employment opportunities mean many families find themselves in increasing debt and are unable to access basic services.

A recent report looking at community tensions found that 83% of Jordanians and 77% of Syrians identified access to housing as a cause of tension.

Shelter strategy

The Government of Jordan’s National Resilience Plan 2014-2016 reports that the Syrian crisis has exacerbated the shortage of affordable housing in Jordan, raised rental prices, increased social tension, and strained urban infrastructure.

The report recommends bringing new residential units onto the market and implementing a large-scale affordable housing programme to assist refugees and low-income Jordanian families.

In Jordan the humanitarian shelter response is coordinated through a Shelter Working Group, rather than a Cluster, which divides its work into two broad objectives:

- Strategic objective in camps: Enable access to settlements with access to services and transport networks, aiming to reduce the underlying causes of socio-economic vulnerabilities.
- Strategic objective in non-camp areas: Increase the number of adequate shelter solutions available to families (through construction and rehabilitation).

Reduce the rent burden (cash-for-rent), enhance security of tenure, and reduce tensions with host communities.

The Working Group has provided guidelines to set a ceiling for payments to upgrade or convert housing units, with specifications provided on what conditions should be placed on landlords (e.g. a guaranteed period of secure tenure).

Project implementation

The programme is funded by five different donors, each with their own project start and end dates, and the timeframe is ongoing.

The programme staff number around 60 (not including support departments). Teams of engineers assess properties and monitor implementation. Project support staff control the contract and payment process. Outreach teams with legal knowledge identity beneficiaries and monitor their security of tenure once they move in.

Identifying unfinished housing units is done through a communications strategy which includes disseminating leaflets, conducting meetings with local communities and local authorities and through word-of-mouth. Interested property owners then get in touch with the organisation. The properties must be within a reasonable distance of basic services in order to be selected.

An initial assessment is made by the technical team which leads to a Bill of Quantities (BoQ) to provide a Sphere-standards housing unit for a single family. This BoQ becomes part of the contract between the organisation and the landlord.

The contract specifies that once the property has been completed to the agreed standards, the refugee family will be allowed to live in the unit rent-free for a specified period. The landlord receives a conditional grant to make the repairs, the value of which depends on the agreed period of waived rent. For example, 12 months of waived rent corresponds to a grant value of 1,000 JOD (US$ 1,400); 18 months corresponds to 1,400 JOD (US$ 1,960).
Each beneficiary family receives a one-off resettlement grant of 100 JOD (US$ 140).

The construction contracts and rental leases are witnessed and signed-off by community-based organisations and local authorities, in order to reinforce the compliance and accountability of all parties. Property owners contract their own labourers and procure their own materials.

Regular site visits (around ten in total) are made by engineers from the organisation, to monitor and advise on construction works. Payments are made against construction progress.

The first instalment of 35% of the grant is paid in advance; the next 30% of the grant is made once 60% of the works are complete, and the balance is paid once the works are completed and the keys have been given to the beneficiary family.

Rehabilitation works often exceed the anticipated duration of 6 weeks, lasting up to 8-10 weeks. The organisation conducted a survey to identify the reasons for the delays, and the most common were labour shortages, financial problems, and delays in connecting water and electricity. Consequently the organisation revised the payment plan from an advance of 25% to an advance of 35%, and is providing support to identify labourers and is also working with the utility companies.

In a limited number of cases it has not been possible to enforce the contract between landlords and the organisation, and in one instance a property owner took the first instalment without completing the project or returning the funding. The organisation relies on the goodwill of the community to ensure contracts are honoured, as it is reluctant to take these cases to court.

Another sensitive issue is the suitability of property owners to act as landlords for refugees. Applications by landlords are rejected if it is felt that they are hostile to refugees or are known to be aggressive or dangerous.

**Beneficiary selection**

The organisation’s vulnerability criteria are based on UN standard operating procedures for cash assistance. However, a new Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) is being finalised by the Inter-Sector Working Group.

The vulnerability criteria for beneficiary selection includes prioritising families who are homeless, living in overcrowded and substandard accommodation, or facing imminent eviction due to an inability to pay arrears.

Other priority families are female-headed households, families of more than ten members, and/or families with disabled or severely ill family members.

Beneficiaries are finally selected following a home visit by an outreach team. The beneficiary assessments are completed using a mobile phone application (which can be used on basic handsets as well as smartphones), with the data later downloaded to a database. Outreach teams work with CBos for lists of refugees, through word-of-mouth and, most recently, through a new organisational drop-in centre in Irbid, which is visited by up to 100 refugees daily.

**Coordination**

The organisation is the only organisation currently implementing this shelter methodology in Jordan, but the hope is that other organisations will copy the model.

The project approach is in line with recommendations from the Syria Crisis Regional Response Plan (RRP6), the ECHO Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 2014 and the government’s National Resilience Plan 2014-2016.

**Wider project impacts**

A survey of participating landlords found that the majority would not have developed their properties for another 15-20 months without the organisation’s financing. Around two-thirds had planned for the housing developments to be for their personal housing, the other third had planned to let the units for rent.

Landlords contributed on average 29% of the total costs of construction with the organisation providing the rest.

In terms of impact, landlords considered the scheme to be overwhelmingly positive in terms of investment in the local community. All but one of the 61 landlords interviewed said that they would recommend participation in the project to others.

“It’s good for Jordanians as it’s difficult and expensive to secure loans to build our houses. … I have another project for upstairs and with another grant, I can welcome another Syrian family here.”

Participating landlord
**A.17 Lebanon – 2011 – Conflict**

**Case Study:**

**Country:**
Lebanon

**Project location:**
Bekaa valley and Wadi Khalid (northern Lebanon)

**Disaster:**
Syrian conflict

**Conflict date:**
March 2011 (ongoing)

**Number of people displaced:**
Project start: 6,900 registered refugees in Lebanon
End of 2012: 119,596 refugees, though numbers were rapidly rising

**Project outputs:**
Rehabilitation of 980 houses
“Sealing off” 1,555 houses
Non-food items for 1,200 households

**Shelter size:**
Variable
One room with sanitation facilities per hosted family

**Cost:**
US$ 1,700 / family housing rehabilitation
US$ 40 / family sealing off

**Project timeline**

- 17 months – 120,000 registered refugees in Lebanon
- 13 months – Sealing off begins
- 10 months – 26,000 registered refugees in Lebanon
- 2 months – 6,290 registered refugees in Lebanon
- September 2012 – Rehabilitation project begins
- March 2011 – Conflict start

**Project description**

This project rehabilitated houses where people fleeing from Syria were hosted. It also made quick repairs to winterise dwellings and distributed non-food items, including stoves and fuel. Particular care was taken with targeting of affected populations through detailed social and structural assessments of hosting arrangements. Assessments were followed by phased cash payments for host families to make repairs. As refugee numbers continued to rise, the organisation conducted pilot cash for rent and transitional shelter construction projects.

**Strengths and weaknesses**

✔ The project built upon existing hosting capacities and provided support for the host families.
✔ The investment in improved shelter and domestic infrastructure remained with the hosting families. This encouraged good relationships with the refugees.
✔ Although the project was focused on shelter, the project was flexible and included works to improve water and sanitation for hosts’ houses.

✗ The project required a large number of staff to make multiple visits per house. This made the project difficult to scale-up quickly in response to rapid refugee influxes.

✗ As a practical solution to assure tenure, limited one-year hosting agreements were signed, after which there was no assurance that the families could remain. In reality, however, there were few evictions.

✗ The total hosting capacity in case of new influxes of refugees was not assessed in detail.

✗ It was not always clear if hosted families stayed free of charge or had to make some payment to their hosts.
- There are significant numbers of privately owned empty and incomplete buildings in Lebanon.
- Whether or not refugee families would be welcomed by host families strongly depended on the political allegiances of the local authorities.
- Significant intervention costs per family were due to high commodity costs in Lebanon.
- Although the total number of direct beneficiary households may seem relatively low, assessments actively identified many families as being able to cope without assistance.
Before conflict in Syria

Lebanon has had a long history of immigration from Syria, with hundreds of thousands of Syrians estimated to be working and living in Lebanon.

Despite its relatively small size, the climate in Lebanon varies greatly both seasonally and geographically. In summer it can be very hot at lower altitudes. During winter, parts of the north and east of the country see snow, while coastal regions remain warm.

There are a large number of privately owned, unoccupied or partially complete houses across Lebanon. Most houses are reinforced concrete buildings with cement block walls. A few older houses have mud block walls. Most buildings in urban areas as well as in rural areas are multi-storey.

Lebanon is classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank. There is significant wealth, especially in coastal areas. However, there is also considerable poverty, and migrant workers can be found across Lebanon living in makeshift shelters made from timber and plastic sheeting.

During the conflict

Following intensified civil conflict in Syria in March 2011, thousands of Syrians fled into Lebanon, mainly into the north and east of Lebanon, the Akkar Region and the Bekaa valley. The numbers of registered displaced Syrians rapidly increased from around 6,000 at the project inception in October 2011 to over 100,000 by the end of 2012. This far exceeded initial planning figures for the expected scale of migration.

The situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is made more complicated by political and religious divisions. Refugees mainly settled in locations with sympathetic municipalities, where they felt safe. This led to relatively localised populations of refugees in the Bekaa valley. It also led to challenges in identifying refugee families, as some preferred to remain in anonymous.

Shelter strategy

The strategy adopted by the organisation focused on six core activities:

- **Weatherproofing** - Quick rehabilitation with plastic sheets to provide weather.
- **Cash for rent and t-shelters** - Planned in case of larger influxes in 2013.

This case study focuses on the housing rehabilitation component.

Initial beneficiary selection

The project was established in locations with the largest populations of registered Syrians displaced by the conflict.

As there were relatively few actors involved in host family support early in the response, the organisation was able to coordinate with the other organisations, both formally and informally, in the field as well as with the local authorities.

The organisation received a list of Syrian families from the United Nations who were registered as being displaced from Syria, and who met additional vulnerability criteria. These criteria included families with extremely low incomes, families headed by women or elderly people, families with chronically ill members, families with no adults and households without a water supply.
Household assessment

The organisation carried out a further assessment visiting all shelter with a team of engineers and social mobilisers. This team completed two assessment forms: one highlighted structural and infrastructure needs with questions, including:

- Are the kitchen and wc separated?
- Is the bathroom connected to a permanent water supply?
- Are there sewerage connections/networks?
- Is there structural damage?
- Is there access to drinking water?
- Is there access to electricity?
- How large is the room?
- How many people are sleeping in each room?

The second form focussed on social issues and other vulnerabilities. Approximately one quarter of households were identified as needing assistance while the others appeared to be coping adequately.

Implementation

Once families had been identified for inclusion in the project, the engineering team returned and conducted a detailed assessment of the works required using a standard but detailed bill of quantities template.

Each line in the bill of quantities was given a unit cost, from which materials costs were calculated.

The documents were reviewed in the office, and a schedule of work was agreed with the homeowner.

“Repair minor cracks in walls - cut out the cracks with a masonry grinder to form square edged slots and remove all dust and debris. Apply Epoxy Primer liquid by brush and whilst tacky lay in the putty-like repair mortar, Mouldable Epoxy Mortar. Apply mesh tape and plaster. Work to include all plaster.”

Example of detail in the BOQ

Cash grants were allocated to households so that they could pay for repairs. Cash grants were paid in installments following the organisations’ monitoring teams’ confirmation that certain stages of the construction had been completed:

- 1st installment of 25 per cent was paid when the contract agreement was signed.
- 2nd installment of 30 per cent was paid when sixty per cent of the 1st installment were completed.
- 3rd installment of 45 per cent paid on completion.

A contract agreement was signed by all parties to prevent the host family from demanding additional rent from the Syrian family or evicting them following the rehabilitation.

The organisation operated from two field offices, each less than three hours drive from Beirut. Staff worked in teams of three people. Project managers at each location supervised two teams each.

Collective centres

In addition to rehabilitation of two family houses, some collective centers were also repaired. Typical works carried out include:

- replacement of doors and windows and broken walls
- roof repairs
- rehabilitation of sanitation facilities
- provision of cooking facilities
- water and electricity supply
- installation of partitioning for privacy.

Further works, such as decorating and the provision of additional social spaces were also assessed but not prioritised during the emergency rehabilitation.

What next?

In late 2012, as the number of Syrians in Lebanon continued to rise rapidly, and winter approached, additional solutions were required. New programming responses included rental subsidies, ongoing distribution of non-food items, including stoves and fuel vouchers, and simple “sealing-off kits”. These kits consisted of timber, plastic sheeting, tools and fixings that could be used by mobile teams to seal windows and doors in unfinished buildings.

Contingency planning was also undertaken to include tents and other emergency shelters that could be deployed at scale, either individually on small plots of land or inside unfinished buildings.
A.17 Malawi - 2009 - Earthquake

Case study:

Country: Malawi
Disaster: Earthquake
Disaster date: December 6th and 20th 2009
No. of houses damaged: 6,000
No. of people affected: 24,000
Project target population: 2,400 people (rural and urban)
Government construction guidelines also developed.
Shelter size: New build houses - 45m²
House repair - 20m² to 40m²
Materials Cost per shelter: House construction (including labour) approx 2,400 USD
Repair grants were 310 USD / household

Project timeline
- Project start
3 months
December 6th and 20th 2009 - Earthquake
- Project completion
18 months

Project description
The project provided materials, cash grants and training to build and repair houses. The project led to national guidelines on safer house construction that were adopted by the government. The project also provided psychological support, hygiene promotion, sanitation facilities for households and schools, and disseminated better building practice.

Strengths and weaknesses
✓ Strong links with communities, government, and other organisations enabled access to the affected communities.
✓ Communities and local government were responsible for developing the selection process that was managed and implemented by the communities.
✓ International links provided access to technical support and specific assistance, especially during the first phase of the emergency.
× The national organisation lacked the technical experience to implement large scale shelter programmes and had to rely on external support, especially during the first phase of the programme.
× The organisation was the main, and often the only, provider of assistance after the earthquake. Deploying and sharing the resources of other ongoing programmes was a challenge in terms of personnel, vehicles, office space, and finance and administration systems.
× The projects had to be implemented within a short time to coincide with the dry season, to meet donor requirements, and to meet the expectations of the community. This created a constraint in terms of time available for staff development and training, maintaining quality assurance, and the timely resourcing of the programme, such as the purchase of equipment and access to funds.
- The recovery programme was able to engage with other initiatives that were running prior to the earthquake, such as housing and urban planning projects, and disaster risk reduction planning and preparedness. Through the support of an international agency, partnerships were formed with government and other stakeholders to develop a disaster risk reduction strategy to assist reconstruction.
Before the earthquake

Malawi is one of the lowest income countries in the world, with many households having cash income below one US dollar per day. The population is mainly rural, living in scattered communities focused on agricultural activities. Land is allocated through traditional authorities. In urban areas property and land is bought or rented.

Traditional houses are built from wattle and daub with thatched roofs. While lacking durability, these dwellings were largely undamaged by the earthquake, provide good thermal comfort, and are constructed using local materials. All other buildings are of brick and block construction.

At the low-income end of brick construction, houses are built with un-burnt brick and mud mortar. Where there are sufficient resources, bricks are burnt using locally sourced firewood.

To economise on the use of bricks, walls a single brick thick were often built. These walls are not earthquake resistant. Additionally, the position and size of doors and windows and the type of un-braced roof construction, added to the structural failing of the buildings.

Houses are generally constructed over a period of time, as families gain the resources to purchase the required materials.

In rural areas most households owned the houses they lived in. In the urban areas many were tenants and had less opportunity to build or repair their homes.

Issues of public health were greater in the urban area. Latrines in the rural areas were generally constructed using local materials, whilst in urban areas many were built of brick, but were no longer usable.

After the earthquake

The first earthquake on the 6th December destroyed and damaged thousands of houses, hundreds of schools and public buildings, cracks appeared in the ground and the levels of the earth altered in some locations.

The number of deaths and injuries were relatively low but, as this part of Malawi had never experienced an earthquake, the population was traumatised by the event and was fearful of going back to their homes.

On the 20th December there was another earthquake.

In some areas near the town of Karonga, the land is lower than Lake Malawi, and there was the natural fear that the earthquake may cause fissures that would lead to flooding. This community moved to an area of high ground where the government and other agencies established a temporary camp.

In the first months after the emergency most households slept in temporary shelters outside their houses. There was a limited distribution of tents, but for most, temporary shelters were constructed using local materials such as timber and thatch.

Implementation

One of the guiding principles for the project was that householders, communities, and government were responsible for providing safe and adequate housing. The organisation would provide support where there were gaps in skills, knowledge, and resources.

The following parallel activities were implemented:

- Construction of new houses
- House repairs
- Construction of latrines
- Training of hygiene promoters
- Training of artisans
- Beneficiary dissemination workshops
- Guidelines for safer house construction

Two project officers were appointed to manage the urban projects and the rural projects and both shared resources and staff.

Guidelines for safer house construction

During the emergency phase of the response, an international shelter specialist assisted. This expertise led to the organisation taking a national lead in shelter and allowed an alliance to develop with government, other agencies and non-government organisations working in housing and shelter. This group was given the responsibility by the government to produce guidelines on house construction to assist the recovery process. The guidelines were produced as a manual and as a series of posters.

It was recognised that information should be made available nationally to reduce the risk of all hazards, including earthquakes. The guidelines would be the start of a process to create national guidelines and standards for construction.
Construction of houses

The Government of Malawi had already produced designs for rural housing and these designs were adopted and modified to improve structural performance.

Every beneficiary was given a range of designs to choose from. They were given the possibility to make further modifications so long as these met the design guidelines.

Both householders and artisans were provided training to ensure that important construction details and methods were implemented. The organisation provided construction supervisors to monitor and assist the construction process.

Cash grants were provided to the household to purchase materials and pay for labour. Payments were made in tranches aligned with the phases of construction. The householder was responsible for the construction.

The houses were constructed using locally made burnt brick, mud and cement mortar, timber for the roof structure and joinery, and iron sheeting for roofs.

House repairs

The construction supervisors, with the householder, surveyed the houses to identify the repairs and produce a prioritised schedule of work and an approximate budget.

The householder was paid a grant in two phases to carry out the work. Repairs focused on strengthening each element of the structure.

Hygiene promotion and sanitation

The urban part of the recovery programme identified a need for better sanitation and hygiene practice. In addition to house repairs, 250 household latrines and school sanitation facilities were constructed.

Selection of beneficiaries

The project targeted the most vulnerable within the communities. Vulnerability criteria were collaboratively identified.

Community groups were established to identify beneficiaries, to process the application, and to have officers from government and the organisation verify the applications. An appeals process was established to allow for the review of an application.

This method of selection empowered the communities, allowed government to have responsibility for the administration of the recovery process, and enabled the organisation to provide support and monitoring of the process.

Technical solutions

There were many constraints in terms of available materials, financial resources, skill level, and cultural aspiration. This led to the choice of brick construction.

Proper brick bonding, the use of lintels to brick openings, the bracing of roofs and methods in connecting the brickwork, were not previously applied. The position and size of door and window openings was addressed, as was the design of unsupported masonry such as gables and internal partition walls.

Cash transfers

The transfer of funds provided a challenge in the rural areas, and was implemented through a partnership with a mobile phone company.

Beneficiaries were given a phone and funds as credits were transferred to their phone. These credits could be exchanged for cash through the phone company’s outlets, or exchanged for materials at specified hardware stores.

Logistics and supply

Beneficiaries were encouraged and supported to buy materials in groups. The suppliers could then maximise efficiency and minimise rates charged by delivering in quantity. The organisation provided four wheel drive vehicles for transport when required.

Local suppliers were used for all materials other than the doors and windows, which went out to tender and were purchased in the capital.

Materials list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Materials</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timber 1&quot;x8&quot; (25x200mm)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricks (230 x 115 x 75mm)</td>
<td>8400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire mesh</td>
<td>25 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chlorinated (Anti-termite treatment)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>22 bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement bars 12mm x 12m</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting plain bars 6mm x 6m</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap (timber treatment)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damp proof course</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarry stones for the ring beam</td>
<td>3 Tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber 2&quot; x 3&quot; (50x75mm)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbers 2&quot; x 4&quot; (50x100mm)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbers 2&quot; x 6&quot; (50x150mm)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire nails 2&quot; (50mm)</td>
<td>5 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire nails 3&quot; x 4&quot; (75, 100mm)</td>
<td>7 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire nails 5&quot; &amp; 6&quot; (125, 150mm)</td>
<td>15 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roofing nails</td>
<td>18 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galvanized ridges</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Sheets 28 gauge 1/4&quot; (4.3m)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand for pointing, plastering, flooring</td>
<td>8 Tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement for pointing, plastering, flooring</td>
<td>76 bags</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Case Study:** Nepal 2015-2016 / Earthquake

**Keywords:** Winterization, Cash/Vouchers, NFI distribution, Shelter upgrades, Protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total houses damaged</strong></td>
<td>604,930 (fully damaged), 288,856 (partially damaged).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total people affected</strong></td>
<td>886,456 (affected families), 649,815 (displaced families).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project Locations:** Sindhpulchok, Gorkha, Dhading, Nuwakot and Dolakha districts.

**Beneficiaries:** 15,480 households. Females 31%; Children 45%; Adults 35%; Elderly 20%.

**Project Outputs:**
- 7,801 vouchers for winterization
- 2,510 cash grants for shelter enhancements
- 5,169 winterization kits

**Materials Cost:**
- USD 126 (for e-vouchers and cash grants)
- USD 130 (for winterization kits)

**Project Cost:** USD 160 per household (including staffing costs, air lifting and road transportation).

**Project Summary:**
The project provided winterization support in high and remote areas to 15,400 vulnerable and marginalized households in five of the worst affected districts, through the delivery of e-vouchers for winter and shelter enhancement, cash grants for shelter enhancement and winterization kits (clothing and shelter materials).

**Timeline:**
- 25 Apr 2015: Market assessments carried out in seven affected areas.
- 12 May 2015: Implementation
- 26 Nov 2015: End of state of emergency.

**Strengths:**
- Effectiveness of the e-voucher modality, accountability, and learning.
- Cash grants and e-vouchers enabled families to prioritize their winterization needs.
- Effective targeting of the most marginalized communities.
- Community participation ensured 90% of items were as requested by beneficiaries.
- Promotion of local economy and support to recovery.
- Coordination with local authorities and use of pre-existing systems.

**Weaknesses:**
- Issues in controlling prices in local markets.
- Lack of proper communication on the modality led to hesitation amongst local traders.
- Poor accessibility of distribution points.
- Lack of transportation support for some beneficiaries.
- Delays in the winterization kits response.
- Non-replicability of the e-voucher system developed.
- Online monitoring system had issues due to poor connectivity.

**Context:**
See overview A.3 for more information on the country background and overall shelter response.

Geographic and climatic conditions in Nepal vary greatly, and temperatures can reach -10°C in high mountainous regions, with heavy snowfall from December to February. Remote communities in these areas are several walking days from district capitals, and are accessible only by porters or via air transport.

In general, communities living in high altitude regions are well prepared for harsh winters and use a number of coping mechanisms to withstand the cold temperatures. These include in-sulating their homes (e.g. thick wall construction, insulating their roots using locally sourced materials), space heating (e.g. coal burning stoves, electric and gas heaters) and wearing warm clothing (traditional woven Yak and Wool clothing).

In terms of housing supply, owner-built is the predominant mode, which makes quality control critical. Furthermore, a significant proportion of this stock is inadequate to withstand extreme weather conditions.
SITUATION AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE

Following the powerful aftershocks, large-scale landslides occurred in multiple locations, three months after the initial earthquake, and many families were still living in temporary shelters or in their damaged homes. These temporary solutions were not sufficient to protect against the severe monsoon rains, nor did they provide adequate protection from the approaching winter months. Dalits and other minority groups were particularly affected in comparison with other communities.

LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION

The five selected districts were some of the worst affected by the earthquakes, with almost all homes having been destroyed. A preliminary assessment for the selection of Village Development Committees (VDCs) and beneficiaries for winterization support was conducted in coordination with relevant government authorities and the Shelter Cluster. The communities for winterization and shelter enhancement support were selected based on the altitude (above 1,500m) and other vulnerability criteria (women, children, elderly households, persons with disabilities, number of children, status of the house, marginalized groups and income). Continuous coordination with VDC officials, local stakeholders and partner NGOs was crucial during this data collection process. Pre-selected beneficiaries were then verified with the vulnerability criteria and a scoring tool. The final lists were approved by the local government and committees involved.

Due to accessibility challenges, the initial implementation method was modified to a dual approach of cash/e-vouchers and distribution of kits.

MARKET ASSESSMENTS AND CONSULTATIONS

Market assessments were conducted in the nearest markets to working VDCs by the logistics team, programme team and casual labour that was trained to support the activity. The parameters for the assessment were the following:

- **Accessibility**: walking distance from the nearest functioning market (3 days walk was considered inaccessible) and the altitude of the affected community (more than 3,000m above sea level was deemed inaccessible).
- **Capacity**: market ability to supply and meet the demand.
- **Willingness**: of the suppliers and beneficiaries to engage in the process.
- **Quality of materials**: assessed by Shelter Cluster technical team, with the support from the organization and the affected people as well. Government guidelines and organizational quality check benchmarks were used.

A meeting was called for all interested merchants and the process, provision, rule and regulation of the e-voucher system was explained, allowing all interested merchants to fill in a form. Further on, **community sessions were held** in order to identify the most pressing item needs for redeeming the e-vouchers. **A survey of the market and prices was carried out** and the selected merchants were verified in their capacity of stocking and restocking, and in their legal registration with the chamber of commerce.

After this process, five out of the seven markets were included in the process and framework agreements were established with 28 merchants in Gorkha and 50 in Sindupalchok.

SELECTION OF DELIVERY MODALITIES

The key factors influencing the selection of modalities were geographical location, availability of materials in markets and recognition that affected communities have pre-existing knowledge and strategies to withstand cold winter temperatures. If markets were functioning, the use of cash grants and e-vouchers were deemed more appropriate than in-kind assistance, as they contributed to strengthen existing supply chains and therefore stimulate recovery. Cash grants and vouchers also gave beneficiaries the flexibility to choose according to their own diverse needs and priorities what best supported their household. Cash grants were used in communities with access to banking facilities and where it was less likely that this modality would be misused. On the other hand, when communities were in hard-to-reach areas (above 3,000m), or markets were not functioning or accessible, the distribution of a winterization kit was used instead.

E-VOUCHER SYSTEM

The e-voucher system was implemented using a simple smart phone application, partnering with the service provider Hello Paisa for technical support and the Civil Bank for transactions. As part of the framework agreements with traders, specifications were set and agreed (as per national and international standards). Traders were then provided with a list of potential items that beneficiaries were likely to purchase, enabling them to stock accordingly.

A PIN card with ten secret digits was provided to beneficiaries who showed their identity card and Earthquake Victim Card number. Beneficiaries were provided with training and information on the markets where they would be able to redeem the vouchers. The selected merchants were also trained on the use of the App and how to upload their purchases through a simple mobile network. As this was a new system in Nepal, beneficiaries and merchants were supported during the process by staff members, who were present in the markets daily and accessible through a telephone hotline.

The e-voucher system allowed the beneficiaries to choose from a list of 36 pre-agreed items divided in three categories:

- **House and personal insulation materials**: CGI sheets, ridge sheet, tarpaulins, insulating p-foam, mattress, mat, woolen or fleece blankets, etc.
- **Winter clothes**: sweater, jacket, woollen caps, socks, shoes, underwear, and children’s clothes.
- **Kitchen utensils**: vacuum flask, cooker, heating plates, cooking bowls, etc.

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1 VDCs are the lower administrative parts of the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development.

2 See opinion piece B.2 in Shelter Projects 2011-2012, on cash-based assistance in shelter programmes.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
During the winterization programme, communities were encouraged to participate in the planning of activities through briefing meetings that explained the programme and mapping exercise, group discussions and participatory prioritization exercises that were used to identify community and household priorities for winter and shelter enhancement items. Over 90% of the items identified by the community were included in the winterization kits, which were used for the market assessment and formed parts of the items on the voucher programme.

COORDINATION
Coordination at the national and district level was important for beneficiary selection and avoiding duplication. The values of the e-vouchers, cash grants and winterization kit were jointly calculated to meet minimum requirements and agreed with the Shelter Cluster, Nepalese Government and VDCs.

MAIN CHALLENGES
A key challenge was due to the impact of fuel shortages. In September 2015, the Government of India imposed a blockade that lasted until February 2016, leading to substantial shortages of fuel, construction materials and other essential supplies across Nepal. The subsequent fuel crisis caused delays in the distribution and affected the households who received e-vouchers, as few local suppliers had the ability to restock items.

Inflation also affected the procurement of winterization kits and the cost of the items that could be redeemed with the vouchers. However, allowing beneficiaries to choose and bargain for the selected items helped mitigate this challenge.

Initially, the majority of beneficiaries who received e-vouchers were unable to purchase items at competitive rates, despite agreements between the NGOs. To overcome this issue jointly, a monitoring committee was formed consisting of representatives from the Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, local administration, a community representative and the organization’s technical staff.

In terms of accessibility challenges, the organization coordinated with government authorities to access fuel supplies for the humanitarian response and received support from the Logistic Cluster for the transportation of kits. Helicopters were used to distribute kits to particularly hard-to-reach communities before the winter started, as well as assisting the communities served with e-vouchers to transport redeemed materials from the suppliers. This was not needed for those who received cash grants, as their communities had functioning markets.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT
- The project reached about 10% of the vulnerable families in need of winterization support nationally. After this intervention, the government also distributed cash amounts of USD 100 to the remaining families.
- The distribution of e-vouchers and cash grants (equivalent to USD 1.7 million) was injected directly into local markets, supporting the local economy. This cash flow helped local suppliers to rebuild and expand their business and ultimately supported recovery of the worst hit areas.
- The e-voucher system is now established as a modality for future support. It was the first time this system was used in the area, so the Organization trained both beneficiaries and traders, providing a level of preparedness in case of future emergencies.
STRENGTHS

+ **Effectiveness.** Using the e-voucher modality allowed for effective and efficient data collection and analysis, hence fostering accountability, transparency and learning. The ability to capture purchase patterns, prices and suppliers’ details enabled the organization to have a better understanding of beneficiaries’ priorities and the local context.

+ **Empowerment.** Cash grants and e-vouchers enabled families to prioritize their winterization needs.

+ **Targeting marginalized communities.** Effective vulnerability targeting ensured 80% of beneficiaries reached were Dalits and other marginalized communities, including 550 households with persons with disabilities.

+ **Participation.** Consulting vulnerable community members for improved programme design and delivery: effective community participation ensured 90% of winterization items distributed were as requested by beneficiaries (excluding compulsory children’s clothing).

+ **Supporting recovery.** Promotion of local economy, by injecting USD 1.7 million into the local market. This cash flow helped local suppliers to expand their business and ultimately supported recovery and reconstruction phases.

+ **Cooperation with local authorities** to ensure full support for the project modalities

+ **Utilizing pre-existing mechanisms** and systems, such as Earthquake Victim Cards issued by the government as a source of verification for beneficiaries’ eligibility.

### Winterization kit components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winterization kit components</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gloves, size small</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal coat (suit &amp; trousers), child: 1 small + 1 medium</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool cap, 2 child + 1 adult</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarf for children</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal socks, 2 small child + 2 medium child</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leggings, 1 small child + 1 medium child + 1 adult</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar sweater, free size for adult</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarf, for adults</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal socks (pair), for adults</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleece blanket (high quality)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolen blanket (armpit)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleece jacket</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermo for warm beverages (1 litre)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged carrying bag</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEAKNESSES

- **Issues in market monitoring.** Initially, most beneficiaries were unable to redeem the e-vouchers at competitive rates. Good coordination with relevant stakeholders later solved this.

- **Poor dissemination of information on the modality.** Local traders were initially hesitant to participate in the e-voucher programming as the modality was new. This could have been mitigated with better dissemination of information about cash-transfer programming and processes, e.g. through local media.

- **Accessibility of distribution points.** Post-Distribution Monitoring indicated that beneficiaries had to walk for approx. 2.5 hours to reach the distribution point. Walking distances could have been reduced if distribution points were at different VDCs/wards (or at a central location chosen with the communities). This could have been achieved through better community engagement at planning and implementation stages.

- **Support for transportation.** 52% of households reported that they did not receive any support for transport of materials. Transport support for beneficiaries was considered, but due to the costs only about half of the total beneficiaries were prioritized for this assistance.

- **Delays in the response.** As part of the PDM feedback, beneficiaries suggested they would have benefited more from the winterization kit if it had been distributed approx. 45 days earlier.

- **Non-replicability.** The phone application developed and used was not open source and therefore could not be utilized by others. However, the app developer has since partnered with other organizations to develop an e-voucher app to deliver humanitarian assistance in Nepal.

- **Online monitoring mechanism.** Poor internet connections at times made it difficult to monitor transactions.

LEARNINGS

- **Beneficiaries choice.** Beneficiaries are active responders after a disaster and are best placed to decide what their household needs are. Therefore, cash-based assistance should be considered over in-kind were appropriate.

- **Efficiency and support to recovery of cash vs in-kind.** Cash grants and vouchers can be faster to distribute (especially at scale) and more cost-efficient (eliminating logistical and import costs) than in-kind. In addition, this modality can stimulate local markets, helping the recovery of trade and local economy, therefore benefitting more than the direct recipients.

- **Conditional cash.** Conditional cash allows for quality and technical restrictions to be placed, for effective shelter and NFI outcomes. However, robust monitoring tools are needed to ensure that the value for money and the quality in construction and shelter NFI outputs are achieved.

- **Distribution committee.** The formation of distribution committees is a vital method for effective mobilization, security and solving distribution-related issues at community level.
**A.24 Pakistan - 2010 - Floods**

**Case study:**

**Country:** Pakistan  
**Disaster:** 2010 Floods  
**Disaster date:** July – September 2010  
**No. of houses damaged:** 1.8 million houses damaged or destroyed  
**Project target population:** 38,500 households  
**Estimated 217,617 beneficiaries targeted**  
**Shelter size:** Shelter sizes vary. 225 square feet (70m²) was recommended. For mud structures, this was the suggested maximum.  
**Materials cost per shelter:** 300 USD cash per shelter provided. If DRR recommendations are followed, cost to beneficiaries 500 USD for a mud house, 1,000 USD for a fired brick house.  

**Project timeline**

- 16 months - 38,500 shelters complete  
- 12.5 months - 20,000 shelters completed  
- 11 months - 10,466 shelters completed  
- 10 months - 3000 shelters complete  
- 5 months - Project start  
- 4 months - Most people able to return  

**July to September 2010**

**Floods**

**Project description**

This large scale project provided cash to provide households with the means to buy materials and hire labour. Each household received the cash in 3 tranches. Each payment was made when a group of up to 25 households constructed to an agreed level. Payments were made via an agreed focal point for each group of households. The project was managed by 44 implementing Partners spread over 3 provinces, most of them local agencies.  

**Strengths and weaknesses**

✓ Cash transfer allowed households to use money in the way they saw fit.  
✓ Transferring cash instead of materials meant that materials were purchased locally.  
✓ Using community focal points to distribute cash proved to be overwhelmingly reliable.  
✓ 25 households built shelters as a group, supporting each other in order to receive the next payment.  
✓ Disaster Risk Reduction trainings and messages to communities resulted in safer houses.  
✓ A monitoring and evaluation and an information management system ensured that the programme was carefully tracked.  
✗ The banking system in Pakistan lead to cash transfers often being delayed.  
✗ Because households were free to choose the construction materials they wanted, giving out disaster risk reduction advice to each household was difficult.  
✗ Not all of the implementing partners had the shelter experience or the staff capacity to cope with the project requirements.  
✗ Some organisations working in nearby sites provided different amounts of money, leading to initial dissatisfaction among recipients and some drop outs.  
✗ Internal requirements on financial accountability led to a significant amount of paperwork, requiring 59,054 separate signed documents (various forms, MoUs, approvals, receipts, checklists, etc.).  
- Identifying the most vulnerable households required major efforts from the implementing partners and extra verification from the organisation.
Before the floods
See Background: “Pakistan - 2010 - Floods - Overview”, p. 70.

Implementation overview
The project built One Room Shelters (ORS) through a cash transfer system. One room shelters were traditional houses that could be extended later. They were generally built with brick or mud walls.

The project allocated a total of 300 USD to build each shelter. Households were then able to use the money to procure materials and/or labour as they saw fit.

Technical advice was provided to help families to improve their resilience to future disasters.

The 300 USD that was provided to each household was nationally agreed between organisations in November 2010. Some projects that started later, or that worked in areas with seismic risks provided a larger amount per shelter. The organisation continued with 300 USD per household because it allowed more people to benefit.

Many households added their own resources to build their houses, in some cases selling assets such as livestock. Many beneficiaries also used emergency funds provided by the government through the “WATAN” card system.

Most households participating in the project built shelters that were significantly better than the house they had been living in before the floods.

Beneficiary Selection
The village committee was responsible for selecting the most vulnerable households using the following criteria:
1) The house must have been destroyed or heavily damaged as a result of the 2010 floods.
2) In addition, one or more of the following criteria were met: no adult male in the family, disabled family member, medically unfit family member, elderly family member, family taking care of orphans, large family, or poor family.

The implementing partners verified that the targeting had been done using the criteria before people joined the programme. Monitoring staff also verified compliance with targeting criteria.

Groups of 25 households
The organisation insisted that every household participating in the project worked as a group and completed each stage of construction before any household would receive the next tranche of funds.

The group of no more than 25 beneficiary households had to work together as a unit. It was stressed that none of the beneficiaries would succeed unless all of them succeeded.

It was understood that they had to help the most vulnerable people to complete their shelter as a precondition for getting money to construct their own shelter.

Distribution in 3 tranches
Each household received 100 USD as an advance for digging the foundations and constructing the shelter up to the plinth level. Once the implementing partner had verified that all plinths had been completed, a request for the 2nd tranche of 100 USD was made and funds were subsequently distributed.

Once the Implementing Partner had verified that all walls had been completed, a request for the 3rd tranche of 100 USD was made and a final cash distribution was made for the construction of the roof.

Cash transfer focal points
In each village, a representative village committee was established. This was responsible for choosing a highly dependable and respected person from the community who would act as the focal point for the project.

The focal point brought money paid via his/her personal bank to the village and distributed it to each group of 25 beneficiary households.

When the focal point accepted the responsibility, he/she was given a Memorandum of Understanding to sign and told that bank charges related to the programme activities would be covered. Upon the successful conclusion of the project, he/she would also receive 175 USD.

It was explained that when beneficiaries signed the Memorandum of Understanding to participate in the programme, they were also
accepting the focal point to receive money on their behalf. Once the focal point had received the money, it was no longer the responsibility of the implementing organisations.

The focal points brought three separate tranches totalling up to 2,500 USD each to the community. In only a handful of cases were funds not delivered to communities according to plan. This relatively small number of cases should be seen in the context that the programme worked with approximately 1,600 focal points.

**The 11 required photographs were:**

1. Head of household standing in front of existing shelter.
2. Head of household holding CNIC (National Identity Card).
3. Close up of CNIC card.
4. Head of household standing in front of the empty plot where they are going to build.
5. Head of household receiving first tranche (thumbprint on documentation).
6. Plinth level completion.
7. Head of household receiving second tranche (thumbprint on documentation).
8. Wall level completion.
9. Head of household receiving third tranche (thumbprint on documentation).
10. Roof level completion.
11. Household occupying the shelter.

**Land rights is a major issue in Pakistan, especially in Punjab and Sindh provinces which have large tracts of land under the control of landlords. In this project, no distinction was made between those owning and those renting land.**

**Monitoring**

Implementing partners were required to fill in forms that established the vulnerability of the household, tracked the progress of the construction and tracked the distribution of tranches to beneficiary heads of households. In addition, the organisation had its own team that monitored around 7% of the households to verify targeting and to ensure that the construction progress reported by the implementing partners was being accurately described.

A great deal of monitoring both by implementing partners and the organisation ensured that households were meeting the construction thresholds.

GPS coordinates and 11 photographs taken during the course of cash distribution and construction were required for each beneficiary household so that construction progress could be comprehensively tracked throughout the process.

All of the information and photographic evidence was uploaded into a large database that was managed by a team of information managers.

**Programme management**

The programme operated in 3 provinces. The programme headquarters were in Islamabad but the day-to-day management responsibilities were devolved to four hub offices.

In Northern Pakistan, the organisation directly implemented the construction of shelters, whereas in Punjab and Sindh provinces the organisation worked with 44 Implementing Partners, of which all but 4 were local agencies.

**Case study**

**Keywords:** Cash / vouchers, Advocacy / legal, Training.

**Emergency:** Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), Philippines.

**Date:** 8th November 2013.

**Damage:** 1.12 million houses damaged.

**People affected:** Approximately 14 million affected, 4.1 million displaced.

**Project location:** Tanauan and Tacloban, Eastern Leyte.

**Beneficiaries:** 35,000 - 45,000 people.

**Outputs:** 6,615 shelters (3,277 completed as of September 2014).

**Occupancy rate:** 100%.

**Shelter size:** Average of 12.5m² depending on household inputs. Engineers make recommendations based upon Sphere.

**Cost per shelter:** The organisation provides US$ 450, with beneficiaries’ self-recovery efforts valued at around US$ 250.

**Project description:**

The main organisation, in collaboration with a local implementing partner, supported the self-recovery of those affected by Haiyan through the provision of direct cash grants, vouchers for quality-controlled materials, and training and guidance in DRR techniques.

The two organisations lobbied the government to allow assistance to families waiting to be relocated who were living in the “No Build Zone” (NBZ). Relocation is likely to take 1-2 years.

**Emergency timeline:**


**Project timeline [number of months]:**


[4-9] Conditional cash grant payment.


**Strengths**

✓ The project provides choice, rather than imposing one shelter solution on all beneficiaries.

✓ Price and quality control components ensure value for money and safety, with vouchers reducing the potential for corruption.

✓ Material assistance is delivered with minimal transportation costs by mobile hardware stores.

✓ The local economy has been stimulated, and local suppliers have been keen to provide good quality products and service to their local customers.

✓ The relocation process away from the NBZ takes time, and the main organisation, following the lead of its local partner, successfully advocated for the government to allow light material assistance to those still waiting in the NBZ.

**Weaknesses**

✗ The voucher system can end up causing delays since small traders have limited capacity and are unfamiliar with the process.

✗ The cash-on-delivery procurement mechanism does not suit small traders who need cash up-front to buy in stock. Revising the procurement procedures to resolve this issue delayed the project implementation.

**Observations**

- Sourcing quality materials from small suppliers has proved to be problematic.
Situation before the disaster

The Municipality of Tanauan’s economic activity is based around fishing and farming, whilst Tacloban City is a large urban area. Poor families, whether living in urban or rural areas, were mostly living in one-room shelters made of coco lumber with bamboo or plywood walling and CGI sheet or ‘nipa’ shingles (leaves from the nipa tree sewn together over bamboo sticks) for roofing.

In urban areas foundations were more likely to be made with concrete, but in general shelters were poorly constructed, because of limited financial resources and because skilled craftsmen with good technical knowledge tended to work in larger cities.

Situation after the disaster

Six months after Typhoon Haiyan struck, shelter remained the highest priority need, with only 22% coverage out of 1.12 million affected houses across the Philippines by the end of April 2014, when the project was just beginning.

The city of Tacloban presented complex challenges due to the high level of damage and the large urban population. Those that began recovery in “safe zones” were often re-building their shelters to an even lower standard than before the typhoon, due to limited financial resources and poor quality materials. In April 2014 heavy rains caused flooding, especially in Tacloban and in July Typhoon Glenda hit, which resulted in some families being evacuated for up to two weeks.

Shelter strategy

A Damage Loss and Need Assessment (DaLA) led by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and supported by the Shelter Cluster, was completed in December 2013. The conclusions recommended a self-recovery approach for rapid recovery.

A “No Build Zone” (NBZ) was announced by the President a few weeks after the Typhoon hit, and humanitarian agencies were prevented from providing non-emergency assistance in the NBZ whilst people were moved to temporary shelters away from the NBZ (tent cities or bunkhouses) in preparation for permanent relocation.

Government relocation plans involve the moving of 200,000 households in total, with 10,000 households being relocated from parts of Tacloban City. While waiting for relocation to take place, some families have lived in tents and makeshift shelters for nearly a year and the relocation process continues at a slow pace.

For the first six months, no shelter assistance to these families was permitted, apart from the distribution of tarpaulins.

Humanitarian organisations, including efforts made by the project’s local partner, advocated for the provision of more substantial shelter support in the NBZ.

In March 2014, the NBZ was re-classified as a No Dwelling Zone (NDZ) by the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery, in order to allow work to begin on the reconstruction of buildings for tourism and other livelihoods activities. However, local government authorities retained the power to take final decisions on policy, and the impact of the decision was not immediately felt.

After further advocacy by humanitarian organisations, it was accepted by the local government that light materials assistance could be provided in the original NBZ. Whilst the authorities in Tanauan allowed assistance to families on the site they were currently living in, authorities in Tacloban wanted all potential plots where temporary shelter would be provided to be officially accepted. This meant that a number of alternative plots had to be identified by the project, delaying the response until August 2014.

As of end of October 2014, 325 IDPs living in tents have been assisted by helping them to move to a safe lot, signing an agreement with the lot owner to pay a rent of US$ 2 per month.

Project implementation

Prior to beneficiary selection, several community consultation sessions were conducted in Tanauan, in order to provide feedback on the proposed strategy. Following the meetings, several adjustments to the plan were made, including replacing tools with additional money for roofing materials, and adjustments to beneficiary criteria to include financial considerations and the need for extra construction support for the most vulnerable (they were given additional money to pay for four days’ worth of unskilled labour).

Build Back Safer Committees (BBSC) were formed, with their membership including representatives from local government, community leaders, beneficiary representatives,
grassroots organisations, women’s representatives and representatives of religious groups. This community participation mechanism played a crucial role in the transparency and effectiveness of the project.

Following beneficiary selection, beneficiaries were grouped into clusters of 25-30 households, with each cluster choosing a representative who became a member of the BBSC.

There were three main components of the assistance programme, described below:

1) Technical assistance

Prior to the cash and voucher distribution, the two organisations provide training in DRR techniques with on-site demonstrations, educational material and scale models. The quality of salvaged materials is validated, and support is given to the families to identify their specific needs and recommend how to best utilise the cash and voucher to recover the shelter.

2) Conditional cash grant

The organisations link local suppliers to the community, with the leader of each group of beneficiary households being supported to produce a procurement order. Suppliers agree standard prices and quality levels with the organisations. The grant is paid through the Philippine Post Office once the beneficiary cluster has completed the training.

3) Cash voucher for roofing materials

Vouchers are distributed once the structures are complete, and can be redeemed at mobile hardware stores, with a master-list of available materials printed on the beneficiary’s registration card.

The materials are quality-controlled by a team made up of BBSC members, staff from the main organisation and its local partner, and local government representatives. A certificate of satisfaction is signed by the team once the quality of the materials presented by the supplier on distribution day has been validated and cross-checked against previous warehouse joint visits.

The implementation of key DRR messages is monitored during the project, with checks made before the next phase of support is provided. The project records all information on materials-use and DRR techniques implemented in a database, to facilitate a final evaluation.

Beneficiary selection

The Disaster Assistance Family Access Card (DAFAC) database and Local Government Unit (LGU) damage assessment were used as initial data to triangulate beneficiary needs and avoid duplication of responses.

Due to many people’s identity documents being destroyed in the typhoon, assistance has been based on pre-issued tokens combined with the detailed beneficiary databases. Vulnerability criteria are then used to select households, whose needs are validated by a home visit. Criteria include prioritising female-headed households, the elderly, and people with disabilities.

The BBSCs have an important role to play, helping to resolve problems and ensure that beneficiary lists are correct. Beneficiary lists are made public (through notice boards or community meetings) for two days, to allow time for beneficiary feedback through help desks and complaints boxes. After following up feedback (in the presence of the BBSC, to ensure the process is transparent) the final list is posted, along with written responses to complaints.

Coordination

The organisations were actively involved in the Shelter Cluster, which operated at national, regional, provincial and LGU levels, done in order to prevent duplication. The organisations also cooperate closely with the local government. In order to reduce the potential for conflict and tensions in the communities, the organisations within the Cluster agree to make sure that their assistance packages do not greatly differ in value.

The main organisation’s partnership with the local partner, who had led the advocacy for a change in policy on the NBZ, had a great deal of local knowledge and understanding.
The survey also indicated that the communities were able to provide around a third of the cost of the shelter in terms of providing unskilled labour and salvaged materials.

The final collapsible shelter design can be dismantled in 2-3 hours, making it possible to completely collapse the shelter if there is advance warning of an extreme typhoon. The dismantling requires no skilled labour and the shelter itself is made from local materials.

**Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)**

The Build Back Safer techniques include:

- Using hurricane strapping to tie down the frame and roofing.
- Assessing the quality of salvaged materials.
- Elevating structures in flood-prone areas.

At the beginning of the project, an international training organisation organised and ran the Training of Trainers sessions for the staff of the main organisation and its local partner in order to establish a model for training the household clusters.

Each household cluster participated in a half-day construction training. This involved on-site demonstrations with models and training material identifying ten key points for typhoon-resistant construction.

A separate four-day training workshop, targeted only at specific villages in Tacloban, comprised of practising emergency evacuation drills and developing contingency plans for the most vulnerable areas. The BBSCs also received preparedness training in order for them to become rescue teams in an emergency.

A disaster preparedness campaign was launched, with educational material developed and distributed in collaboration with local government. The wall and roof frames are built with coco lumber and wall screens are made from either plywood or weaved bamboo mats locally known as ‘amakan’. Roof options include cladding with leaf mats, locally known as nipa shingles, or corrugated iron sheets.

By providing materials through local suppliers using mobile hardware stores, the organisation avoids the overheads of centralised procurement, warehousing and transport costs.

**Wider project impacts**

The project voucher approach has influenced the national government to review their own roofing material distribution process, changing from in-kind distribution to vouchers in order to increase beneficiaries’ choice and reduce supply chain problems.

The project approach has resulted in the injection of direct and indirect cash payments worth US$ 2.5 million into the local economy of the specific target municipalities.

The certified training of 200 women carpenters is linked with long-term gender programmes in the area.
**CASE STUDY**

**PHILIPPINES 2013-2015 / TYPHOON HAIYAN**

**KEYWORDS:** Multisectoral, Resilience building, Core houses, Community participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED</td>
<td>518,878 partially damaged 493,912 totally destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED</td>
<td>3,424,593 households (16,073,191 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT LOCATIONS</td>
<td>11 barangays spread across two distinct regions: Guilan (Eastern Samar) and Coro (Palawan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>3,197 households (16,209 people).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>1,028 houses (666 new houses and 360 repair), 505 individuals trained in hazard-proof construction, 744 houses with improved sanitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER OUTPUTS</td>
<td>41 community managed projects, which included: an estimated 100,000 paid labour days for implementing community projects; 49 livelihood groups capacitated; 20 livelihood projects funded; 72 water interventions constructed; 6,000km² cultivated for vegetable production; 42 community registered organizations continuing beyond programme life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER SIZE</td>
<td>11.5-23m² (sizes varied as beneficiaries could choose from different designs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER DENSITY</td>
<td>Average of 4m² per person (Based on national average household size of 5 and average shelter size of 20m². Note: size densities were ultimately determined by community needs based on direct consultation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIALS COST</td>
<td>USD 2,259 per household on average, including a latrine (Most families also contributed salvaged materials or other resources to expand upon the basic core shelter design).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT COST</td>
<td>USD 2,550 per household on average.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROJECT SUMMARY**

This community-led resilient recovery programme supported remote indigenous communities on sectors including shelter, infrastructure, livelihoods, WASH and Disaster Risk Reduction. The projects adopted an integrated approach, taking shelter as an entry point for area-based programming and then expanding to a broader programme of community resilience-building. The different offices were given flexibility on implementation within a common principle of maximizing communities’ agency. Communities were allowed to manage their own funds; planning and implementation of the activities.

**TIMELINE**

- **2014**
  - EMERGENCY PHASE
  - 1 Apr 2014: Households assessments begin
  - 2 Jul 2014: First Infrastructure and Housing Projects start
- **2015**
  - EARLY RECOVERY PHASE
  - 3 Jan 2015: Livelihood Projects start
  - 4 Jul 2015: Water Projects start
- **2016**
  - RECOVERY / RESILIENCE PHASE
  - 5 Sep 2014: First houses completed
  - 6 Jul 2015: Water Projects start

**SHELTER AND CASH: 16 CASE STUDIES**

**STRENGTHS**

+ Adaptable and contextual programme.
+ Communities and households were given full control.
+ Capacity-building and technical advice supported the owner-driven approach.
+ Recovery programming successfully transitioned into development issues.
+ Early projects that served the whole community won their trust.

**WEAKNESSES**

- The development of new methodologies was not adequately documented.
- Alignment of programmes in distant areas proved challenging.
- Engagement with the local government was difficult.
- Recruitment difficulties delayed implementation.
- The scope of the programme could have been expanded to cover more communities.
SHELTER AND CASH: 16 CASE STUDIES

SHELTER AND CASH: 16 CASE STUDIES

SHELTER Projects 2015-2016

NATURAL DISASTER

CONTEXT

For an overview of the situation before and after the disaster, and the national shelter response, see overview A.23 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014 and overview A.8 in this edition.

The communities targeted by this programme spread across distinct geographic regions of the country, encompassing a variety of contexts, including regions affected by recurrent extreme weather, marginalized indigenous communities and remote small island communities. All were known to be impacted by climate-induced hazards.

SITUATION AFTER THE TYPHOON

Needs varied by region. The town of Coron was not severely affected, so supply lines were established rapidly and those who could afford them purchased basic items in town. Two months after the disaster, the market was almost back to normal.

The organization conducted a Multisector Initial Rapid Assessment in Coron immediately after the typhoon, determining that 18% of houses were destroyed and 23% were severely damaged. In another early assessment, community members indicated that they were not familiar with resilient construction techniques (due to the significantly less frequent occurrence of typhoons in the western regions). In addition, they were observed to suffer from a number of small-island development issues, ranging from poor access to education, to water shortages and coastal livelihoods threatened by climate change.

Most affected were the coastal fishing communities, whose means and sources of income had been destroyed or damaged to a large extent. Also the physical damage to houses, schools and other communal facilities was greater in coastal communities, which were already in vulnerable positions before the typhoon.

RESILIENT RECOVERY APPROACH

The programme followed a “resilient recovery approach”, using and strengthening available capacities in the communities as much as possible. This focuses on organizing the communities around the common goal of resilience building, beyond strengthening their physical environment (e.g. shelter and infrastructure) and including livelihood groups, new knowledge and increased social capital and organizational capacity.

The approach allows for local people to exchange knowledge and encourages the community to analyze why buildings collapse and how to make them stronger. Ultimately, it encourages programme design to take place together with its “clients”, in order to properly meet their needs – involving communities in meaningful decision-making, engineering shelters together with local builders and not forcing a “one size fits all” design.

LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION

The geographic regions were chosen strategically, to cover a broad sweep of contexts and to eventually pull in different sources of funding. Within those regions, early assessments helped target a combination of hard-hit and inherently vulnerable communities. Within each community, the whole population was then targeted for the integrated resilience approach, with projects such as health centres, water systems, sea walls, etc.

Detailed social and technical assessment determined which portion of the population was more or less affected by the typhoon and, specifically in regard to the shelter programme, those who qualified for housing assistance (destroyed or severely damaged home). Within these, the final selection was made by applying vulnerability criteria (defined by community groups during workshops and voting). This process varied for each community. Broadly, facilitators were aimed for the establishment of criteria by the community (e.g. elderly, single headed household, etc.) and then summed the voted scores for each potential beneficiary. However, in some cases, decisions were taken outside of this rigid framework.

Transparency meetings were established to follow up on selection appeals, among other activities. Contentious selections did occasionally arise, usually due to pre-existing social conflicts within communities. In these cases, inclusive community meetings usually provided the best forum to resolve differences and reach consensus.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

After initial distributions of emergency NFIs through local partners, the organization focused on developing the resilient recovery programme for a two year recovery phase, building on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) methodologies.

Shelter and community infrastructure needs were identified through early assessment and began in the first year. This was then broadened out into integrated programming including Livelihood, WASH, DRR and Health.

Livelihood programming in particular became very important in addressing the impacts on the fishing communities and building towards longer-term economic resilience – both directly (e.g. Market Hub, Seaweed Cooperative, Rice/Fish/Fuel Resellers) and indirectly (e.g. community labour and logistics for all construction projects, local procurement of materials, boat landings to enhance trade). These projects were all implemented alongside existing activities, during the second year.

The organization was determined to use a participatory approach, granting communities agency and sense of ownership over the project outputs. Therefore, the entire
programme was designed to be delivered through conditional cash transfers, with community and household taking an active role in managing the projects, while being supported by capacity-building and technical guidance from the organization.

In early risk assessments, communities were facilitated to analyze their own risk, develop their own risk-proofing strategies, write their own project proposals and submit them to the organization for review and approval. For some elements of programming, such as infrastructure, communities were even given decision-making power over their total budget, deciding themselves which projects to invest in based on their value for money and impact towards resilience-building.

Examples of the houses built through the programme. Each household was free to adopt a different design and manage the construction directly.

Additionally, some areas employed a cluster-based management of housing projects: entire groups of families would progress through the cash tranches together, while in other areas beneficiary families were treated separately. This variety was experimental, but ultimately helped to contextualize the project for each area.

Once the projects begun, communities and households would handle an unprecedented level of responsibility, managing all the project funds, handling material procurement, record keeping, organizing logistics, hiring and paying their own labour force and managing construction. A strict upholding of the cash tranche conditions ensured that beneficiaries would follow the technical guidelines of the organization’s engineers and build according to their typhoon resilient standards and designs. In the case of deviation from these conditions, or misuse of the funds, individual projects (or in some cases housing clusters) would have their tranche payments suspended. However, this turned out to be very rare (less than 5% of cases) and successful resolutions were always found.

Additionally, a master-builder programme (practical training and on-site mentoring) was established, to support the housing projects through to completion. Experienced local carpenters and masons were trained and contracted to manage housing clusters.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

To make all this possible, the organization had to support the communities with a rigorous set of capacity-building workshops, including on financial literacy, bookkeeping, management, construction and leadership. The organization put significant resources into hiring many community organizers and technical staff, as well as partnering with a local community-development organization to capacitate the staff.

Additionally, a Transparency Strategy established tools and mechanisms to manage feedback and complaints
within the community and resolve issues internally, while maintaining accountability. Features included regular community meetings, an anonymous suggestion box for dealing with potentially contentious issues, and notice boards to expand communication of messages (and in some cases even construction receipts) beyond those who attended meetings. When issues arose, they would first be dealt with at community level, and under certain circumstances escalated up, eventually to the organization's regional level, for external judgement. Only a few dozen cases ever reached this level, and supplementary facilitation was provided to avoid potential conflict.

Each project had community-assigned management teams with respective responsibilities, usually including a project manager, construction site foreman and treasurer. Roles were identified based on advice from the engineers and available funds within each project. Later in the programme, some large community infrastructure projects even experimented with establishing community auditing teams. This was particularly well received and led to less management problems and smoother running of the projects.

**Racial division challenges**

In Coron, indigenous leaders initially refused to work with the migrant communities. In the end, dialogue workshops and suspension of the programme worked to resolve differences and allow access to the whole population. However, this required the organization to adopt a more interventionist approach than usual. This reflects the conflict that sometimes arises between participatory approaches and organizational control.

**KEY MESSAGES AND DESIGN SOLUTIONS**

Building on the Shelter Cluster 8 Key Messages¹, design details and safe building location were emphasized and demonstrated through the construction features and site location of each house, rather than through a single prescriptive design, aiming towards replication by the larger community. In partnership with an international construction NGO, these features were codified and made obligatory through a checklist that was distributed to beneficiaries². Compliance was checked through inspection by the primary organization's engineers and linked directly to cash tranche releases.

Following vernacular construction practices, all shelters were designed to be core houses that could be expanded over time. Supported by the livelihood components of the project, time beneficiaries could raise the resources necessary to extend the structure, as is traditionally performed. While it is hard to control the quality of future extensions, the core house itself was designed to resist in the case of another typhoon, leaving each family with a hub from which to build back from.

While a better understanding of resilient building details was established, the replication of such details outside of the programme was seen to be limited, in light of the economic circumstances of each family. For example, while some people could afford extra nails to strengthen important connections, few were willing to invest in the relatively expensive bolts.

**Materials sourcing and transport**

Being set in areas where markets were still functioning, the projects granted responsibility to beneficiaries to procure locally, according to pre-agreed specifications (included in the agreement between the beneficiary and the organization) and transport their own materials to site. By sourcing in the procurement and logistics burden, the beneficiary communities were given more choices and the organization. The organization played its role by the fast and transparent suspension of projects where such cases arose, and warning against the practice of illegal procurement.

**Wider impacts of the project**

Improvements were made in community organization and project management, safety of houses, new and rebuilt community infrastructure, increased knowledge, income diversification and the re-establishment of local businesses. The involvement of affected people in the programme ultimately enabled the communities to be safer and more resilient to typhoons than before. The approach also helped communities organize preparedness plans supported by the Local Government Unit, national policies, laws and financing arrangements.

With the appropriate adjustments, and largely based on experiences from this programme, the organization's Resilient Recovery Approach was used again, most notably in Nepal after the earthquake of 2015.

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¹ See overview A.8 and find the 8 Key Messages online at http://bit.ly/2QANL6F.
² Some of the contextually new features introduced to local communities included bolts as major connections (e.g. columns to bases), bracing and cross bracing in the walls and roof, minimum numbers of nails for each connection, poured concrete pad foundations (as opposed to the less durable timber post foundation used locally), connecting the timber column dry to footing to the foundations to withstand wind uplift forces, nailed blocking to faster pullout to joists, and timber treatment for termite protection.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ Adaptable and contextual programme that remained relevant in a changing environment, allowed by a flexible funding.
+ Communities and households were given full control over implementation funds and took on much of the responsibilities, allowing them to truly lead and take ownership of the project.
+ The focus on capacity-building and technical advice supported the owner-driven, community-managed, approach to become a success.
+ Recovery programming successfully transitioned into development issues and became the basis for long term community development programming.
+ Winning the communities' trust with early projects that served all, smoothed the way for participation and cooperation later on.

WEAKNESSES

- Time and resources to properly document the development of new methodologies were not adequately allocated.
- Alignment of programmes on different sides of the country proved challenging in some areas. Because ultimately the programmes developed quite differently, some systems and structures designed for one context could not be easily adopted for the other.
- Engagement with the local government was difficult, due to their limited capacity and the organization’s community-focused, bottom-up, approach.
- Recruitment difficulties early on, specifically in relation to specialized roles such as engineers, delayed critical paths to implementation.
- In hindsight, the scope of the programme could have been expanded to cover more communities without compromising on quality. In balancing the quality vs. scale dilemma, smaller scale interventions were chosen, to maximize impact in the selected communities.

LEARNINGS

• Conditional cash transfers can be an effective tool for strengthening the owner-driven approach in shelter construction, while retaining quality control for the organization.
• Communities can be capacitated to take on more responsibilities in shelter implementation. Areas such as logistics and procurement can be managed by the beneficiaries, if training is provided and markets are functioning.
• In supporting self-recovery, shelter programming should be used as a platform to promote broader learning about resilient construction techniques and look beyond traditional shelter outputs.
• Resilience Programmes require “smart baselines” in order to evaluate beyond the programmatic outputs. Baselines should include elements of social assessment and aim to reflect knowledge, attitudes and behavioural change.
• Elements of typhoon-resilient house design will not be replicated if the materials go beyond the usual budget of homeowners (e.g. bolts vs. nails). Sometimes, weaker (yet cheaper) alternatives should be used, in order to aspire towards replicability and ultimately engender behavioural change.

The programme led to a variety of community-wide infrastructure projects and communal facilities, led by the communities themselves.
B.8 Russia, Ingushetia - 1999 - Conflict - People displaced

Case Study: Cash for shelter - host families

**Project type:**
Cash grants to assist host families to shelter displaced people in private households

**Disaster:**
Internal displacement of civilians following 2nd armed conflict in Chechnya, 1999

**No. of people displaced:**
At the peak of the crisis, 213,000 people fled to neighbouring Ingushetia. Up to 150,000 people were privately accommodated by host families.

**Project target population:**
Winter 2000/01 – 15,000 Ingush host families.
Winter 2001/02 – 11,000 Ingush host families.

**Occupancy rate on handover:**
100% of the host families accommodated on average of five IDPs from Chechnya (subject to corruption, which was carefully screened out).

**Shelter size**
The cash grant was equivalent to an average of one month’s salary in Ingushetia. A 2.1m² minimum net floor area was strongly recommended. The shelter consisted of two rooms, one corridor and an external latrine.

**Summary**
An international donor, in close cooperation with the international leading agency for shelter assistance in Ingushetia, provided cash grants to every family that hosted displaced people from the conflict in neighbouring Chechnya. The project goal was to prevent IDPs, who were being accommodated by host families, from being evicted during winter. This was achieved though the provision of cash grants to all registered host families in Ingushetia.

A one-off cash grant, roughly equivalent to one month’s income, was given with no restrictions to each host family. The programme was implemented by the donor in close cooperation with the government of Ingushetia. The Ingush branch of the Russian postal service made the cash payments.

After a successful implementation during the winter of 2000/01, it was decided to implement a second phase, since the situation for displaced people in Ingushetia had not improved.

**Project timeline**

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Strengths and weaknesses

X No eviction of IDPs during the winter months of 2000/01 and 2001/02 were reported.
X No abuse during cash distribution or any security incidents occurred despite a rather tense security situation.
X The programme’s level of transparency achieved high acceptance among beneficiaries and local authorities.
X Professional cooperation with the Russian postal service (Ingush branch) allowed for a timely and accurate cash disbursement.
X The significant influx of liquid cash supported the local economy.

W The high number of beneficiaries in different databases required an intensive verification process.
W Implementation of the 2nd phase during the following winter was exposed to severe fraud attempts, as some individuals had manipulated official documents in order to meet the eligibility criteria. However, the fraudulent cases were sorted out and expelled from the beneficiary lists before payment was released.
W In view of the scope of the project (the entire Republic of Ingushetia) an evaluation of the project was recommended to reveal detailed information about its effects and impact.

Context

The conflict in Chechnya started in 1999, forcing 213,000 people to move to the Republic of Ingushetia. At one stage in early 2000, there was one displaced person from Chechnya for every Ingush citizen.

Almost two-thirds of the IDPs were accommodated by Ingush host families. This was possible because of close family and religious ties between the two countries.

In the spring of 2000, there was some evidence that IDPs had been evicted from private accommodation. This was commonly as a result of financial pressures on families, many of whom had been hosting the IDPs for more than one year.

This project recognised that staying with host families was psychologically better for IDPs than living in camps. It also sought to encourage the solidarity effort of the Ingush population. As a result, the project aimed to support host families with economic incentives to encourage them to continue hosting the IDPs.

Assessments were conducted in the spring of 2000. These confirmed:

- the appropriateness of the cash for shelter approach;
- acceptance among potential beneficiaries and authorities; and
- the readiness of partner organisations to provide security and logistics.

Eligibility criteria

A host family was eligible for the cash grant when they:

- presented official registration documents proving that they an Ingush resident; and
- presented a Chechen IDP’s temporary registration document with the same address and a registration date within a given time period.

Implementation

Registration - The registration of beneficiaries was based on United Nations and the Federal Migration Service lists. The two lists were combined and filtered. The resulting beneficiary lists were cleared.

Verification - To ensure that the registered beneficiaries were hosting
By supporting host families with one off cash grants, the project aimed to avoid evictions.

Cash for shelter collection point

IDPs, monitoring teams were sent to the registered beneficiaries’ address.

Public information - The intention to implement a cash project was initially announced to the Russian federal government as well as to the Ingush government and the humanitarian aid community. Regular reports on local television kept the population updated on the programme and its progress. Detailed information on eligibility and lists of beneficiaries were posted at post offices and on the premises of local administrations.

Complaints - A complaints process involving the project management was originally not foreseen. Complainants were asked to refer to the Ingush government, which determined that 680 cases (out of 1,200) were eligible for compensation.

During the second phase in the winter of 2001/02, 6,100 fake documents were identified (out of 7,800 submitted). This was resolved as a result of close cooperation with the Ministry of Interior.

Payments - Payments were made by the Ingush branch of the Russian postal service. The postal service received a 1.5% commission for all transactions and personal invitations for beneficiaries. The cooperation was excellent in terms of reliability of payment procedures.

Assistant provided - Each family received the equivalent of US$ 100 – the equivalent of an average monthly salary.

This project was accompanied by 32 small projects, such as equipment for computer classes and support to soup kitchens. The objective of this was to acknowledge the goodwill of the local community.

Staffing - The team consisted of two expatriate staff (a programme manager and a deputy programme manager), four local employees, two drivers and up to 24 part-time monitors and drivers. The staff were based out of two offices, one in Ingushetia and one in North Osetia.

Security - Movement was heavily restricted as a result of security restrictions on international staff. Small projects were visited by local staff.

Impacts - Although there were some signs of eviction reported among the international humanitarian aid community, no eviction of IDPs during the winter months of 2000/01 and 2001/02 was officially reported.

According to unofficial surveys, the cash grant was mainly used for daily needs as well as for the payment of electricity bills.

Due to the significant size of the two project phases, a total amount over US$ 2 million was indirectly invested in the local economy.
A.28 Sri Lanka - 2009 - Conflict Returns

Case study:

**Country:**
Sri Lanka

**Conflict:**
Population movement due to civil war

**Conflict date:**
Conflict ended in May 2009

**No. of houses damaged:**
160,000

**No. of people affected / displaced:**
300,000

**Project target population:**
2,511 families (Estimated 12,555 people)
669 houses built by January 2012

**Shelter size:**
46m²

**Materials Cost per house:**
4,600 USD

**Additional costs per house:**
3,100 USD

**Project timeline**

- 11 months - Project starts
- 7 months - Returns begin
- May 2009 - End of conflict
- 48 months - ANTICIPATED Project completion

Project description

This owner-driven programme provided cash to support people to build houses damaged or destroyed by the conflict. The project aimed to contribute to the sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction in the north of Sri Lanka. It primarily supported people who have been displaced who were resettling after the conflict.

**Strengths and weaknesses**

✔ The owner-driven approach with direct cash grants to the beneficiary bank accounts created a sense of ownership.
✔ The project was able to build upon experiences and use staff from the post-tsunami recovery programme.
✔ The shelter projects were part of a larger programme including support in water, sanitation, livelihood, disaster risk reduction, community infrastructure and efforts to rebuild civil society.
✔ The project aimed to empower civil society, and provoke them to take initiatives on behalf of themselves.

✘ The project was delayed by lack of legal documents.
✘ Often beneficiaries could not produce evidence of land ownership, such as land permits, birth/death/marriage certificates etc. as they were lost during the conflict.
✘ Construction skills differ from one family to another. As a result experienced staff were required to ensure that the project was effective.
✘ Because the project started with beneficiary lists from the local authorities, it was open to some politicisation.
✘ Each house required a minimum of eight documents and five separate transactions. This led to delays when combined with the processing of funds requests and bank transfers.
✘ The project aimed for high quality but as a result is relatively small scale, aiming to meet 1.5% of the housing needs. In total all organisations together aim to meet a total of 20% of the overall housing need.
- The organisation was able to establish good relationships with the government and military allowing improved access to difficult to work in areas. However given the context this required significant efforts to be seen to remain impartial.
Background

Conflict between forces of the government of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began in 1983 and continued until 2009.

Between 2006 and February 2009, over 281,000 people became internally displaced. This was in addition to over 214,000 people who had been displaced before 2006, meaning that over half a million people had been displaced by the conflict.

The total population that lived in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka prior to May 2009 is yet to be assessed.

The conflict left hundreds of thousands of people in transit, displaced, and seeking refuge with host families or in government-run camps or centres for internally displaced people. Two entire districts were fully deserted and three other districts had partial displacements as a result of the conflict.

Hundreds of thousands of people lost almost everything and suffered without shelter, water, sanitation, health care, livelihoods or other basic facilities.

The government and humanitarian actors estimated that approximately 160,000 houses in the north of Sri Lanka were in need of reconstruction. This figure excludes more than 100,000 families who were scheduled for return from India and other countries.

Of those houses that needed to be reconstructed, 74% needed to be constructed anew, and the rest required repairs. Considering the size, complexity, and evolving nature of the situation, it had been a challenge to gain access to isolated or inaccessible areas and to assess the needs of the most-affected people.

Implementation

The national organisation with support from its international counterparts received approval from the government to assist 2,511 households.

Of these, 2,181 are new build houses for fully damaged houses, and 330 are repairs for the partially damaged houses. 669 were completed by the end of 2011 with 1,294 ongoing.

Selection of beneficiaries

The organisation was provided with a list of beneficiaries by the local authorities (a list from the District Secretariat, approved by the Government Agent), and given an opportunity to verify beneficiaries and communities.

The final selection was done by the by the organisation after conducting interviews. Each beneficiary in the given list provided the following documents at the interview:

- family details,
- copy of the National Identity Card,
- copy of the bank pass book/bank details,
- copy of the deeds,
- consent letter by land owner approved by the assistant government agent if the land is not owned by beneficiary,
- plan of the site.

After the selection of the families, each community was given

Houses were rebuilt using cash grants. Photo: Silvester Kueeveser, IFRC

Rebuilt house in Northern Sri Lanka. Photo: Silvester Kueeveser, IFRC
a chance to object when the lists were publicly displayed.

Noting that families are re-building their houses on their own land, a site investigation was carried out following the beneficiary selection.

The site audit was done by a project technical officer and a field engineer to satisfy that the house had stood on the site before the war and was completely damaged and to ensure suitability for reconstruction.

**Beneficiary files**

A beneficiary file was built up for each beneficiary with the file cover clearly marked with the project name and number, beneficiary name and beneficiary address. The beneficiary file consists of:

- a family details form,
- a copy of the beneficiary’s National Identity Card,
- a copy of the beneficiary Bank pass book indicating name and account number,
- copies of documents indicating ownership of land (copy of the deed or consent letter by the land owner approved by the assistant government agents if the land is not own by the beneficiary),
- a plan of the site,
- the site audit report conducted by the organisation,
- a copy of the house plan,
- a baseline survey form,
- documents such as affidavits, certificates etc. in the absence of required documents,
- any other documents relevant to the project.

**Housing construction**

A cash grant amount of 2,900 USD (LKR 325,000) was paid to each beneficiary through the bank in five instalments. An additional grant of 267 USD (LKR 30,000) was provided to construct the toilet and for the water supply.

Each stage was to be completed by the beneficiary within three weeks of receiving the instalment. On completion of each stage, the next grant should have been received within one week.

The technical advisors and support is given by the technical officers and the field engineers, who supervised 100 families and 500 families respectively.

The standard house under the project is a permanent house of minimum size of 500ft² (46m²) floor area with two rooms. The following elements are required for the house to be considered as complete:

- The house is bounded by brick or block wall and covered by a tiled roof.
- There is one internal lockable room with internal plastering, flooring, doors & windows and sashes.
- There is one internal or external kitchen with internal plastering and flooring.
- There is one internal or external toilet with adequate effluent disposal.

Each beneficiary may adjust the standard design to suit their individual needs, within the parameters of the budget and minimum standards.

**Housing construction with each instalment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instalment</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Work to be completed</th>
<th>Technical details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>440 USD</td>
<td>Foundation (house and toilet) - within 4 weeks</td>
<td>Laying of 3” screed concrete, rubble masonry foundation in 1:5 cement mortar along with damp proof course plastering and applying of damp proof course tarp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>790 USD</td>
<td>Construction of super structure (house and toilet*) with brick or block walls up to roof level - within 6 weeks</td>
<td>The brick or block work of the walls up to roof level including the lintel tie beam above the window level using two 10mm diameter steel bars in 1:3:4 concrete mixture and toilet super structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>790 USD</td>
<td>Roof (house and toilet*) - within 4 weeks</td>
<td>House - roof work using clay roof tiles Toilet - roof work using clay/roof tiles or concrete slab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>615 USD</td>
<td>Internal plastering and floor covering of one bed room, kitchen and toilet. Fixing of all door and window frames - within 6 weeks</td>
<td>The internal plastering of one bed room and kitchen in 1:5 cement sand mortar along with fixing of all door and window frames. Also must concrete the floor areas of one bedroom and kitchen with 1:3:4 concrete mixture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>220 USD</td>
<td>Flooring of one bedroom, kitchen and toilet. Complete one lockable room (fixing of doors and windows and sashes in one bedroom) - within 2 weeks</td>
<td>The fixing of door and window sashes in one bed room. Each beneficiary must have at least one lockable room. Also lockable room floor and kitchen floor needs to be plastered and finished with cement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,900 USD</td>
<td>Time taken to complete the construction work is 20 weeks. Additional time required for funds request and transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Water supply can be provided instead of a toilet*
Cash continues to gain prevalence as a modality for humanitarian agencies to help people meet multiple and diverse needs in the wake of a crisis. It provides people with the dignity of choice, and is often significantly more cost-efficient than the delivery of in-kind aid. In programs with a shelter focus, cash may be given to project participants to access rental homes; to buy shelter materials; or to pay for labor, technical advice, or other services.

Is cash appropriate for every shelter program? When does it provide benefits to project participants, communities and local economies, and when doesn’t it? What do we, as humanitarian aid practitioners, need to do to make cash more effective in achieving shelter outcomes?

To start to gain a better understanding of when cash works, why it works, and what factors contribute to its success or failure, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) conducted a review of eight recent CRS programs wherein cash was considered as a response modality to achieve shelter outcomes. CRS used cash in six of the countries, and project participants were able to meet Sphere and other building standards. In one country, CRS decided against using cash. In another country, CRS used mixed modalities.

These case studies are intended to serve as a platform for more discussion and review on promising and best practices in how and when to utilize cash to achieve shelter outcomes.
This booklet is a compilation of case studies of humanitarian shelter responses with cash components, compiled across the six past editions of the interagency publication *Shelter Projects*.

The projects described in the case studies and overviews contained in this booklet represent responses to conflict, natural disasters and complex crises, implemented by national and international organizations, as well as host governments, and demonstrating some of the implementation and response options available.

The publication is intended to support learning by highlighting the strengths, weaknesses and some of the lessons that can be learned from different projects, which try to maximize emergency funds to safeguard the health, security and dignity of affected people, whilst – wherever possible – supporting longer-term shelter needs and sustainable recovery.

The target audience is humanitarian managers and shelter programme staff from local, national and international organizations at all levels of experience. *Shelter Projects* is also a useful resource for advocacy purposes, showcasing the work done by the sector, as well as for research and capacity-building activities.

All case studies and overviews contained in this booklet, as well as from all editions of *Shelter Projects*, can be found online at:

[www.shelterprojects.org](http://www.shelterprojects.org)